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Psychological and Spiritual Illness in the View of Modern Psychotherapy 
and the Philokalia: 
Anthropological Foundation and Comparative Study 
 
Abstract 
The present research brings together two broad areas of human knowledge, modern 
psychotherapy and the ascetic practice as envisaged by the Philokalia, to bear on the 
concept of psychological and spiritual illness. In so doing, it employs a comparative 
methodology which allows for contrasting the two paradigms in order to identify overlaps 
or separations, but also to generate new hypotheses concerning the phenomena under 
investigation and therefore, broaden knowledge further.  
At the same time, it represents a new study in the search for a suitable method to be used 
when conducting interdisciplinary study in these two fields. The method emerged from the 
present research and suggested that further interdisciplinary inquiries in the same area 
were termed as border research so bringing forward the profile of a border researcher. It 
envisages that the ‘travelling’ concepts come to the border, where the comparison takes 
place. Since the present inquiry’s universe of discourse relates to a border that is found 
within the human being, when analyzed it naturally follows a vertical vector. 
Methodologically, the study is placed within the area of humanities.  
The first part of research addresses comparatively the issue of anthropology – which in the 
Philokalic framework becomes an aspect of Christology. The conclusions inferred from this 
analysis will be largely employed in the second part of the study which directly addresses 
the matter of psychological and spiritual illness. We found that the comparison on illness 
was not methodologically possible without reference to the larger anthropological 
background that produced it and which needs to be kept constantly in view throughout the 
entire comparative effort. Therefore, the second part comprises a short discussion on the 
matters of diagnosis and discernment with an analysis of their underlying values; the next 
chapter comparatively discusses generalities on normality and abnormality with a 
conclusion that the data are not sufficient to infer assumptions as to the relationship 
between psychological and spiritual illnesses; the comparative effort goes more in-depth in 
the last two chapters by focusing on the case studies of anxiety and depression, with the 
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Per aspera, ad astra. 
… (…) …     
‘Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveler, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth. 
 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same. 
 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
Oh, I kept the first for another day! 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— 
I took the one less traveled by, 
And that has made all the difference.’ 
 








Due to the sensitive topic of this research which focuses on psychological and spiritual illness as 
conceptualized by two major realms of knowledge, modern psychotherapy and the Philokalia
1
, 
we would like to state from the beginning that this work is an attempt at understanding, rather 
than a discourse on ethics, as it might inevitably seem to be by drawing on the various values 
that underlie and accompany the discussion all along. I believe that the real richness in the realm 
of knowledge, and life in general, comes from honestly looking for the truth and not from 
definitely holding it, hence the interest in research. In relation to values there is one single 
position that we hold: everyone is free to choose between the many available and live his life 
accordingly.  
 
I. General Remarks on the Present Study  
 
Although different in their targets:
2
 for one the alleviation of human suffering; for the other 
unification with God and deification, both modern psychotherapy and the Philokalia deal at the 
practical level with the same issues, namely behavioural, emotional, and thinking patterns 
involved in the soul‘s illness. These patterns are approached by the Philokalia through the means 
of the ascetic/hesychast method and by modern psychotherapies through the various methods of 
different psychotherapeutic paradigms out of which the present research considers four: 
psychodynamic; behavioural; cognitive; and existential-humanist. The present research employs 
a comparative methodology and, at the same time, represents a foundational study in the search 
for the most suitable method to be used when conducting interdisciplinary study in these two 
fields.   
 
A major turn in the initial stage of this research was generated by the impossibility of 
considering any kind of comparison of illness outside the anthropological framework, which was 
found as it ought to be maintained constantly in view throughout the comparative process. 
Moreover, the Philokalic anthropological perspective proved to be in fact ‗an aspect of 
                                                          
1
 The Philokalia is a collection of spiritual texts, which promotes the Orthodox Christian spiritual practice of 
hesychasm. In English, four of the five volumes have been published so far: Palmer, G.E.H., Ware, K., Sherrard, P., 
The Philokalia: The Complete Text, (Faber and Faber, 1979-1999). See below. 
2
 Chris Cook in his recent scholarly work makes a similar observation. We strongly recommend his work, especially 
for those interested in the relationship between psychological and spiritual well-being as provided by the Philokalia. 
Cook, C., The Philokalia and The Inner Life, (Cambridge: James Clarke and Co., 2011) 
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Christology‘ as Metr. Kallistos Ware pointed out, and consequently we had to engage largely 
with Christology, as part of our Philokalic anthropological paradigm:  
 
‗There is an integral connection between the doctrine of man and the doctrine of Christ. 
Jesus Christ is the man, the model of what it means for us to be human, the mirror in 
which we see reflected our own true face; all theology of the human person needs to be 




What criteria should be used when making the research design? How do we infer information 
and how do we draw conclusions from the two areas? To what level might the comparison be 
placed and how is the universe of discourse organized? The chapter on methodology is intended 
to answer these questions and details both the method used in this study, as well as the method 
suggested for further interdisciplinary inquiries in the same area. In methodologically placing the 
study within the area of humanities we were greatly helped by the insight offered by Professor 




The research is organized thus: the first part addresses comparatively the issue of anthropology 
whose conclusions will largely be employed in the second part of the study; the second part 
comprises a short discussion on the matter of diagnostics and discernment with an analysis of the 
underlying values and the issue of stigma attached to labelling; the next chapter comparatively 
approaches the topic of normality and abnormality with a conclusion that the data are not 
sufficient to infer assumptions as to the relation between psychological and spiritual illnesses; in 
the next two chapters, the comparative effort goes more in-depth by focusing on the case studies 
of anxiety and depression, with the conclusion that the will to love seems to be the unifying will 
which brings man to health and normality.  
 
II. The Place of the Study  
 
Next, we will try to see where this work stands with others already undertaken in the same 
interdisciplinary area. In the last couple of years, there has been a growing interest in this area of 
research, coming mainly from professionals with a theological background but to which recent 
insights developed by psychiatrists, mainly from the Russian school, were added. First, we shall 
introduce Jean-Claude Larchet and Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos who also represented two 
of our main secondary sources. Larchet, a French theologian and philosopher, undertook an 
extensive scholarly work in the fields of patristics focusing on the presentation of the patristic 
material in a form intended to meet the present needs of man such as: spiritual illnesses; mental 
                                                          
3
 Ware, K., ‗Forward‘ in: Nellas P., Deification in Christ: The Nature of Human Person, (Crestwood: St Vladimir‘s 
Seminary Press, 1997), p. 13 
4
 Louth, A., Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) 
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and bodily illnesses; spiritual unconscious; facing suffering and death; Christian love as a 
method of inner healing, etc. His broad work has been available to us in Romanian
5
 for more 
than ten years, which constituted a first insight which guided our future interests. Metropolitan 
Vlachos goes further in conceptualizing Orthodox theology as a psychotherapeutic system 
termed as Orthodox psychotherapy. In a book which represents a continuation of Orthodox 
Psychotherapy and comprises various debates raised by this initial book, he argues that the very 
specific aim of Orthodox theology, and consequently of the proposed therapy, is to be found 




The works of a few archimandrites from Mount Athos, who undertook the task of offering a 
contemporary interpretation of some of the writings from the Philokalia,
7
 were very useful as 
introductions to the hermeneutics of patristic texts and as such in helping us elaborate the 
research design for the present study. From the same area of monastics’ written books, are 
different kinds of writings which focus directly on clinical topics such as is the case of 
Archimandrite Spyridon Logothetis‘ book on depression
8
 where he offers solutions for the 
prevention, alleviation and cure of depression as provided in the Orthodox Church. It is his firm 
belief that ‗God can surely cure us of depression‘
9
 and brings patristic and biblical arguments to 
sustain his view. A special place is taken by the writings of Archimandrite Simeon 
Kraiopoulos,
10
 which are the equivalent of an ‗orthodox psychoanalysis‘ through their 
contemporary in-depth insight on the soul.  
 
Continuing the presentation of related works and following on the same line from ‗purely‘ 
patristic to interdisciplinary undertakings in the field, we mention the work of two other priests 
who in addition hold degrees in psychiatry or pastoral psychology. Fr. Filotheos Faros is trained 
                                                          
5
 Larchet, J.C., Terapeutica bolilor spirituale, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2001); Larchet, J.C., Inconştientul spiritual, 
(Bucureşti: Sophia, 2009); Larchet, J.C., Terapeutica bolilor mintale, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2008); Larchet, J.C., 
Teologia bolii, (Sibiu: Oastea Domnului, 1998); Larchet, J.C., Creştinul în faţa bolii, suferinţei şi morţii, (Bucureşti: 
Sophia, 2004); Larchet, J.C., Despre iubirea creştină, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2010). Only one of his books is available 
in English: Larchet, J.C., Mental Disorders and Spiritual Healing, (Hillsdale: Sophia Perennis, 2005) 
6
 Cf. Vlachos, H., Psihoterapia ortodoxă: Continuare şi dezbateri, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2001), p. 13 
7
 Their works were available to us in Romanian. Emilianos Simonopetritul, (Arh) Tâlcuiri la Filocalie: Avva Isaia, 
(Arad: Sfântul Nectarie, 2006); Emilianos Simonopetritul, (Arh), Tâlcuiri la Filocalie: Avva Isihie, (Arad: Sfântul 
Nectarie, 2008); Teoclit Dionisiatul, Tâlcuiri la Filocalie: Sfântul Diadoh al Foticeii, (Arad: Sfântul Nectarie, 
2008); Evsevios Vitti, (Arh) Tâlcuiri la Filocalie, Sfântul Nil Ascetul, (Arad: Sfântul Nectarie, 2009) 
8
 Logothetis, S., Depression: A Spiritual Guide, (Nafpaktos, Brotherhood of the Transfiguration of our Saviour Jesus 
Christ, 2004)  
9
 Ibid., p. 12 
10
 Kraiopoulos, S., (Arh), Te cunoşti pe tine însuţi? Viaţa duhovnicească şi problemele psihologice, (Bucureşti: 
Editura Bizantină, 2008); Kraiopoulos, S., (Arh), Taina suferinţei, (Bucureşti: Editura Bizantină, 2007); 
Kraiopoulos, S., (Arh), Sufletul meu, temniţa mea, (Bucureşti: Editura Bizantină, 2009) 
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in political sciences, law, theology and pastoral psychology, and throughout his books,
11
 drawing 
on various case studies from his professional experience as a psychologist, argues for the need 
that responsibility should be restored to the human soul, in order to be able to master its own 
illnesses. He suggests that responsibility psychotherapy could deal efficiently with such 
matters,
12
 supplemented by an art of interpersonal dialogue and communication meant to rebuild 
the ability to trust the fellow being, seen as an essential aspect of the soul‘s healing.  
 
Fr Vasileos Thermos, priest and psychiatrist, is the author of an interdisciplinary study where 
Saint Gregory Palamas and Donald Winnicott are brought together to bear on the case of true 
and false self.
13
 His studies in the area of psychoanalysis and patristics made him conclude that 
psychoanalytic and orthodox theological viewpoints converge on the matter of empowering the 
patient to master his unconscious content and make a choice unrestrained by them. He talks 
about a ‘patristic man’ who ‗is nothing else but the man reborn in Christ, having restored the 
functionality of his powers according to nature‘.
14
 In regard to the contemporary sciences of the 
soul he postulates that ‗in their good aspects if they meet with theology, they bring much hope, 
as any meeting between created and uncreated does‘.
15
 Similar in approach to Fr. Vasileos‘s 
book on Saint Gregory Palamas and Donald Winnicott, is the book of Fr. Alexis Trader, a 
hieromonk at the Karakallou Monastery on Mount Athos. Drawing on both patristic writings and 
current cognitive psychotherapies, especially on the work of Aaron Beck, his book provides a 
detailed analysis on the way our thinking patterns influence our emotions and behaviours as 
derived from the two areas considered. In the same category belongs Chris Cook‘s book 
mentioned above, an Anglican priest and psychiatrist, concerned mainly with well-being in the 
Philokalia and the way the information comprised by it could be read in current conceptual 
categories.  
 
We arrive now in the area where interdisciplinary approaches are assumed by ‗pure‘ 
professionals in psychiatry and psychology. Here we have to mention the work of two Russian 
psychiatrists, Dmitri Avdeev and Konstantin Zorin. In his writings,
16
 Zorin analyses the measure 
by which the soul‘s personality, illness and health depend on genetic inheritance. Drawing on 
various cases of ischemic heart disease, asthma, allergic reactions, hypertensive and oncological 
                                                          
11
 Faros, F., Dialogul în psihoterapia ortodoxă, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2010); Faros, F., Mitul bolii psihice, (Galaţi: 
Ecumentiţa, 2009) 
12
 Mitul bolii psihice, op. cit., pp. 58-78 
13
 Thermos, V., In Search of the Person – True and False Self According to Donald Winnicot and St Gregory 
Palamas, (Montreal: Alexander Press, 2002) 
14
 Thermos, V., Om la orizont: Psihologia şi psihiatria ortodoxă, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2010), p. 336   
15
 Ibid., pp. 337-8 
16
 Zorin, K.V., Genele şi cele şapte păcate capitale, (Bucureşti: Sophia, 2006); Zorin, K.V., Păcatele parinţilor şi 




diseases, which he views from a biblical and patristic perspective, he concludes that ‗personal 
sins are not inherited but the propensity for them, i.e. the perversion of human nature‘.
17
 Avdeev 
approaches topics such as depression, anxiety, suicide, traumatic life events and the like,
18
 from 
the double perspective of psychiatry and of the psychological dynamics implied by patristic 
writings. In opposition to Fr Vasileos quoted above, he reaches the conclusion that ‗no one 
should treat himself with the help of psychoanalysis‘
19
 and argues against the Freudian method 
as taking one to a different finality than that proposed by patristics and Scripture.    
 
Our last bibliographic stop is Vladeta Jerotić a Serbian academician and writer, specialized in 
psychiatry and Jungian psychology, also a teacher of pastoral psychology, who wrote intensively 
in the fields of psychology, psychotherapy, theology and literature. Unfortunately his books are 
available only in Serbian and the only book available to us in Romanian,
20
 was enough to get the 
glimpse of a brilliant psychologist‘s mind but not enough for referencing him in our work as 
much as we should have. As far as we could grasp from the little book translated in Romanian, 
he does a reading of the person‘s psychological universe with a patristic understanding of it in 
mind. To give an example, in one section he examines the following four inner positions and 
argues them patristically: the man is gentle with himself, but severe with others; he is gentle both 
with himself and with others; he is severe both with himself and with others; and he is severe 




So where does our work stand in relation to others already undertaken? Our research builds on 
the various insights of Larchet and Metr. Vlachos who tend towards a comparison being possible 
and necessary between the two areas.
22
 The same point is made by Cook‘s recent research in the 
same area.
23
 If previous works pointed towards the resemblances between the psychological and 
spiritual illnesses, our research is the next step which attempted to ‘bring the comparison to life’ 
and actually to see, in a detailed analysis, how much they resemble or differentiate. Having been 
trained in psychology we are naturally familiar with viewpoints held in the field of 
psychotherapy. Later, to this theoretical background further patristic readings were added, as 
well as writings from the above-mentioned interdisciplinary area. From each of them we learned 
something and they helped us get a general view of a field which has no firm foundation yet, in 
terms of interdisciplinarity, since it lacks the proper methodology. Patristics comes with its 
ascetic method and practice, the modern psychotherapeutic paradigm with its heterogeneous 
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methodology and eclectic approaches towards the human being.
24
 So, where does an 
interdisciplinary approach concerned with them both stand? Since the present research is a 
theoretical and conceptual comparative study, where could we find the common place to ground 
our inquiry? I consider the method to be essential in order to reach well-grounded arguments. 
And in our opinion, provided that we could not find any proper method, perhaps we should 
remain studying them separately. That is why the present inquiry had a constant interest in 
searching for the method able to offer some satisfactory answers to such dilemmas.  
 
III. The Universe of Discourse - Working Definitions  
 
The Philokalia is a collection of ascetic and mystical writings written between the fourth and the 
fourteenth centuries and comprising about thirty-six authors. These writings were compiled by 
Saint Nikodimos (1749-1809) of the Holy Mountain of Athos and Saint Makarios of Corinth 
(1731-1805), and the Philokalia was issued for the first time at Venice in 1782. Being a 
collection of writings from various authors who wrote in different periods of time one might 
expect to find some differences between them.
25
 Louth, Banev and Ware, in various scholarly 
studies address the issues of theology, ecclesiology and spirituality of the Philokalia.
26
  
The Philokalia as a collection itself suffered some influences in time due to various doctrinal 
debates: for example, the work of Evagrios of Pontus, On Prayer, was initially attributed to Saint 
Neilos, but modern scholarship established that it actually belonged to Evagrios; the work 
attributed to Saint Anthony the Great is considered now to belong to an anonymous compiler 
who put together some ‗extracts from various Stoic and Platonic writers of the first to fourth 
centuries A.D.‘
27
 from which he eliminated the non-Christian terminology. However, the 
translators of the Philokalia in English are careful to show that: ‗The distinctions between 
genuine and spurious where all these writings are concerned must rest, not on the correctness of 
the attribution of their authorship, but on whether or not they belong to the spiritual tradition 
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Given the last observation above and due to the specific of our work we treat the Philokalia as a 
unity agreeing with Cook‘s remarks on the common assumptions that underlie the Philokalia‘s 
focus on the inner world: ‗Firstly, there have been historical, philosophical and theological 
influences, which appear to have provided something of an enduring source of reference to its 
authors. Secondly, there is evidence of internal consistency in regard to certain significant 




Although the Philokalia was born out of the monastic environment and comprises an 
ascetic/hesychast method and approach to life, its compilers, Saint Nicodimos and Saint 
Makarios, clearly intended it to be a collection that addresses both monks and laity, not only 
specialists but all Christians.
30
 One of the general purposes of the Philokalia is inner action or 
work as opposed to outer work which brings it close to the preoccupations of modern 
psychotherapy, as also showed below. The other major aim is deification.
31
 Fr. Dumitru 
Staniloae, the translator of the Philokalia from Greek to Romanian, states in his introduction to 
the first volume: ‗Holy Fathers are unsurpassed masters in the ―science of soul‖ … which is the 
most precious reality after God. Before attaining to live mystically is required the conscientious 
orientation after the most precise science of the soul. Holy Fathers do not tire of saying that the 
soul needs to be directed ―scientifically‖ and that the highest ―science‖ is that of leading the 
soul‘.
32
 The Philokalia offers information ‗concerning phenomena of spiritual life‘,
33
 ‗with all the 
manifestations and activities accompanying it‘,
34
 ‗it shows the way to awaken attention and 
consciousness, and to develop them‘,
35





The translators of the Philokalia on the one hand outline that the hesychast method implies as a 
primordial condition and absolute necessity the need to know oneself and that acquiring this type 
of knowledge one must ‗learn to be alive to the many-sided possibilities of the ego … and he 
must eliminate all obstacles, personal as well as external‘,
37
 and on the other hand specify that 
this type of knowledge ‗is not a matter of information or agility of mind but of a radical change 
of will and heart leading man towards the highest possibilities open to him, shaping and 
nourishing the unseen part of his being, and helping him to spiritual fulfillment and union with 
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 Therefore, the ‗psychological‘ change emerges indirectly from the ‗spiritual‘ change 
which is addressed directly. The present study focuses mainly on the four volumes in the English 
translation, but when necessary a few sources outside the English Philokalia were used. 
 
The research addresses modern psychotherapy as applied in the clinical settings although its 
current practice may be developed in many other contexts such as: community; organizations; 
the voluntary or independent sector; and private practice. Understandably, in each of these 
contexts the application of a particular psychotherapeutic approach will take a slightly different 
course. In the clinical area, the various psychotherapeutic theories have natural interferences, 
especially with clinical psychology, psychopathology, and psychiatry. Therefore, our study will 
indirectly draw on information which is currently shared in practice between all these fields. In 
order to see the connections but also the main differences between them, we will next try shortly 
to present the areas that are entailed by this interdisciplinary common ground.   
 
In general terms, psychology is considered to be the study of the psyche or mind, a study which 
seems to be as old as the human species.
39
 Although there is no unanimous or ultimate definition 
for it, psychology is more often regarded as the scientific study of mental states and processes,
40
 
or the scientific study of people, human thought and behaviour;
41
 psychotherapy is seen as an 
applied science, i.e. the application of psychology to the problem of treating disease. 
Psychotherapy can be conceptualized differently depending on one‘s theoretical orientation and 
therefore, no single definition has won universal agreement. A relatively neutral working 
definition in terms of method and theory could be the following one:  
 
‗Psychotherapy is the informed and intentional application of clinical methods and 
interpersonal stances derived from established psychological principles for the purpose of 
assisting people to modify their behaviours, cognitions, emotions, and/or other personal 




However, a different viewpoint claims that all current forms of psychotherapy stem directly or 
indirectly from psychoanalysis;
43
 psychiatry is a branch of medicine. Within medicine, 
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psychiatry is simply defined as that branch which deals with ‗mental illnesses‘. It is a pragmatic 
endeavour. Therefore, it has been claimed that ‗the definition of psychiatry is not based on 
theory, as in psychology or psychoanalysis, but on practice‘;
44
 clinical psychology is generally 
considered the science that studies the psychological mechanisms inferred by the state of illness 
and health. According to the clinical psychologist Daniel David it has two main components: one 
refers to investigation of psychological mechanisms inferred in health optimization and 
prevention of pathology. The second involves analysis of psychological processes inferred in 
pathology.
45
 In the first case it is also called Health Psychology, and in the second Clinical 
Health Psychology, Psychosomatic, Abnormal Psychology, Psychopathology or Medical 
Psychology; psychopathology is considered by some authors a boundary discipline resulting 
from the conjunction between psychology (rooted in philosophical knowledge) and psychiatry (a 
branch of natural medical sciences). It looks like an emergent product of a few disciplines 
because it took up the object of study from psychiatry, the methods and principles from 
psychology, and the primary image of psychological life – in general, and the psychological 




A main characteristic of this research consists in that it tries to bring together two major realms 
of human knowledge which are more or less perceived as being independent of one another at 
the present moment. In order to succeed in our task, we created a new ‗space‘ – represented by 
the border methodology proposed in the next chapter – where their ‗meeting‘ becomes possible. 
Consequently, in our comparative effort we tried to consider the various psychotherapeutic 
paradigms as a unity in the same way as the Philokalia presents a unity among its numerous 
writings and authors. However, we acknowledge that this approach of psychotherapy seen as a 
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METHODOLOGY - THE COMPARATIVE METHOD 
 
 
The present chapter intends to answer two main questions: what is the methodology employed by 
the present research? And, what is a suitable methodology to be used when engaging in 
interdisciplinary research in the fields of patristics and current psychotherapeutic approaches? 
Our methodology did not entirely focus on any specific methods employed by the two fields 
considered; instead, we intended to find a new way of approaching such an interdisciplinary 
endeavour, keeping in mind that ‗an adequate understanding of the human subject‘ is mainly 
‗dependent upon methodological breadth‘ and should be ‗creativity lead‘,
47
 and at the same time, 
approached in terms of a mystery that needs to be discerned.
48
 Our aim was, if possible, to 
provide a new solution regarding the research methodology to be employed by further study in 
this interdisciplinary area, to identify some guiding principles and suggest advantages or 
disadvantages of interdisciplinary research, as well as foster future debates on this matter.   
 
 
I. Justification of Method Choice  
 
 
Before the methodology of this study is described, a brief justification for the choice of method 
will be presented. The chosen method first relates to the characteristics of this research which 
addresses two fields that provide valuable information concerning the same topic, the soul‘s 
illness and health, and second, to the characteristics of the researcher himself who embraces 
both areas of research at a theoretical and practical level, by being both a professing 
psychologist with a full training in the nowadays hard-core science of psychology who later 
became acquainted with the various patristic writings, and ended up becoming a professing 
Christian himself. As such, the further enrolment in interdisciplinary theological-psychological 
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1. The Profile of the Researcher 
 
 
Being initially trained in psychology and as such not ordinarily familiar with theological 
knowledge, I consider the encounter with patristic literature, and especially the Philokalia, a 
‗very fortunate occurrence‘ in my professional and personal life.  My initial contact was with 
books per se. Due to my ignorance of the field at that time I do not even remember what was the 
first book I read. What I remember very clearly though is that I thought: ‗this person really 
understands what the human being is about‘ and that it was indirectly answering the various 
questions I had concerning human beings and to which the main training in psychology could not 
provide answers. And I continued reading and reading for a few good years until I realized that 
the authors of such books were categorized as saints. But what exactly was a saint? Then I 
started investigating the life of the authors I was reading and found out about the close relation 
between their writings and their life. That explained a lot about their conceptualization of man 
and it was the moment when I realized that to be a Christian is not just a name inherited by 
baptism but a very informed way of life. Since I was already ‗in love‘ with their ideas which so 
many times had had the opportunity to be confirmed by empirical observation and practice, it 
was without any inner conflict that I followed their way of life, which was for me not necessarily 
related to faith but rather to the science in which I was already professing. Since my interest 
towards patristics was from the first instance professional, beyond my personal and any later 
acquired meanings, it remained professional, hence the engagement in the current research.  
 
I explained the above personal journey just to make clear that for a researcher with such a profile 
it is much easier to ‗navigate‘ between the various concepts and meanings provided by the two 
fields for a few reasons: first, because of the equally acquired extensive knowledge in both; 
second, because of being involved in practising both and therefore testing them by experience; 
third, since professionally the values of both of them are less likely to be biased towards one of 
them; fourth, engaging in interdisciplinarity, the guiding principle remains at all times the 
connectivity between theory and practice, both grounded in the empirical evidence they provide 
and its usefulness for the empirical outcomes the researcher has in mind. In other words, we 
believe that this type of research is fit to serve clear empirical purposes, but not to be engaged in 
the emergence of new theories concerning human nature which would bear the risk of falsifying 









2. The Profile of the Research 
 
 
Perhaps the best way to describe it is to say that this type of study constitutes a border research 
and consequently transforms one into a border researcher. Just as a border officer controls 
‗passports‘, and checks who comes ‗in‘ or ‗out‘ in order to ensure proper and orderly conditions 
for ‗travelling people‘, border researchers check ‗concepts‘ from one realm and the other, so as 
to ensure an orderly comparison in regard to ‘one and the same human being’ to which they 
refer. The question that arises is: where does this border lie? The answer is that the border lies 
‗within‘ man and ‗separates‘ the psychological versus pneumatological/spiritual realms. The 
implicit question this research tries to answer is if there really exists such a separation or is it just 
a mere theoretical distinction? The explicit question of the research is if there are any distinctions 
or overlaps in the way psychological versus spiritual illness is conceptualized by the two fields.  
 
Hence, what the border researcher needs to do is just stay on the border and look to the various 
concepts from the two realms, understand them in their own terms, and then compare them in 
order to identify agreements or differences in relation to the universe of discourse represented 
here by the human being. This was the pre-analysis which led us believe that a comparative 
approach is best fitted to answer the research question.  
 
 
II. Research Design 
 
1. General Description  
 
 
The aim of choosing the comparative method was to allow a broadening of understanding for 
professionals coming from both fields and provide new insight into what is going on in the 
human soul. We looked for commonalities but respected the differences, and did not, however, 
intend to create an eclectic integration,
49
 not even build working alliances,
50
 but merely look for 
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the best explanatory concept for the matter under investigation that the universe of this research 
could offer.    
 
Scientific training in psychology implies a strong focus on methodological rigour, which is 
greatly restrictive as to the object of research and does not allow too much creativity, and that is 
why when organizing the present study we had in mind, as much as possible, to ‗respect the 
reflexive nature of the human subject and organize a methodological stance to reflect that 
respect‘.
51
 From the perspective of psychology, the present method might be associated, but not 
identified, with a type of qualitative research
52
 which reflects an in-depth inquiry into the whys 
and hows of the human soul, on one hand, and to an exploratory research
53
 which addresses 
problems that are still looking for a complete definition or the best research design meant to help 
in identifying that definition, on the other hand. The exploratory research, as in our case, relies 
not so much on primary research, but on secondary research, specifically reviewing relevant 
existing literature.  
 
From the perspective of theology, from the two main methods, historical and hermeneutical, the 
present research design draws on interpretation as a theological method, which shares common 
characteristics with both theology and psychology. Professor Louth fairly pointed out in regard 
to the theological method that it ‗betrays itself if it seeks to become ―scientific‖ by any attempt to 
fashion an objective scientific method‘
54
 and that, as an academic discipline, theology ‗finds its 
closest neighbours among the humanities rather than among the sciences‘.
55
 Consequently, 
having all these in mind, the review of methods both in psychology and theology resulted in 
‗escaping‘ to find a new research ground which we discovered in the broad area of humanities 
where ultimately our research methodologically stands. Thus, it was possible to ‗double‘ the 
answers to the initial whys and hows and even supplement them with where to, as it emerged 
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2. Specific Description 
 
 
‗The ―art of comparing‖ is thus one of the most important cornerstones to develop knowledge … 
and insights into what is going on, how things develop and, more often than not, the formulation 
of statements about why this is the case and what it may mean to all of us.‘
56
 This comparative 
approach perfectly matched our needs since it ‗is a basic tool for linking ideas and, eventually, 
theory to evidence‘.
57
 The comparison offered us the possibility of making the best use of 
description and impacted on generating new ideas.  
 
The comparative method we used consisted mainly of an adaptation of the one used by Pennings 
et al.
58
 in their comparative work on politics and society which in our case involved three steps: 
 
1. Elaboration of the phenomenon under review and description of the core subject of 
comparative enquiry – in our case the universe of psychological versus spiritual illness;  
2. The mode of analysis which is also involved in ‗develop[ing] a view on the theoretical 
concepts that can ―travel‖ comparatively‘
59
 – the travelling concepts are individualized in 
the third section of each chapter of this research and are represented by various topics such 
as the unconscious, thoughts, habits or conditioning, wholeness, diagnosis, anxiety, 
depression and so on;  
3. Formulation of conclusions and discussion in regard to the logic of the comparative method 
as a means to an end.  
 
The material of the research was arranged in such a way so as to allow separate identification of 
the notions that are to be compared, in the way they are provided by their own universe of 
discourse, and with their own ‗flavour‘. Thus, we dedicated the first two sections of each chapter 
to the description by review of the two broad paradigms which was necessary so as to formulate 
and define the core subject of the enquiry. A comparative effort is not possible without a relevant 
description of the core phenomena involved; in the same way a description alone provides less 
insight without a comparison.  
 
The mode of analysis predominantly involved the methods of difference and agreement as 
developed by John Stuart Mill in his System of Logic.
60
 The method of difference has a special 
focus ‗on the variation of certain features amongst others that do not differ (dramatically) across 
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comparable cases‘ whereas the method of agreement compares concepts ‗in order to detect those 
relationships … that are similar, notwithstanding the remaining differences on other features of 
the cases compared‘.
61
 The third section of each chapter of this work involved these two methods 
to various degrees, depending on topic and on the type of information previously offered for 
comparison.  
 
The last step of formulating conclusions employed several techniques: first, we simply presented 
the result of the comparison, in terms of differences and similarities according to the principles 
described above; second, by choosing the most comprehensive and explanatory providing 
concept which, in this specific research, proved to be more often in the favour of the Philokalic 
viewpoint, due to the extension of the coverage area offered by its concepts, which naturally 
prevailed over the psychotherapeutic perspective in terms of its level of enquiry; the third way of 
concluding was to advance the result of the comparative demarche in the form of a new 
hypothesis derived from means of analogy;
62
 and finally, some other conclusions came out ‗at 
the surface‘ in an allegorical form by means of interpretation, consequently reflecting the 
wonder in front of the perceived mystery of man‘s inner constitution which could not be 
expressed in any another way.   
 
The logic of using the comparative method, as far as the results of our research suggested, 
constituted the best way to keep simultaneous contact with both universes of discourse involved 
and, at the same time, vividly relate them to the direct professional interests of the day, 
consisting, for example, of a more complete understanding of depression and anxiety‘s 
aetiological landscape.  
 
However, one question arises: Do concepts travel across the border from one realm to the other? 
Where is the place of comparison if the researcher acts as a border officer who has no parti pris 
with concepts from any realm, but his function is merely to check and compare them? Discussing 
styles of integration when related to theology and cognitive sciences, Beck and Demarest 
enumerated three styles by drawing on Peterson‘s proposals,
63
 to which they added a fourth style 
of their own:  
 
‗The first is reduction, reducing one completely into the categories of the other in either a 
friendly or hostile manner. … The second style is challenge, calling things in one 
discipline into question from the perspective of the other discipline. … the third model … 
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is using the cognitive sciences as a lens through which to view theology or using 
theology as a lens through which to view cognitive sciences. … We suggest a fourth 
approach … engagement. We think germane and relevant information flows out of the 
work of both theology and psychology when we come to the task of understanding the 
human person. We need to lay out data from both sources, compare and contrast them, 




Indeed, our method is closer to the fourth approach and does engage the two fields by means of 
comparison and contrast, but it does it in a different way and with a different purpose in mind. 
As mentioned earlier, we do not believe that an ‗integration‘ of the two is possible due to their 
different anthropological backgrounds and, if applied in practice, might lead to more confusion 
than clarification. The dialectical method of the lens might be useful but only in order to identify 
the concepts that will be subjected to comparison, otherwise it does not bring too much in terms 
of increased knowledge. Due to the methodology employed the solution we came up with is 
different. The answer to the aforementioned question that came out through our undertaken 
research was that the comparison takes place on the border, and it follows a vertical vector since 
the universe of discourse we operate in is the human being itself who actually ‗covers‘ both areas 
considered by the current research. In other words, the border is within it, not outside it as is the 
case with the habitual border. Since the research is concerned with the whys, hows and where to 
of the human soul, it is natural that the answers found will arrange themselves in a vertical plan 
depending on the level of depth, abstraction, generalization, and breadth of the realities they 
point to. Considering all these, we prioritized the vertical over the horizontal, and looked at 
concepts from this perspective. Thus, the concepts in this comparative study ‗travel‘ to the 
border where they are analyzed, attentively compared and contrasted in terms of similarities and 
differences, and then arranged vertically, thus gaining extra value, generating new hypotheses 
and broadening knowledge.  
 
 
3. Anthropology as Premise  
 
 
A major turn of the current research was represented by the acknowledgment that without 
reference to the anthropological roots of both paradigms, it would have been impossible to make 
a valid comparison able to reflect the relation between psychological versus spiritual illness. The 
comparison would have been superficial, falsifying and inconclusive. In other words, irrespective 
of the comparisons of the concepts from these two fields, a reference to anthropology should be 
present from the start of the research design until the concluding section.  
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Given the situation, the anthropological foundation became an integral part of our 
methodological design, and as such we have given it extensive consideration in the first part of 
this study. In approaching it we used the same comparative method and principles described 
above. On the other hand, in this newly created inquiry context, the illnesses considered here, i.e. 
anxiety and depression, became a kind of case study, in regard to the anthropological framework. 
A case study is a qualitative method more often used in the clinical psychology area, but not 
limited to it, and involves an in-depth description of a problem with the goal of testing old 
theories, generating new ones, and creating new research techniques that allow for an increase in 
knowledge. Their strongest point is considered to be the richness of insight they provide into a 
problem.
65
 Since ‗understanding and explanation are achieved when the causes of a phenomenon 
are discovered‘,
66
 having viewed the illnesses considered here as case studies of the wider 
anthropological framework consequently resulted in a fruitfulness of new connections.  
 
 
III. Writing Style and Language Involved 
 
 
We need to say a few words about the language used throughout this work since every new 
methodological development indirectly comes with a specific approach to language which is 
‗said to represent the common language of the discipline‘s researchers‘.
67
 Considering the two 
fields envisaged, the level of abstraction of the concepts and their underlying realities analyzed 
here on one hand, and reviewing relevant literature on the topic, on the other hand, we reached 
the conclusion that our research should not only ‗try to tell a simple and clear story, but also try 
to tell it in simple and clear prose‘.
68
 Since psychologically, language is closely connected to the 
thinking processes, we always felt a great agreement with Einstein‘s famous quote: if you can't 
explain it simply you don't understand it well enough. Also, we were greatly helped by the 
symbolic language employed by patristics and modern psychotherapy, at least in some parts of it, 
which created in form a kind of linguistic closeness of the two. Thus, our writing style envisaged 
to tell the story in a clear prose as much as possible, but maintaining constantly the specific 
label-concepts as found in both fields examined.  
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However, since the means of interpretation and allegorical language were also heavily involved 
in the last part of the third section of each chapter, we also need shortly to make some 
distinctions in this topic. Interpretation is intensively used by current psychotherapies, mainly 
psychoanalysis, and obviously patristics, but it has very different meanings in the two realms. 
Thus, although psychoanalysis was considered for a time a ‗theoretical, philosophical system 
very similar to a religion‘,
69
 and as such supposedly sharing some commonalities with 
theological interpretation, the research done on the subject shows that between them there is no 
similarity. Psychoanalytically,
70
 interpretation is considered the foundation on which the entire 
analytical method stands. It is related to conveying to the subject the hidden meanings of desires 
from beyond the defensive system employed by illness and also to obtaining an awareness of 
such a system in the process. The theological interpretation made in the Philokalia aims towards 
‗translating‘ the invisible into the visible and vice versa, and according to Saint Gregory of Sinai 
this concerns the activity of a teacher experienced in the divine things who:  
 
‗interprets what is intelligible and invisible in terms of what is sensible and visible, and 
the visible sense-world in terms of the invisible and suprasensory world, conscious that 
what is visible is an image of what is invisible and that what is invisible is the archetype 
of what is visible. He knows that things possessing form and figure are brought into being 




Therefore, the distinctions made in the Philokalia are always related to a clear differentiation 
between the created and uncreated within the human soul while, viewed from a Philokalic 
perspective, psychoanalysis operates within the created realm. Hence, the two modes of 
interpretation are different in terms of whys, hows and where to. When using interpretation, the 
language becomes somehow naturally allegorical, in both the Philokalic and psychotherapeutic 
fields, especially in the psychoanalytic and existential paradigms, but the meaning of using 
allegory is circumscribed to the above distinctions concerned with interpretation. When used by 
patristic writers, allegory, as Professor Louth states:  
 
‗is bound up with their whole understanding of tradition as the tacit dimension of the 
Christian life: allegory is a way of entering the ―margin of silence‖ that surrounds the 
articulate message of the Scriptures, it is a way of glimpsing the living depths of tradition 
from the perspective of the letter of the Scriptures‘.
72
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As far as we are concerned, we did not use interpretation in either of the meanings implied 
above, but merely as an attempt to present the broader implications and meanings of the 
research,
73
 and as already stated, a method of advancing conclusions conveyed as hypotheses. 
The method of interpretation is extremely useful for this type of research design since, on one 
hand, it ‗requires imagination and insight into the psychological meaning of the phenomena‘, and 
on the other hand, ‗involves understanding the meaning of the findings, in terms of previous 
research and theory. This task involves relating the findings back to the literature: the research, 
theory, or conceptual model that the study was based upon‘.
74
 In this way, the researcher remains 
connected to all the variables employed by the research.  
 
 
IV. Weaknesses and Strengths of the Method 
 
 
In terms of the weaknesses recorded, we need to point to the large amount of literature to be 
consulted and reviewed and consequently the lack of a preset of theoretical references related to 
the logics of our inquiry.
75
 Derived from the former is the fact that an interdisciplinary research 
of such breadth is extremely time-consuming. While the latter might be counterweighted by an 
extensive previous engagement of the researcher with the two fields that are later to be 
approached interdisciplinarily, our experience is that only through a combination of practice and 
relevant theory could one identify the referential set needed to develop a solid logic of inquiry. 
Perhaps in most of the literature reviewed over years, the theoretical foundations and the 
experience accumulated will not always be expressed within a study in a direct way, but they 
will have a major and decisive impact on the logics of designing the entire research method. 
 
Due to the specific nature of this border research, although in the first two parts of each chapter 
the concepts are described and used with the same meanings as those initially provided by each 
area, in the third part, which deals with the border analysis of the travelling notions, the 
language and the various concepts used are bound to lose their accuracy. One example is 
represented by the way we make use of the triad: cure-treatment-healing.
76
 In the comparative 
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part we use them interchangeably and as synonyms. They all emphasize the general idea of 
recovery from illness following a certain pattern of proposed actions – Philokalic or 
psychotherapeutic. Similarly, instead of psychological or spiritual illness we might sometimes 
use the general term of inner illness when referring to the conceptual product that resulted from 
the comparison.  
Another weakness refers to the choice of the psychotherapy theorists when treating the 
conditions of anxiety/fear and depression/dejection that might not always seem consistent. This 
is due to the fact that even if we tried to give the four paradigms equal treatment, the 
comparative process itself ‗selected‘ some theories as being able to offer more material for 
comparison than others, as for example is the case with the discussion on symbolism and realism 
in the depressive loss. Although all four paradigms have provided insights into the two 
conditions treated, they have each taken a different interest as far as our comparative 
examination is concerned and consequently might give the impression of inconsistency.  
Also, a critique might be made concerning the way in which the conclusions were integrated 
vertically, and hence the prevalence of the Philokalic viewpoint over the others. Perhaps other 
forms of deriving conclusions might be found according to different targets one has in mind, but 
as far as our work is concerned, this mode perfectly matched our logic of inquiry, since as long 
as the comparison takes place on the border, it goes without saying that it could not expand too 
much horizontally, as is the case with every border, but conclude itself vertically. A partial 
disadvantage of the method comes from the fact that in its case ‗theory comes before method and 
research questions before research designs‘
77
 which might result in limiting the access of some 
researchers to the method due to insufficient theoretical background in both areas. However, this 
shortcoming may be offset in time in the way stated above and by developing a corresponding 
body of knowledge on which one may draw.  
 
However, the major advantage of the chosen methodology is that it proved to be appropriate to 
answer the research question being asked. Its strength consists in both the research and 
researcher profile as described above, in which case it also becomes naturally dialectic without 
initially intending to be so. By the fact that both the research method and the researcher 
undertaking it are equally equipped in terms of theory and practice of the two fields compared, 
the shortcomings described by Lonergan, as to the positions and counter-positions reflected 
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when engaged with the dialectic method, are reduced.
78
 The method also proved to be 
innovative, creative and allowed enough freedom as to enhance knowledge.  
 
 
V. What This Research Methodology Did Not Involve 
 
 
1. We did not find it useful to conceptualize the topic investigated in terms of the science – 
faith dispute, partially because of the reasons already outlined which link to the 
researcher‘s personal experience as a professing psychologist and Christian, and partly 
because included in our designated logic of enquiry was to reduce the investigated 
phenomena to separate dimensions so as to allow for a comparison that relates to 
empirical facts and, as such, did not consider too much the ‗claim‘ of such facts having 
been acquired by ‗faith‘ or by ‗science‘. On the level of the lived fact, ‗science‘ appears 
as a kind of ‗faith‘ because it relies on previous discoveries made by other people that 
need to be trusted, believed and only later partially known by experience (since nobody is 
ever able personally to remake the whole way of a science from ‗cell‘ or ‗atom‘ up to 
date), and in the same way ‗faith‘ needs first to be trusted, believed and later known by 
experience at which moment it becomes knowledge, ‗science‘. However, when necessary 
some references to the topic have been made.  
2. The discussion linked to the body-soul relation was not the concern of our work, but we 
acknowledge the existence of such a relation, as confirmed by both psychotherapeutic 
and philokalic sources. The main consequence of this fact was that when considering 
anxiety and depression we excluded the pharmaceutical treatments that are available to 
ameliorate the condition. An inquiry into this topic could constitute a different study 
which would require some adjustments of the current research design. However, the 
currently prevalent medical model of illness was considered in relation to the diagnosis 
and conceptualization of illness. 
3. It is not a historical approach, in the sense that it does not follow a certain concept from 
its origins until today, and does not trigger arguments using a critical-historical method. 
4. It does not involve an east and west debate as the type established in theology. We 
consider theologians much better equipped for such controversy which inevitably draws 
on the historical method mentioned above and is not considered here.  
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VI. Concluding Thoughts on Methodology 
 
 
The method presented above falls into the area of basic or pure research by addressing ‗the 
underlying processes that helps us understand the regularities in nature … processes common to 
most people‘.
79
 From the psychologist‘s point of view, it remains fundamentally linked to the 
qualitative and exploratory type of research whose goal is to increase understanding, develop 
new hypotheses and create new research techniques; from the theologian‘s perspective it 
represents a way of engaging in dialogue with current views on the soul; while, from the 
perspective of the present study, it constitutes the right means to answer the research question 
intended to benefit professionals from various areas.  
 
The present research is a creative endeavour meant primarily to respond to the needs of a 
practitioner working with the human person, from whatever perspective, and to make sense of 
the evidence met in practice. Our express goal was not to justify or defend a certain thesis but 
merely to find the best explanatory concept in relation to the matter investigated. Hence, the 
methodology discussed here also promotes a new type of interdisciplinary study, simply labelled 
as border research and brings forth the profile of border researcher. To employ this method 
would imply following the guiding principles outlined above, out of which an engagement with 
anthropology is essential. At the same time, such a comparative method opens up a huge field of 
investigation and innovation, for addressing the multitude of topics provided by the two broad 
fields concerned with the human soul and considered here.  
 
We hope that the proposed methodology has succeeded in meeting the goal of respecting the 
reflexive nature of human being, proving that psychology might perhaps be closer to that science 
done with art, than submitting to the scientific statistical-mathematical method that has lost being 
from sight. From the perspective of this border research, since both patristics and psychotherapy 
have to do with what is human, methodologically, it naturally finds its place in the area of 
humanities.  
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This chapter intends to offer a comparative anthropological account on the ascetic writings of the 
Philokalia and modern psychotherapeutic paradigms. In the present thesis, the term anthropology 
is used in reference to the image of the human being which is promoted by these two fields, 
overtly or covertly. Our premise is that every theory concerning man, either labelled nowadays 
‗psychological‘ or ‗spiritual‘, is produced by such anthropological background information and 
comes with a certain understanding about what man is, the values he follows, how he should live 
his life in order to attain normality/health, and how abnormality/illness results. The methods for 
healing used by these two areas – modern psychotherapy and the Philokalia – are naturally 
derived from their anthropological perspectives.  
 
The difficulty in approaching this topic consists in the fact that the Philokalia comes with an 
overtly presented anthropology while, in the case of modern psychotherapy, its anthropology is 
implicit, likely to vary from one paradigm to another and this makes it difficult to be captured. In 
this research we will take into account four such paradigms – psychodynamic, behavioural, 
cognitive and humanist – which employed the main psychological theories of the last century 
with an impact in the present. Following our proposed methodology, in the first two parts of the 
study we will let these two fields ‗speak‘ about themselves by describing the core subject of the 
comparative enquiry, while in the third part we will try to find relations, connections of any kind, 
or various differences and discrepancies between the two, following the concluding techniques 
described in the chapter on methodology. The concepts that travel comparatively and are being 
analyzed at the border in line with the methodology previously described are: the unconscious; 
the tripartite structure of the soul; habits and behavioural conditioning; thoughts; self versus 
Christ-actualization; wholeness and holiness; and the cure by grace.
80
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I. Anthropological Perspectives in Psychotherapy 
 
The main purpose of this chapter‘s section is to identify an anthropological profile brought 
forward by what was regarded as ‗a new form of scientific inquiry that may be considered to be 
the birth of modern scientific psychology‘,
81
 namely psychotherapy and its underlying 
psychologies.  
Consistent with our research method, our intention is first to draw on the main assumptions, key 
concepts, methods, strengths and weaknesses of the four major paradigms in psychology which 
shaped the way we think about the human being in connection with the soul‘s illness and healing 
paths. We present them in a historical order, trying to uncover the evolution of modern 
psychotherapeutic thought in relation to man‘s psychological needs.  
In our task of identifying the main assumptions of these paradigms we were greatly helped and 
oriented by the work of C.H. Patterson and C. Eduard Watkins Jr. in their book titled Theories of 
Psychotherapy and William E. Glassman and Marilyn Hadad who reviewed these paradigms in 
their book Approaches to Psychology. We are also indebted to Paul Bennet and Alloy, Jacobson 
and Acocelia (eds.) for their well documented books on Abnormal and Clinical Psychology, 
whose writing style and approach we found as best fitting our own. We investigated extended 
amounts of literature on the topic, primary and secondary sources as well, and the chapter uses 
many other sources too, but nonetheless it is greatly indebted to these few all-embracing works.  
 
A. The Psychodynamic Perspective 
 
Thousands of books and perhaps millions of articles have been written about Freud
82
, Jung, 
Adler and the psychoanalytic movement in general, not to mention its dissenters. In this section 
it will be impossible to capture all the ideas that have been produced within this area of human 
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knowledge; instead, our intention is to bring into discussion some of the main psychoanalytical 
assumptions that brought a new understanding concerning who or what the human being is and 
may help us compose an anthropological profile. We focus both on theory – how we think what 
the human being looks like in his inner composition, and practice: how does one get sick and 
healthy again? These points offer us the basis for a general understanding of the main themes of 
this approach, meant finally to confer on us the foundation for the comparison between the 
Philokalic and psychodynamic perspectives that will be done in the third part of this chapter.  
It has been claimed that ‗psychotherapy, as well as its attitudes, really begins with Freud's 
development of psychoanalysis‘
83
. This is why we will start the enquiry into understanding 
modern psychology‘s view on man with the psychodynamic perspective.
84
 It is likely that 
psychoanalytic theory changed the face of the 20
th
 century into looking at the human being and 
that Freud was the one who laid the cornerstone of this paradigm, as of the entire modern 
psychotherapeutic field.
85
 What really might create a strong impression in regard to 
psychoanalysis is especially its extent rather than its novelty. Its concepts are largely used 
outside the clinical field where they primarily appeared, and flooded various other spaces from 
literature and cinema to marketing, economical and political areas.
86
 However, beyond their 
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extensive use and acceptance as normative outside the clinical area, the debates in psychology 




1.  Theory  
 
 
It has been advocated that the starting point of Freud‘s theory on the soul is a development of his 
work with people whom we would consider being sick or in serious distress from the 
psychological point of view. This methodological line will influence the evolution of the entire 
psychotherapeutic field, and although it will suffer some variations from paradigm to paradigm, 
they will still be circumscribed within the same philosophical perspective on man. However, 
while this is not to state that these theories are all altered by the use of such methodology, it is 
important to underline this fact since it constitutes a major difference from the Philokalic ascetic 
methodology.  
The psychoanalytic approach understands the human being from the perspective of his early 
childhood experiences and the major role played by the unconscious in the dynamics of 
personality. Although not a personal discovery,
88
 the conceptualization of the unconscious in a 
new language and its ‗promotion‘ toward a scientific study produced an irreversible paradigmatic 
shift of the entire field of psychotherapy and remained forever linked with Freud‘s name. In 
Freud‘s own terms these are the main assumptions of the psychoanalytic theory:  
‗The assumption that there are unconscious mental processes, the recognition of the theory of 
resistance and repression, the appreciation of the importance of sexuality and of the Oedipus 
complex – these constitute the principal subject-matter of psycho-analysis and the 




Therefore, in the following pages we will shortly define and clarify these principal subject 
matters, that are the co-ordinating concepts of the psychoanalytic movement even if one 
considers him/herself a Freudian or not.  
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1.1 Freud’s Main Themes 
 
 
The psychoanalytic movement is known as bringing to light a psychology of the unconscious as 
opposed to the psychology of the day, which was a psychology of consciousness developed by 
William James in the USA and Wilhelm Wundt in Germany.
90
 Thus, for the psychoanalyst the 
psychological problems are rooted in the unconscious mind, being caused either by various 
unresolved issues during the developmental stages or by repressed trauma. In their view a 
manifest symptom is caused by a hidden or latent malfunction. Freud distinguished between two 
main divisions of psyche: the unconscious and conscious. Between them there is an intermediary 
space called the preconscious. These notions play a fundamental role in his theory as he himself 
emphasizes: ‗the division of psyche in conscious and unconscious represents for psychoanalysis 
a fundamental premise‘
91
. Between these two divisions there is a descendant movement in the 
form of repression and an ascendant one in the form of displacement and sublimation. The 
unconscious content becomes conscious either through dreams, considered via regia to the 
unconscious, or through intermediary instances of the preconscious, where they get a linguistic 
content and therefore may be integrated into the conscious content.  
 
Starting in 1920, Freud proposes another composition of psyche formed this time by three 
psychic instances: Id (das Es), Ego (das Ich) and Superego (das Uberich)
92
. In this tripartite 
structure of personality, Id is considered hereditary and the depositary of all instincts that urge 
towards immediate satisfaction, Ego represents the part that has differentiated itself from Id and 
is conceived as a perception organ of the outside and inner world, and Superego represents the 
introjections of parental models. While ‗Ego puts into practice Id‘s will, as if it is its own 
intention‘
93
, Superego assimilates the parent as a model of moral consciousness.  
Another theory promoted by Freud is the theory of psychosexual stages development, according 
to which the human being‘s development follows five stages, from oral, anal, phallic, to the 
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latent and genital stages
94
 which may produce psychic pathologies if not overcome 
appropriately. In adult development, fixations may appear as a result of a failure to resolve 
conflicts associated with one of these psychosexual stages. The well known Oedipal Complex
95
 
is in close connection to these theoretical stages.  
Another assumption of psychoanalysis postulates a fragmented state of the psyche, and therefore 
different parts of the human unconscious are considered to be in constant struggle which, 
depending on their intensity, may result in neurosis. Thus the main goal of psychotherapy would 
be to release the repressed feelings/experiences and the cure comes by making conscious the 
unconscious content through getting an insight.
96
 The way towards consciousness is blocked by 
the defence mechanisms that Ego uses in order to reduce anxiety, which is formed as a result of 
the pressure created by the concomitant Id‘s immediate biological urges and the reality of social 
and moral demands of the Superego. Ego‘s defence mechanism is the concept as well as the tool 
we use nowadays to understand the unconscious protection against the anxieties of life, or better 
said life itself.  
Freud identified some of the most common ego defence mechanisms
97
 which are still in use 
today and have a great explanatory power in understanding psychic illness. There is a strong link 
between defence mechanisms and the anxiety resulted from Ego‘s inability to admit its 
weaknesses. Freud describes this difficult fight that the ego has in bringing harmony between the 
three structures of personality with the words:  
―The ego, driven by the id, confined by the superego, repulsed by reality, struggles to master 
its economic task of bringing about harmony among the forces and influences working in and 
upon it; and we can understand how it is that so often we cannot suppress a cry ―life is not 
easy!‖ If the ego is obliged to admit its weakness, it breaks out in anxiety – realistic anxiety 
regarding the outside world, moral anxiety regarding the superego, and neurotic anxiety 
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1.2 Jung’s Main Themes 
 
Jung widens the anthropological framework which Freud originally proposed, by introducing 
besides the personal unconscious the new notion of the collective unconscious. Jung, like Freud, 
believes that the personal unconscious is the history of individual data which for one reason or 
another has been removed from the field of consciousness. In his own words these data include: 
‗lost memories, painful ideas that are repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose), subliminal 
perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that are not strong enough to reach 
consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness‘.
99
 To exclude such 
contents from consciousness leads to an unbalanced lifestyle which will finally burst into 
neuroses. Similar to Freud, the repressed material of the personal unconscious exerts a great 
power over the individual until it is acknowledged and integrated into consciousness.  
Causing a major disagreement with Freud, the collective unconscious
100
 developed by Jung is a 
depositary of all humanity‘s psychic experience, a collection of behaviours, fears and thought 
patterns which he found as being identical across time and culture.
101
 It contains some primordial 
images, potentialities and predispositions inherited from our ancestors, called archetypes.
102
 The 
‗agglomerations of associations‘ – complexes – are part of a personal unconscious, while the 
primordial images, archetypes belong to the collective unconscious. They are a kind of ‗typical 
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, but one that transcends humans and ‗is felt to be of superhuman or even 
cosmic significance‘.
104
 In Jung‘s own words they are:  
‗a typos [imprint], a definite grouping of archaic character continuing, in form as well as 
in meaning, mythological motifs. Mythological motifs appear in pure form in fairy tales, 
myths, legends, and folklore‘.
105
 
The most important archetypes determined by Jung are persona, anima/animus, shadow and self. 
In direct relation to our comparative work, we will emphasize mainly the psychological aspects 
of persona, shadow and self‘s archetypes although it is not entirely possible to clean them out of 
their mythological load. Thus, archetypes are thought of as not having ‗a content of their own, 
but instead serve to organize our experience almost like cognitive schemata‘.
106
 Persona is found 
at the point of convergence between man and society. This archetype implies that humans are 
involved in various forms of role-playing according to society‘s expectations of them. This is 
usually done to the detriment of what the person really is, and thus the person might find himself 
totally identified with this mask and in opposition or at least at a distance from his inner 
constitution. As with any mask, it is in other words something that might be worn by anyone, but 
the falsification comes in that other people or the individual himself might take it as being his 
own personality, and not only one aspect of it, which might prevent or even block the curative 
process. In normal circumstances, since people also tend to choose the roles that are in 
accordance with their personality, it seems that ‗to this degree, the persona is individual, but it is 
never the whole man or woman‘.
107
 If the danger of persona is that of inner falsification, its 
advantage consists in that it ‗simplifies our contacts by indicating what we may expect from 
other people, and on the whole makes them pleasanter, as good clothes improve ugly bodies‘.
108
  
Although treated as one of the major archetypes of collective unconscious, the shadow is at the 
same time the personification of the personal unconscious, which is hidden to reason and 
consciousness. The shadow represents ‗the dark side‘ of us, the depositary of ‗the inferior being 
in ourselves, the one who wants to do all the things that we do not allow ourselves to do‘.
109
 In 
Jung‘s own words it is ‗that hidden, repressed, for the most part inferior and guilt-laden 
personality whose ultimate ramifications reach back into the realm of our animal ancestors and 
so comprise the whole historical aspect of the unconscious‘.
110
 Although it is made up of 
‗morally reprehensible tendencies‘, according to Jung the shadow ‗also displays a number of 
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good qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative 
impulses, etc.‘
111
 At this point, it seems that Jung‘s perspective is coherent with that of both 
Freud and Adler.
112
 They all saw the personal unconscious in the same way and dealt with it in 





 is brought forward as a central archetype. It is considered the centre of the whole person 
in direct relation with its unity and coherence,
114
 found at the confluence of the conscious and 
unconscious: ‗not only the centre but also the whole circumference which embraces both 
conscious and unconscious. It is the center of this totality‘.
115
 Unlike ego, which is threatened by 
distraction if including contents of the collective unconscious, in Jungian theory the self is the 
depositary of both conscious and unconscious contents, the centre of the totality that results from 
here, and that is what unites all opposites within the human being. In direct relation with self is 
another major concept of Jung‘s anthropological framework: individuation. By this he refers to 
the permanent process of the human being‘s development which occurs at the start of the second 
part of one‘s life and potentially continues until the end of life. In Jung‘s own description 
individuation is ‗the process by which a person becomes a psychological ―in-dividual,‖ that is, a 




                                                          
111
 Ibid. As Storr observes ‗Jung is not at all clear in his discussion of how far the ―shadow‖ is really a collective 
figure, and how far personal‘ in Storr, op. cit., p. 59. This archetype seems to be an interaction point between the 
personal and collective unconscious. Frieda Fordham in her comprehensive analysis of Jung‘s main concepts makes 
the point that the shadow is ‗something more than the personal unconscious‘ and then she goes on in distinguishing 
between personal and collective by saying that ‗it is personal in so far as our own weaknesses and failings are 
concerned, but since it is common to humanity it can also be said to be a collective phenomenon. The collective 
aspect of the shadow is expressed as a devil, a witch, or something similar‘ in Fordham, op. cit., p. 50. Coherent 
with the sharp distinction made between the psyche‘s conscious and unconscious levels promoted by Jung, comes 
Storr‘s conclusion that ‗the shadow is perhaps no more than a personification arising from the infantile tendency, 
already discussed, to divide persons into black and white categories; gods and devils, virgins and witches‘ in: Storr, 
op. cit., p. 59 
112
 ‗Jung maintained that both Freudian and Adlerian analyses were principally engaged with the ―shadow-side‖ of 
human nature; since they were concerned with exploring the primitive, selfish drives of sexuality on the one hand, 
and power on the other‘. Storr, op. cit., pp. 58-59  
113
 Jung‘s position on self is developed in his book The Secret of the Golden Flower, and represents the outcome of 
his studies on Eastern thought and doctrine, where the main source of inspiration revolves around Atman, Brahman, 
and Purusha. Cf. Jung, C.G., The Secret of the Golden Flower, vol. 13, The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) 
114
 It is ‗a point of new equilibrium, a new centering of the total personality, a virtual center which, on account of its 
focal position between conscious and unconscious, ensures for the personality a new and more solid foundation‘ in: 
Jung, Two Essays, op. cit., par. 365 
115
 Jung, C.G., Psychology and alchemy, CWCGJ, v. 12, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 41 
116
 Jung, C. G., Conscious, unconscious, and individuation, CWCGJ, v. 9, part 1, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1968), p. 275 
46 
 
Individuation is a creative process of self-fulfilment and integration by the conscious ego of the 
self‘s unconscious content. Both ego and self have a part to play in the process of individuation 
but this role appears to be different since ‗for the ego, which reflects the conscious sense of 
identity, growth involves expansion of one‘s awareness of the world and of oneself. But for the 
self, which is the whole of one‘s being (including the unconscious), the goal is to transcend 
egotistical interests, achieving a union of the conscious with the unconscious‘.
117
 Since 
individuation is related to self, its aim is that of inner growth in order to attain wholeness. This 
differentiation process is seen by Jung as having a transcendent function.
118
 Although the 
individuation process is natural and comes as a given to the individual, it may very well be 
blocked at different levels and for various reasons. Thus, the psychotherapeutic process meant to 
unblock the individual has to identify that which belongs to the person and those which do not, 
by firstly clearing up issues that belong to the personal unconscious and continuing with issues 
where contents of the collective unconscious are involved.
119
   
 
Complex is another concept that we would like to consider shortly in direct connection to our 
comparative work. This concept made history and nowadays not many will dispute its intense 
use in everyday language. Although Freud, Jung and Adler have addressed these concepts 
slightly differently, taken together they make up a common body of knowledge. If Freud 
emphasized the sexually driven part of the complex and the further development of the 
individual depending on the manner it is solved, Jung saw them in terms of ‗psychic 
fragments‘
120
 which have been rejected by the consciousness due to emotional distress associated 
with them, while Adler understood complexes in social terms of ‗striving for superiority‘, hence 
power. What was fundamental in Freud‘s theory, the Oedipus complex, for Jung becomes only 
‗an expression of an underlying archetype, in contrast to Freud‘s view that it reflected a 
developmental conflict‘,
121
 while Adler turns to the desire to ‗master over oneself‘
122
 and acquire 
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1.3 Adler’s Main Themes 
 
If Freud and Jung had obvious developments of the unconscious dimension of the psyche, for 
Adler this was not so important,
123
 at least not enough so as to devote his attention to it. 
Nevertheless, as Jung
124
 notices Adler was indirectly engaged in dealing with the shadow-side of 
individuals, meaning that an important part of his work was developed in the realm of the 
personal unconscious psyche.  
If Freud branded the Oedipus complex, Adler might be considered the father of the inferiority 
complex, ‗a most popular complex‘ as Hadfield fairly points out.
125
 For him the individual 
evolves along a lifespan from an innate inferior feeling that initially is felt as organic 
inferiority
126
 towards an attitude of self-importance identified as a superiority feeling which is in 
fact a compensation of the first one. Adler‘s anthropological perspective is goal-focused and 
teleological.
127
 He sees people moving toward a goal, having ideals that actually bring 
organization to one‘s personality functioning. The optimistic perspective upon humans and the 
focus on man‘s striving for superiority which he also calls ‗striving for perfection‘ or ‗the great 
upward striving‘ is ‗common to all men‘,
128
 as is the inferiority feeling universal for mankind. 
On the other hand humans do have fundamental needs to belong and achieve. Adler‘s ideas will 
find their way in the humanistic paradigm in psychology as we will show later on.
129
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2. Practice  
 
2.1 The Cure Through Psychodynamic Therapy130 
 
Cure is conceptualized differently depending on the various views on man that these theories 
presuppose. Thus, for Freud cure primarily involves the annihilation of defence mechanisms and 
freeing of the repressed unconscious feelings; for Jung it requires both resolving complex 
information and clarifying archetypal information,
131
 while for Adler it is to identify and analyze 
the individual‘s lifestyle, and then operate changes so as to reduce the feeling of inferiority, 
develop a social interest and correct faults in thinking.
132
 The methods used by these three 
theorists vary a little, also in terms of emphasis, but nevertheless they all aim and have as 
common ground the target of making the unconscious conscious.    
 
Cure through Freudian and Jungian analysis is a rather lengthy process which includes a few 
sessions per week. If Freud‘s method positioned the client on the couch and with the therapist 
sitting behind, Jung‘s method implies that the client and the therapist sit and face each other. In a 
meta-analysis of psychodynamic treatments, including Freudian, Jungian and Adlerian methods, 
seven factors have been identified which represent the steps followed by a classical cure as well 
as evidence for it: ‗1) the quality of the therapeutic alliance; 2) the correctness of the transference 
formulations; 3) the accuracy of the interpretations; 4) the quality of self-understanding; 5) the 
changes in the transference pattern; 6) the degree of the internalization of the gains; and 7) the 
level of mental health.‘
133
 Jungian treatment emphasizes catharsis and emotional cleansing, 
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elucidation of the content of the personal and collective unconscious, education and 
transformation,
134
 while the Adlerian cure focused more on the quality of the therapeutic alliance 
and change of faulty thinking and conditioned responses.
135
   
Beyond their emphasis concerning the methods used, all these therapies have in common the fact 
that they have been termed as talking cures.
136
 So, they are therapies that use the word as their 
main medicine. Freud himself has pointed out that this type of healing is not new:  
 
‗Let me remind you that psychotherapy is in no way a modern method of treatment. On 
the contrary, it is the most ancient form of therapy in medicine … There are many ways 
and means of practising psychotherapy. All that lead to recovery are good. I despise none 




As such, for Freud anything that leads to healing can be included in this method of healing 
through words, and this explains the massive proliferation of various directions and methods in 
psychotherapy in the previous and current centuries. In the classical psychoanalytic cure the 
repressed forbidden urges and drives become conscious and therefore force the ego to reorganize 
at a superior, optimal level. In order to escape anguish, the ego might deny reality or even seek 
refuge in the realm of phantasm to protect itself. This will affect the ego‘s contact with reality 
and the finality may be an open gate to delirium, neurosis or psychosis. A strong ego implies 
efficient defence measures, which presuppose equally limiting the anguish to an acceptable level 
and partially satisfying the drives. Becoming aware of one‘s defence mechanisms allows for 
reducing anxiety through the patient‘s better understanding of himself/herself on the one hand, 
and open the way to personal change in order to reduce relapse on the other. All these processes 
are mediated through linguistic means, i.e. by word.  
 
Within the psychodynamic spectrum the perspective upon illness is varied. As shown above for 
Freud the source of neurosis is anxiety of the ego due to the dangers of unconscious material 
entering the conscious mind, hence the treatment would be a way of assisting the patient in 
acknowledging this material, defeating his self‘s defences and thus the psyche would regain 
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freedom to engage in more constructive activities.
138
 Jung considered neurotic distress not only 
in individual terms of a flight from authentic suffering but also in terms of a psychosocial 
phenomenon which refers to ‗a sick system of social relationships‘.
139
 Adler considers neurosis 
as a failure of the attempt to process the desire of self-affirmation.
140
 Therefore, the adequate 
treatment would be the change of proposed goals and the style of life in order to reach 
interrelatedness and social adjustment. For both Jung and Adler, healing is a process of 
integration in order to reach wholeness.  
 
Before discussing issues related to the interpretation of transference and therefore ways of 
making use of words in talking cures, we have to mention the methods used in psychoanalysis 
which primarily include free association, dream analysis as well as the analysis of resistance, 
regression, faulty acts (parapraxis), and transference that occur during the therapeutic process. 
In addition, Jung‘s methods also include word associations and active imagination, while Adler 
introduced paradoxical strategies and focused more on encouragement and a technique named 
catching oneself.
141
 The latter is a ‗method meant to raise awareness of the symptom, and to stop 
it immediately after it started or even before‘.
142
 This technique is designed to help the patient 
fight unwanted behaviours or symptoms and presupposes a special attention to his inner life.   
 
2.2 The Word in Talking Cures  
 
 
Both Freud and Jung establish a connection between symptom and dream. The conflict expressed 
by the symptom is found in the patient‘s dreams. Thus, the dream becomes the material that 
allows for the interpretation of the symptom and by extension helps us to understand the nature 
of the unconscious. Since its content is disguised, we reach the unconscious in an indirect 
manner by interpretation. As interpretation appears in relation to the analysis of transference and 
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resistance we need to define transference and resistance first, in order to analyze the 




 is a psychological phenomenon that consists in the patient‘s repetition of 
previously experienced feelings and representations in relation to the therapist. Thus, in the 
course of the psychotherapeutic process the patient sees the analyst as representing an important 
figure of his past or early childhood, and as a result transfers towards the analyst positive or 
negative feelings that were initially directed toward the figure from the past.
144
 Jung‘s 
perspective on transfer is very different from Freud‘s. He sees in transfer a patient‘s effort to 
connect psychologically with the analyst and from this perspective to free the energy that is 
blocked in the unconscious and which may therefore be used in the healing process.
145
 However, 
in every psychotherapeutic process transference plays a vital role since ‗success or failure of the 
treatment appears to be bound up with it in a very fundamental way‘.
146
 
In order for the transference to take place, the whole therapeutic environment needs to be neutral. 
In this way the patient‘s imaginary is projected on to the therapist. The therapist in return needs 
to adopt a neutral attitude, and function as a mirror for the patient‘s projections. At the same 
time the therapist needs to pay attention to the counter transference reactions which represent the 
unconscious response of the analyst towards the patient‘s transference. Often in the 
psychotherapeutic process, before the transference takes place, the psychological phenomenon 
called resistance occurs and blocks the therapeutic activity. Resistance
147
 represents the patient‘s 
process of opposition to treatment. This becomes a paradoxical phenomenon when the call for 
help comes from the patient. The way to deal with resistance is to analyze the resistance itself, 
which precedes the analysis of the content that is defended through this resistance.  
Although interpretation applies to dreams, free associations, slips of the tongue, symptoms, etc., 
the interpretation of transference
148
 is considered a key factor in the psychoanalytic cure.
149
 It 
refers to the verbalization of the whole range of feelings, thoughts, attitudes, behaviours 
displayed by the patient in relation to the therapist that actually represent models of behaviour 
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elaborated in childhood in the family context, and which do not conform to the patient‘s mature 
ego, resulting in much of the present maladjusted behaviour. As a result of interpretation the 
patient gains an insight and becomes aware of things that were hidden to conscious 
understanding. In Adler‘s therapy the focus of interpretation is different in that it falls on the 
more positive side of the patient‘s goals, and more on future plans than past occurrences.  
As Chartier pointed out, in the psychic economy it is important to understand that ‗the force that 
feeds the resistance is the same as the one that determined the repression. The very mechanism 
that plunged painful memories or emotions into oblivion prevents them from regaining 
consciousness‘.
150
 In other words, we need to release this psychic force in order to have the 
necessary energetic strength to restore health and eliminate the psychological blockage. 
Either interpretation is mainly applied to transfer, symptoms, dreams, free associations or it takes 
the form of an educational process meant to lead the individual toward individuation, or 
maturation of personality, healthy lifestyle or better adjustment to society, the talking cures make 
use of interpretation of transference and resistance as one of their main tools, and this reliance on 




B.  The Behaviourist Perspective 
1. Theory  
 
It has been argued that the new behaviourist approach emerged as a reaction to the introspective 
analysis method in psychology and the previous focus on the study of mental processes, 
conscious or unconscious, that dominated the beginning of the last century and which was 
considered the object of psychology at that time.
152
 This new psychotherapeutic approach was to 
dominate psychology for about 50 years. Precursors of this approach were the American 
psychologist Edward Lee Thorndike
153
 and the Russian psychologist Ivan Pavlov,
154
 but the one 
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 Chartier, op. cit., p. 49 
151
 The way the word is used in interpretation has a particular importance in patristics as well since ‗a word is not 
merely a word. It is a relation and manifestation of both, the being who speaks it and of his intent in its 
―spokeness‖‘. Allan, J.J., The Ministry of the Church, Crestwood: St Vladimir‘s Seminary Press, 1986), p. 157 
152
 The main currents of thought were represented by the experimental study of physiological processes represented 
by Wilhelm Wundt (Germany), the introspective perspective of experience emphasized by William James, and the 
psychoanalytical perspective promoted by Freud.  
153
 Thorndike, in 1911, proposed The Law of Effect, according to which behaviours followed by a reward or 
reinforcement will be repeated and the ones followed by a negative reinforcement or complete lack of it will be lost.  
154
 Pavlov, in 1903, with his famous classical conditional principle showed that if two stimuli are associated they 
may produce the same reaction.  
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who established behaviourism‘s theoretical and practical foundations is John Watson.
155
 
Behaviour becomes the focus of psychological investigation as it is considered the only one that 
can be scientifically studied and quantified, predicted and controlled. However, the 
behaviourist‘s main philosophy of a psychology without soul is to be found in Wilhelm Wundt‘s 
laboratories and experimental research developed at Leipzig University, starting with 1879. He is 
actually considered the father of scientific psychology as a result of officially dismissing the soul 




Due to the addition of experiments in psychology even the language used to address human inner 
realities changes and gets closer to that of natural sciences, i.e. becomes somehow mechanistic. 
The main behaviourist assumptions are that: psychology should be seen as a science and 
therefore it should deal with observable behaviours that generate empirical data; the environment 
plays a decisive role in determining behaviour as opposed to the psychic inner processes; all 
behaviour is learnt from the environment and this learning process is similar to animals. In 
contrast with the vague concepts used by introspectionism, behaviourism places a high emphasis 
on the use of operational definitions – that is defining various concepts in terms of observable 
events – which may be used to describe human experience in terms of stimuli and responses. A 




Key concepts of behaviourism comprise the stimulus-response (S-R) equation, classical and 
operant conditioning, and notions of reinforcement and punishment. The method used to analyze 
behaviour is the lab experiment which gives the possibility of manipulating the independent 
variable in order to study the dependent variable. Stimulus is a measurable change in 
environment – any object, fact, event or situation that may have an impact on behaviour, while 
response is a measurable change in behaviour – any reaction to a stimulus whether 
environmental or mental. The behaviourist theory excludes thoughts, feelings and other mental 
occurrences, and genetic factors as well; that is everything that cannot be studied objectively, in 
observable terms.   
Watson took Pavlov‘s idea of conditioning
158
 further and applied it to humans. According to him 
humans are born tabula rasa and the behaviour is simply learnt from the environment through a 
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 In 1913, Watson published the article Psychology as the Behaviorist views it, which was considered the starting 
point of this psychotherapeutic approach. Watson, J.B., ‗Psychology as the Behaviorist views it‘, in Psychological 
Review, 20, (1913), pp. 158-177 
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 Wundt, Wilhelm, Introduction to Psychology, (New York: MacMillan Company, 1912), p. 192 
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 Glassman and Hadad, op. cit., p. 111 
158
 An unconditioned stimulus – UCS (i.e. reflex – a connection between stimulus-response that does not require 
learning – is a natural given, such as with Pavlov‘s dog salivation) generates an unconditioned response (UCR). If 
the UCS (food) is associated with a neutral stimulus – NS (bell, lab assistant in Pavlov‘s experiment) will result in a 
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process of conditioning. In a famous and controversial experiment due to its ethical implications, 
Watson and Rayner (1920) conditioned Little Albert, an 18-month-old toddler, to develop a fear 
response to rats, by associating the rat – NS with a strong noise – UCS. They conducted their 
research following the classical conditioning scheme: Noise (UCS) – Anxiety (UCR); Noise 
(UCS) + Rat (NS) – Anxiety (UCR); Rat (CS) – Anxiety (CR).
159
   
Opposed to the concept of conditioning is the concept of extinction – which suggests that what 
can be learned can also be unlearned, and that a conditional response is not necessarily 
permanent.
160
 As some research indicates,
161
 extinction is likely to appear in humans in some 
basic behaviours involving muscle responses like withdrawing from a hot surface, but not in 
complex behaviours which involve fear responses or other responses of the automatic nervous 
system and which are very hard to extinguish. Using Pavlov‘s extinction procedure, Watson and 
Rayner tried to eliminate the conditioned fear response associated with rats in Little Albert‘s case 
by presenting the rat for a period of three weeks without associating it with the gong‘s noise. 
Contrary to their expectation the fear did not extinguish.  
In the context of this behavioural approach to the human being, Skinner developed the concept of 
operant conditioning. He argues that all behaviour is modelled by complex reinforcement 
patterns from the environment. In his view, humans and animals actively engage with their 
environment, as opposed to the Watsonian emphasis on classical conditioning where they are 
more passive in waiting for the environment to produce stimuli to which they may respond. The 
novelty introduced by Skinner‘s is that the human being is determined by the consequences of his 
past behaviour. If from a Watsonian perspective the behaviour is triggered by external stimuli, 
starting with Skinner the behaviour may be elicited by internal stimuli as well, as a result of past 
internalized experiences. Thus, operant conditioning is a type of learning where future behaviour 
is determined by the consequences of past behaviour.  
According to Skinner the past behaviour may influence future behaviour depending on three 
types of consequences: if it had no consequence, the probability of that behaviour‘s occurring in 
the future is neutral; if the consequence is found pleasant, then the behaviour is likely to be 
repeated in the future – this was called positive reinforcement; if the consequence is negative, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
UCR. In time, by repeatedly associating the NS and UCS a new connection is learnt and the response that used to be 
unconditioned becomes a conditioned one. In Pavlov‘s experiment salivation is a UCR when it is triggered by the 
presence of food, because this is an unconditioned reflex, and is a CR when triggered by the bell or the lab assistant 
because this is a conditioned reflex. 
159
 For a detailed description of the experiment see: Glassman and Hadad, op. cit., pp. 125-6. As we shall see in the 
chapter concerning anxiety, this is the way behaviourists explain the development of phobias as well.   
160
 Pavlov demonstrated that by continuing to ring the bell (CS) without bringing the food (UCS), salivating (CR) 
became weaker and weaker until it disappeared completely. In this way, something that had been learned can be 
unlearned through weakening the connection that was initially established between two stimuli.  
161
 Cf. Grant, B.F., Dawson, D.A., Stinson, F.S. et al. (2006) ‗Trends in DSM-IV alcohol abuse and dependence: 
United States, 1991-1992 and 2001-2002‘, Alcohol Research & Health, 29(2), pp. 79-91 
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then it acts as a punishment and makes that specific behaviour unlikely to appear in the future. 
By extrapolation, learning occurs through the manipulation of positive reinforcements and 
punishments. Newer behaviourist approaches acknowledge that although the two types of 
conditioning – reflex and operant – were developed independently of each other by different 
researchers, they are interconnected and in real-life situations both processes can occur 
simultaneously.
162
 Hence, the complexity of human behaviour, and the necessity of precise 
criteria to distinguish between its various driving sources and mechanisms.   
 
2. Practice  
The behavioural therapeutic approach emerged from the above behavioural principles of classic 
and operant conditioning. All behaviour is learnt and therefore abnormal behaviour is seen as the 
result of faulty learning. In order to be cured the individual needs to learn the ‗correct‘ 
behaviour. The behavioural therapy, applying the principle of ‗here and now‘, focuses on present 
behaviour which the patient finds problematic as opposed to the psychodynamic therapy that 
focuses on identifying and uncovering unconscious conflicts from childhood. The therapist sees 
the patient as standing at the intersection between genetic inheritance and learning that occurred 
through interaction between the individual and environmental stimuli. These result in 
maladaptive thoughts, feelings, attitudes and verbal behaviour.  
Conventionally, the psychotherapeutic process starts with behaviour analysis,
163
 in other words a 
behavioural anamnesis. The focus is on indentifying the current stimulus–response relationship. 
Based on the disruptive behaviours identified the therapist designs a programme meant to help 
the patient unlearn the faulty responses and, if appropriate, learn more adaptive ones. It is 
explained to the patient how psychotherapy works, how the conditioned responses were learnt 
somewhere in the past and how the very same behavioural responses can be modified using the 
techniques of behavioural therapy.  
According to Bennet, behaviour therapy differs from psychoanalytic therapies in the following 
regards: it is directive, the therapist is actively involved in the therapeutic process, using methods 
based on learning principles; the goal of therapy is different in that it intends to change behaviour 
rather than reconstruct personality; the therapy is shorter than other forms; the interventions are 
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 Cf. Glassman and Hadad, op. cit., pp. 149-150 
163
 ‗Behavior analysis is the process of gathering and sifting information for use in the conduct of behavior therapy‘, 
Wolpe, J., The Practice of Behavior Therapy, (New York: Pergamon, 4
th
 ed., 1990), p. 59 
164
 Cf. Bennet, op. cit., p. 41  
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2.1 Behavioural Techniques  
 
Behavioural techniques are derived from the classical conditioning principle and involve: 
systematic desensitization, aversion therapy, implosion therapy and flooding. Operant 
conditioning techniques are related to what is commonly known in therapy as behaviour 
modification, behaviour shaping and token economy. Systematic desensitization is the treatment 
of choice for phobias and various anxiety-inducing behaviours. It aims at replacing the patient‘s 
anxiety response with a relaxation one, by increasingly exposing the patient to a hierarchy of 
stimuli from the less anxiety-evoking one to the anxiety-evoking stimulus itself. During the 
process, the patient goes to the next stage of the stimulus hierarchy only after succeeding to be 
fully relaxed in the presence of the previous stimulus. This method requires the training of the 
patient in relaxation techniques according to Jacobson
165
 and involves the use of imagination, 
since when is impossible to be confronted with the actual situation (as is the case with social 
phobias) the patient has to imagine being in those situations, following that life itself will offer 
opportunities to see if the therapy is successful or not. Thus, the exposure can be done in vitro or 
in vivo, depending on the phobic stimulus. However, studies have emphasized that the important 
factor in curing the phobia is the exposure to the feared object or situation by breaking the 
avoidance cycle created and reinforced in any phobia. This technique is considered one of the 
most effective in treating phobias, has a success rate of 60-70% and the initial improvements 
may disappear in time.
166
 
Aversion therapy is used to induce an aversive response to stimuli which are associated with 
existing undesirable behaviours. It has been used in trying to treat alcoholic addiction, by 
associating a nausea-producing drug or a small electric shock with the undesired behaviour of 
drinking. As a result of this stimulus association, the patient is provoked to vomit. This 
supposedly helps the patient avoid drinking in the future. However, this method raises serious 
ethical and effectiveness problems, with the rates of relapse reportedly very high.
167
   
Implosion therapy and flooding involve the patient‘s facing the worst possible fear-producing 
situation, in imagination only in the former and in actuality in the latter. In contrast with 
systematic desensitization which presupposes a gradual exposure to the stimuli, these techniques 
are more radical and less time-consuming. If successful, the patient might be cured of a phobia in 
one hour.
168
 The advantage of this method is that the patient learns that there are no objective 
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 Cf. Jacobson, E., Progressive relaxation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938) 
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 Choy, Y., Fryer, A.J. and Lipsitz, J.D., ‗Treatment of specific phobia in adults‘, Clinical Psychology Review, 27, 
(2007), pp. 266-86 
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 Cf. Bennet, p. 42 
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 Sometimes this kind of cure comes about by the natural course of life and even quicker, in seconds. In my 
professional experience I have met someone whose main fear was to be considered ‗stupid‘. One day, a person very 
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bases for his/her fear by accepting to confront it openly. Ethical problems are associated as well, 
in regard to suffering from therapy.  
Derived from operant conditioning, the behaviour modification method is largely used in 
educational and clinical psychology contexts. It reinforces desired behaviours and ignores or 
punishes undesired ones. This technique raises problems in choosing reinforcers since people can 
potentially respond to a wide range of such stimuli. Similar to behaviour modification is the 
behaviour-shaping technique successfully used in working with autistic children in order to 
maintain a desired behaviour. Another operant application has been used in institutions (for 
example, schools and hospitals) within programmes called token economies, where conditioned 
reinforcers are offered to strengthen specific behaviours. Tokens are offered in exchange for a 
desired behaviour and can later be transformed into something that the individual wants. Tokens 
behave as a secondary reinforcement for the primary reinforcements which are in fact desired. It 
may also be used to extinguish undesired behaviours by taking away the earned tokens to punish 
undesired behaviour. It was reported that token economies are uncommon and inefficient in 
treating mental disorders, although they might contribute to alleviating some disruptive 
behaviours associated with mental disorders, such as aggressiveness, inadequate social 
interaction and use of bad language.
169
  
We conclude this section by noting that within the behaviourist approach various theorists hold 
positions that may vary in some degrees but fundamentally assert the same thing: behaviour is 
the new foundational object of psychology; this allows psychology to behave and be considered 
a natural science, a belief that legitimates the study of animal behaviour and compare it with 
human behaviour; the emphasis on the environment as causation of behaviour and consequently 
dismissing mental processes.
170
 Behaviourism was criticized for being deterministic, reductionist 
and lacking in ecological validity due to the intense use of experimental methods.
171
 As a result, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
close to the client told him directly ‗You are stupid!‘ Being ‗forced‘ to face his fear in this way, the client reported 
that on that very moment the fear he had had all his life and conditioned his choices just disappeared and never 
returned.  
169
 For more details concerning behaviourist methods see: Patterson and Watkins Jr., op. cit., pp. 168-175; Glassman 
and Hadad, op. cit., pp. 420-425; Bennet, op. cit., pp. 40-44. For an informed critique concerning the inefficiency of 
the reward-punishment technique whose results are said to be only temporary and undermining a solid inner healthy 
development see: Kohn, Alfie, Punished by Rewards: The Trouble with Gold Stars, Incentive Plans, A’s praise, and 
other bribes, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999) 
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 Sharf, R., Theories of Psychotherapy and Counseling, (Belmont: Cengage, 5
th
 ed. 2012), p. 656; Corey, G., 
Theory and Practice of Counseling and Psychotherapy, (Belmont: Thomson Brooks/Cole, 8
th
 ed., 2009), pp. 264-65; 
Craighead, Eduard W., Nemeroff, Charles B. (eds.), The Concise Corsini Encyclopedia of Psychology and 
Behavioral Science, (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 3
rd
 ed., 2004), pp. 113-116 
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 Pavlovian-inspired and behaviourist methods were used not only in order to improve psychological health as 
showed above, but also with the destructive aim of reshaping behaviour following a political agenda as it happened 
in East-European countries under the communist regimes. In Romania, the highest peak of this ‗re-education‘ 
process is known as the ‗Piteşti Phenomena‘ and was conducted in Piteşti prison, where the elite of students and 
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what was reported to be the weaknesses of this approach will determine a new paradigmatic shift 
in psychology.  
 
 
C.  The Cognitive Perspective 
1. Theory 
 
The origins of the cognitive approach to psychology are traced back to the work of the German 
researcher Wolfgang Kohler and the American behaviourist E.C. Tolman. Kohler as a result of 





 introduced the concept of cognitive maps that described the relationships among 
stimuli that are the basis of learning, thus replacing the behaviourist term of associations 
between stimuli.  
 
Cognitive psychology is known for making use of the computer paradigm or metaphor, which 
sees the human mind in terms of input–process manipulation – and output. If behaviourists were 
not interested in what happens between stimuli and response, cognitivists focused on the 
mediating processes,
174
 i.e. cognitions, which occur inside the Skinnerian black box and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
young intellectuals was imprisoned. A great amount of documents written by survivors of Pitesti Experiment stand 
as proof of the methods used: Cf. Bordeianu, D., Mărturisiri din mlaştina disperării. (Cele văzute trăiteşsi suferite 
la Piteşti şi Gherla), vol I, II, editia a II-a, îngrijită de prof. Marcel Petrisor, (Bucureşti: Gama, 1995); Bacu, D., 
Pitesti. Centru de reeducare studenţească, (Hamilton : Cuvântul Românesc, 1989); Ianolide, I., Întoarcerea la 
Hristos. Document pentru o lume nouă, editie îngrijită la Mânastirea Diaconeşti, cu un cuvânt înainte de Parintele 
Gheorghe Calciu-Dumitreasa, (Bucureşti: Christiana, 2006). The official website of the experiment offers some 
resources in English: http://www.thegenocideofthesouls.org/public/english/the-last-witnesses/  
172
 Kohler, Wolfgang, The Mentality of Apes, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1925). Kohler rejected 
behaviourism and developed an approach called Gestalt psychology. His studies on the ape called Sultan made 
Kohler draw the conclusion that the process of learning may be seen in terms of problem solving as an active 
process of insight rather than the behaviourist scheme of trial and error.  This is based on the fact that the ape tried to 
resolve the task by learning to reach the banana with the help of a longer stick found outside the cage using the 
shorter stick which it had. So, it introduced a new element which was not previously given in trying to solve the 
task, an element which was considered insightful, that is, having to do with a cognitive process.  
173
 Tolman E.C., Purposive Behavior in animals and Man, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1932). Tolman 
considered himself a behaviourist but the research he developed could not be described in the traditional framework 
of behaviourism. As a result he had to develop new concepts (‗hypotheses‘ and ‗cognitive maps‘) emphasizing the 
existence of some cognitive factors in the process of learning. ‗Tolman demonstrated that animals may learn the 
pattern of a maze, forming a cognitive map, and yet not perform correctly until a reward is given. This latent 
learning being unobservable as it occurred, suggested that learning is distinct from the performance of a behavior’. 
Glassman and Hadad, op. cit., p. 166.   
174
 ‗The biological approach also deals with mediational processes, but they are defined physiologically, not 
conceptually – for example, looking at how the visual cortex is involved in perception‘. Ibid., p. 165 
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determine our behaviour. Cognitive psychologists try to make sense of what happens within the 
black box by comparing the information at its input and the behaviour it produces – i.e. output. In 
this way the black box is able to translate input into output and allows predictions to be made 
regarding behaviour even without completely understanding what is happening inside it. 
Presumably, the mind organizes past experiences in a schema which is then matched against the 
new sensory input. What is missing from this match is going to be completed in the input 
according to the fill-in-the-blanks principle and thus get a meaning out of it. In order to decrypt a 
certain input one needs to have the appropriate schema. In time, the aims of the cognitive 
approach have broadened, making space for the study of traditional irrational aspects of 
behaviour such as emotions, which will become the focus of the cognitive psychotherapeutic 
paradigm.  
 
Cognitive behaviour therapy (CBT)
175
, with its focus on cognition, has become the treatment of 
choice for a variety of psychological problems such as traditional depression and anxiety,
176
 but 
also for more complex conditions such as borderline personality, paranoid delusional disorder or 
even substance abuse. Professor Stephen Palmer emphasizes its importance in the United 
Kingdom by pointing out that this short-term evidence-based therapy enjoys large governmental 




Although the ground for the emergence of this paradigmatic shift was especially prepared by the 
behaviourist conceptual framework, historically, as shown by its proponents, the cognitive 
movement includes a variety of sources. Albert Ellis was the first to develop a thinking-focused 
therapy,
178
 named rational-emotive therapy (RET), followed by Aaron Beck, another major 
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 What initially was a focus on the mediating or thinking processes, by naturally incorporating behavioural 
techniques became in time known as cognitive behaviour therapy.  
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 In a study from 2006, Andrew Butler, Jason Chapman, and co-workers, while investigating 332 studies with 
9.995 subjects drew the conclusion that cognitive therapy ‗is highly effective for adult uni-polar depression, 
generalized anxiety disorder, panic disorder with or without agoraphobia, social phobia, PTSD, childhood 
depressive and anxiety disorder.‘ In: Butler, Andrew and Chapman, Jason, ‗The Empirical Status of Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy: A review of Meta-analysis‘, Clinical Psychology Review 26, 2006, p. 28 
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 ‗They are evidence based and, therefore, are underpinned by much research. In the United Kingdom the National 
Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) has recommended cognitive behavioural therapies for 
depression and anxiety related disorders such as panic attacks, obsessive-compulsive behaviour, body dysmorphic 
disorder, and post traumatic stress disorder (e.g., NICE, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2009) … In the UK, the government 
funded cognitive-behavioural therapy training as part of the Improving Access to Psychological Therapies (IAPT) 
programme‘. Palmer, Stephen, Foreword in: Robertson, Donald, The Philosophy of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy: 
Stoic Philosophy as Rational and Cognitive Therapy, (London: Karnak, 2010), p. xi 
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 In his own words: ‗So, I became the first major cognitive-behavioral therapist by actively practicing RET, by 
doing a pioneering outcome study of it‘. Ellis, A., ‗The History of cognition in psychotherapy‘ in Comprehensive 
handbook of cognitive therapy, eds. Arthur M. Freeman, Karen M. Simon, Larry E. Beutler and Hal Arkowitz, (New 
York: Plenum Press, 1989), p. 8 
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thinker who contributed greatly to this approach. As is the case with psychoanalysis, RET 




In developing RET, Ellis claims to have been influenced by two major sources: ‗the early history 
(and effectiveness over centuries) of philosophical cognitive therapy and the recent history (and, 
again, effectiveness) of behavioral therapy‘.
180
 If the major source of inspiration for Ellis‘s 
therapy was the Greek Stoic Philosophy,
181
 for Beck the more important were the more recent 
accumulations in the field such as ‗Freud‘s conceptualization of cognitions being hierarchically 




Given that this orientation has experienced incredible growth since the 70s, regardless of who the 
proposer of the form of cognitive therapy is, they all share a number of similarities which 
constitute its fundamental anthropological presuppositions. Professor Keith Dobson underlines 
the main philosophical foundation that represents the background of all currents within 
cognitive-behavioural therapy paradigm: 
 
1. ‗Cognitive activity affects behavior. 
2. Cognitive activity may be monitored and altered 
3. Desired behavior change may be affected through cognitive change‘.183 
 
 
1.1 Ellis’s Main Themes 
 
Ellis developed his Rational-Emotive Therapy as a direct result of identifying during the analytic 
sessions the presence in his patients‘ minds of something which he called irrational beliefs. 
According to him, psychological problems appear as a result of what people think about an event 
and not because of the event itself. In order to make sense of what he saw in his clinical practice 
he developed the well-known ABC system in which ‗A is the activating experience; B, the 
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 Both Ellis and Beck were first trained as psychoanalysts but in time due to dissatisfaction and limitations of these 
theories in solving patients‘ problems they would develop their own systems. First Ellis, and about ten years later he 
was followed by Aaron Beck.  
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 Ellis, op. cit., p. 9   
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 By this he specifically refers to Stoic Greek Philosophy whose relations with the cognitive paradigm are 
extensively discussed in: Robertson, op. cit. 
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 ‗Primary-process thinking is analogous to the rigid, primitive cognitive processing that goes on during 
psychological distress. Secondary-process thinking, with its greater flexibility and finer discrimination, is what 
cognitive therapy regards as the ―normal‖ coding system‘. Cf. Beck, A., Weishaar, M., ‗Cognitive Therapy‘, in 
Comprehensive handbook of cognitive therapy, eds. Arthur M. Freeman, Karen M. Simon, Larry E. Beutler and Hal 
Arkowitz, (New York: Plenum Press, 1989), p. 21 
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 Dobson, K., Dozois, D., ‗Historical and philosophical basis of cognitive-behavioral therapy‘ in K. Dobson (ed.), 
Handbook of cognitive-behavioral therapies (New York: Guilford, 2001), p. 4 
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beliefs or thoughts that irrationally follow; and C, the consequences for the person, both 
emotional and behavioral‘.
184
 Thus if the belief system of one is rational the consequences will 
be rational too, while irrational beliefs will result in irrational consequences and abnormal 
behaviour. One major contribution to the field of cognition is Ellis‘s list of some core irrational 
ideas, believed to ‗inevitably lead to widespread neuroses‘.
185
 From these eleven initial beliefs he 
extracted a few of them considered more general:  
 
‗I MUST be competent, adequate, and achieving, and I MUST win approval of virtually 
all the significant people in my life… Others MUST treat me kindly, fairly, and properly 
when I want them to do so. It is terrible when they don‘t. … I need and MUST have the 
things I really want. I MUST gratify my desires easily and immediately, without having 





In direct relation to faulty thinking he also emphasizes the negative influence of such sentences 
that contain absolute words as ‗ought to, should and must‘
187
 in peoples‘ lives.  
 
 
1.2 Beck’s Main Themes  
 
 
In a very similar way Beck introduced the concept of cognitive distortions to explain that 
individual psychopathology is the result of various existing patterns of distorted thinking. The 
negative triad found in depression made up of destructive thoughts in relation to one‘s self, the 
present state or the future is such an example.
188
 His cognitive therapy has been defined as ‗a 
system of therapy that attempts to reduce excessive emotional reactions and self-defeating 
behavior by modifying the faulty or erroneous thinking and maladaptive beliefs that underlie 
these reactions‘.
189
 In his opinion these cognitive distortions are also automatic; they appear 
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 Ellis, A., Reason and emotion in psychotherapy, (Secaucus, NJ: Citadel Press, 1962), p. 61 
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 Ellis, A., ‗Rational-emotive therapy‘ in Theoretical and empirical foundations of rational-emotive therapy, A. 
Ellis & J.M. Whiteley (eds.), (Monterey: Brooks, Cole, 1979), pp. 3-4 
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 Cf. Patterson and Watkins Jr., op. cit., p. 201 
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 Cf. Alloy, et al., op. cit., p. 110 
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 Beck, A.T., et al., Cognitive Therapy of Substance Abuse, (New York: The Guildford Press, 1993), p. 27 
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somehow involuntary, are ‗typically private or unspoken‘,
190
 behave autonomously and do not 
result from a deliberative process of thinking.
191
 In his own words:  
 
‗Internal signals in a linguistic or visual form [e.g., automatic thoughts] play a significant 
role in behavior. The way a person instructs himself, praises and criticizes himself, 
interprets events, and makes predictions not only illuminates normal behavior, but sheds 
light on the inner workings of emotional disorders‘.
192
   
 
He talks about cognition at two levels: surface cognitions that are easily accessible to our 
awareness and the deeper layer of unconscious beliefs that are organized in cognitive schemata 
and have an influence upon the former. Mutual relationships exist between thoughts and 
emotions, physiological arousal and behaviour. If thoughts have an impact on the latter, so does 
behaviour upon the others.
193
 However, beyond the minor distinctions or terms used Beck also 
emphasizes the strong link that exists between thoughts and the emotional responses they 
generate. In addition to Ellis‘s irrational beliefs, Beck also notes some more thoughts generally 
met in people‘s thinking that may produce illness which he names cognitive errors. They may 
appear as overgeneralization, magnification, dichotomous thinking or selective abstractions.  
 
 
1.3 Meichenbaum’s Main Themes 
 
Donald Herbert Meichenbaum is another major theorist assimilated into the cognitive-
behavioural paradigm. He is well known for bridging what before him used to be two separate 
areas of theoretical analysis and practical intervention: behaviourism and cognitivism.
194
 The 
outcome of his research is a new approach to therapy called cognitive–behaviour modification. 
Through his work with schizophrenics
195
 and later with aggressive children he discovered the 
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 Beck, A. T., Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders (New York: International Universities Press, 1976), 
p. 37 
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 Cf. Bennet, op. cit., p. 45 
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 He concluded in the Epilogue of his book what he hoped to have achieved in these words: ‗What were once 
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importance of self-talk in behavioural change. In his research he focused on inner speech or inner 
dialogue trying to find out if by altering it he could obtain changes in feeling, thinking and 
behaviour.
196
 He draws upon concepts elaborated by other paradigms just to explain that they 
were constructs used to highlight the same inner reality which he terms as internal-dialogue:  
‗What constructs best explain what goes on in your head? Attributions, appraisals, 
interpretations, self-reinforcements, beliefs, defense mechanisms, and many other 
constructs, all have been offered to explain private conscious events or what I will refer 
to as ―internal dialogue‖‘.
197
  
Theorizing on this concept, he quotes Sokolov‘s book on Inner Speech and Thought written a 
few years before his own:  
 
‗Inner speech is nothing but speech to oneself, or concealed verbalization, which is 
instrumental in the logical processing of sensory data, in their realization and comprehension 
within a definite system of concepts and judgments. The elements of inner speech are found 
in all our conscious perceptions, actions, and emotional experiences, where they manifest 
themselves as verbal sets, instructions to oneself, or as verbal interpretation of sensations and 




Thus, building on previous research and adding the laboratory results of his own use of self-
instructional training with impulsive and hyperactive children, Meichenbaum found out that this 
category of children does not understand its experience in cognitive – either verbal or imaginal – 
terms, and they do not internalize rules necessary for the new learning situations. In other words, 
he discovered and emphasized the importance of words in mastering one‘s internal world, and 




2. Practice  
 
2.1 The Cure Through Cognitive Methods  
 
For cognitive theorists the central key to therapy is ‗interfering’ in the client‘s process of 
cognitive appraisal that takes place between stimuli and response. The process refers to 
evaluating the stimulus before reacting to one‘s memories, beliefs or expectations. Therefore, 
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behaviour is shaped by the quality of these cognitive appraisals and ‗it is this internal mental 
activity that accounts for the wide differences in individual responses to the same external 
stimulus‘.
199
 As such, the cure provided by this paradigm will focus on changing people‘s 
cognitive style on the one hand, and ‗encouraging the individual to engage in some form of 
behavioral intervention‘
200
 on the other hand, and this is the only way in which changes in 
cognitive style may be measured and tested. That is why, as shown in the beginning of this 
section, the cognitive naturally merged with the behaviourist paradigm, without losing its focus 
on mediating processes.  
 
All cognitive therapies are considered restructuring therapies due to their direct challenge of 
irrational beliefs (Ellis), faulty thinking style (Beck) or cognitive structures (Meichenbaum),
 201
 
structures that may be both positive and negative. As a direct result of his conceptual framework 
and practice, for Ellis, therapy involves after identification together with the client of his 
irrational beliefs, ‗confronting and disrupting the irrational beliefs (B) so that the emotional and 
behavioral consequences (C) will change accordingly‘.
202
 But his therapeutic method involves 
also a (D) that is Disputation of illogical thinking,
203
 challenging the client‘s irrational beliefs in 





In Beck‘s terms, identifying the ‗dysfunctional schemata‘
205
 is the goal of cognitive therapy.  
Distorted thoughts patterns are challenged against data provided by evidence and when the client 
succeeds in accepting the faulty thinking style created by unrealistic interpretations of life events, 
the therapist teaches him the correct interpretation. Still, in Beck‘s method the focus is on 
solving problems rather than on directly challenging and persuading the client as in Ellis‘s 
method. While Beck develops an accepting, warm and emphatic relationship with the client, Ellis 
deliberately keeps some distance that, in his opinion, is meant to solve the simple problem that 
the client is complaining about.
206
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In order to cure and alleviate suffering Meichenbaum designed the self-instructional training 
which is primarily based on the assumption that ‗the things people say to themselves determine 
the rest of the things they do‘.
207
 What self-instructional cognitive-behaviour treatment promises 
to offer is that language can significantly influence thinking and therefore change behaviour, 
while acknowledging that language must be linked to thinking in order to produce behavioural 
change. This method requires that the client becomes aware of his inadequate behaviours and, by 
doing this, obtains the key that produces the internal dialogue. This internal dialogue initially 
produced by the client is then ‗fostered by the therapist‘s reflections, explanations, 
interpretations, information giving, and cognitive modeling‘
208
 and then the outcome of this 
process is practised outside the therapeutic framework.  
 
Meichenbaum speaks about a process of reconceptualization through which thoughts, feelings, 
and behaviours get different meanings. Different schools of therapy may vary in connection to 
these meanings and not all of them may produce behavioural changes. However, Meichenbaum 
points out that ‗one of the more essential variables that determines therapy outcome is the degree 
which a given conceptualization leads to specific behavioral changes that can be transferred to 
the real-life situation‘.
209
 In other words for the therapeutic process to be considered successful 
the patient needs to produce changes in both his internal dialogue and behaviour. Summarized in 
Beck‘s own words: ‗The formula for treatment may be stated in simple terms: The therapist 





This new approach to therapy where the therapist is equated to a teacher and the client to a 
student represented a new turning point in the modern psychotherapeutic paradigm. This shows 
that a radical distance from the psychodynamic medical model and behaviourists‘ experimental 
laboratories has been taken. Hence, explicitly, Ellis‘s cognitive approach to healing aims to 
reduce irrational thoughts and emotional disturbances, to reduce feelings of anxiety and anger, 
and to teach clients new thinking styles that are meant to keep anxiety and aggression at low 
levels. Implicitly, it has broader goals such as: developing social- and self-interest, attaining 
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independence and responsibility, the acceptance of uncertainty, acquiring flexibility and 




D. The Humanist Perspective  
1. Theory  
 
The humanist approach appeared in the 50s as a direct rejection of psychoanalysis and 
behaviourism that dominated paradigms of the time. Generally referred to as the third force
212
 in 
psychology, this paradigm will bring a completely different view on the human being. The 
theorists of this paradigm strongly criticized the mainstream psychological schools of the time 
‗for proclaiming a diminished model of human nature‘ and as a result they openly struggled for 
‗a new and better concept of humanity‘.
213
 Compared to previous currents of thoughts in 
psychology that developed very specific methodologies and techniques of intervention, 
humanistic psychologists in approaching the human being ‗tend to be more inclusive than 
exclusive‘ since ‗they believe that the other approaches, in their abstract theoretical 
characterizations of humans, exclude much that is essentially human‘.
214
 Therefore, their main 
recommendations for other approaches would be to broaden their perspectives.  
Although arising from the intellectual crucible proposed by psychoanalysis and the fact that main 
theorists of this perspective were initially in contact with behaviourism, the humanistic paradigm 
will crystallize by opposing the reductionism and determinism
215
 of these two currents and 
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promote a psychology that emphasizes the idea of people being essentially good, free to choose 
and with an innate drive to strive towards fulfilling their potential. In the words of one major 
theoretician of this approach, Abraham Maslow: ‗if Freud supplied to us the sick half of 
psychology, we must now fill it out with the healthy half'‘.
216
 To him and to humanists at large, 
this focus on healthy people, in contrast with Freud‘s emphasis on pathology, was the proper 
subject matter for psychology and this idea will guide them in developing theories with a 
different anthropological perspective in mind.  
The humanist paradigm encompasses a few currents of thought which, although they have 
different emphases, they nevertheless share a few characteristics in common. According to some 
authors there may be two
217
 or three main assumptions which gather them together under the 
same umbrella: ‗a phenomenological viewpoint, a belief in the capacity for choice, and an 
emphasis on meaning‘.
218
 Humanists focus on experience and in their opinion this can be studied 
scientifically. Actually they suggest a science of human experience as opposed to the traditional 
understanding of psychological science similar to naturalistic sciences, so aggressively conveyed 
by behaviourists. Rogers, one of the main theorists of this approach, suggests as scientific criteria 
the intersubjective verification,
219
 which is the agreement between two observers in relation to an 
event or observation. Thus, in the humanists‘ opinion, psychology should deal with the 
individual in its unity and wholeness and not with separate aspects of it. While acknowledging 
these minuses of scientific psychology, Allport declares its desirable target in the following 
words: ‗if present-day psychology is not fully equal to the task, then we should improve the 




Furthermore, they have as their main tenet the assumption that people have free will, they choose 
freely and are not conditioned by past events as psychoanalysis holds, nor are they reacting in 
ways determined solely by immediate stimuli and the environment as behaviourists state. In the 
humanists‘ view, human beings make choices that cannot be controlled or predicted, based on 
their subjective perception of a situation rather than being determined by environmental stimuli 
or unconscious drives.   
 
The emphasis on the meaning of life developed by humanists brings us to the core of the 
discussion concerning the nature of modern psychological science. Meaning as an important part 
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of human behaviour has been ignored by previous approaches in psychology and the reason for 
that is outlined by some authors in the following lines:   
 
‗Questions of meaning seem too closely tied to value judgments, and traditionally science 
has been regarded as ―value-free‖: That is, science is neither intended nor equipped to 
talk about such questions. Today, of course, we recognize that no human activity, 
including science, is truly ―value-free‖: What we choose to study, and the consequences 




Another major concern of humanistic psychologists was related to the way psychoanalysis and 
behaviourism pulled out explanations and portrayed human beings ‗in terms of mechanisms 
drawn from the study of neurotic patients and laboratory rats‘.
222
 In exchange, Maslow and 
Csikszentmihalyi proposed ‗to understand humans in terms of their highest potential and through 
the study of individuals who display the highest levels of human functioning‘.
223
 Out of this 
comprehension, theorists of this approach grasped concepts such as self-actualization, ideal self, 
hierarchy of needs, which were then developed and integrated into psychotherapeutic systems 
like person-centred therapy and logotherapy.  
 
1.1 Rogers’s Main Themes 
 
A concept that created ‗history‘ by generating new lines of thinking and opening the gate for a 
new age of self-emphasizing theories is the concept of self-actualization. According to Rogers, 
people have ‗a natural drive toward self-actualization; the achievement of one‘s full potential‘.
224
 
The self in Rogersian terms is not an archetype as Jung sees it, but the view of who we are at a 
given moment, a result of our perception upon all past experiences, the current situation or 
expectations concerning our future. The actualizing tendency is activated in connection with the 
person living here and now, an existential principle of great importance for humanists. This urge, 
if naturally developed, will result in a mature and fulfilled personality.  
The concept of self-actualization is connected to the idea of people being congruent or 
incongruent with themselves. According to Rogers
225
 the state of incongruence results from the 
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existence of too many conditions of worth in connection with introjections of others‘ values.
226
 
In his view all people should be shown love and attention without any condition – unconditional 
positive regard. More often, regard is given when children meet some standards of behaviour 
and as such love and approval are granted to them only if they conform to their parents‘ views 
which results in a distortion of their self by introjecting parental criteria. This will offer the 
content for the ideal self, an image of what people would like to be. The conditional positive 
regard will determine children to adopt parents‘ conditions of worth which falsify the self and 
triggers aggressive behaviours and finally incongruence. In this description, congruence is 
therefore a result of unconditional positive regard, when a person is loved and accepted even if 
one might disagree with his actions or intentions.
227
 The discrepancy between the real and ideal 
self is what brings distress and causes illness.
228
 
Rogers identified a few conditions that facilitate the process of self actualization.
229
 One of them 
is unconditional positive regard as described above. A second condition is what he calls 
genuineness or openness, ‗which refers to a person freely expressing its own sense of self, rather 
than playing a role or hiding behind a façade‘.
230
 And the third condition which brings growth is 
empathy, ‗the ability to understand the world from another‘s point of view and to share their 




To conclude, Rogers‘s view of human beings was full of optimism and very positive. To him 
people are innately good and healthy development depends on one‘s conditions of growth. If 
these are met, the individual naturally moves towards a fully functioning person, acquiring the 
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1.2 Maslow’s Main Themes  
 
Maslow, another major theorist of the humanist paradigm, shared with Rogers the discontent 
with other paradigms in psychology that focus on disordered personalities and reduce human 
beings to instances which are biologically determined and behaviourally manipulated. He brings 
a positive view of humans who are seen as able to love, create, and freely express their inmost 
feelings of beauty and responsibility. They possess a natural internal force which directs them 
towards achieving their highest potential and this process is also called selfactualization.
233
 In the 
midst of Maslow‘s theoretical developments the central place belongs to the well known pyramid 
of needs,
234
 which has in his opinion the power to influence every aspect of behaviour.   
These needs are hierarchically presented, from the physiological and safety needs considered 
basic,
235
 to the higher needs
236
 of belonging and self-esteem, up to the top of hierarchy where the 
selfactualizing need is to be found. In Maslow‘s opinion one must go through this hierarchy, 
following the order provided. The needs that are dominant for a person will motivate
237
 his 
behaviour at a certain moment and will shape his world‘s view. The failure to meet these needs 
results in frustration and finally aggression.
238
 
In his book on Motivation and Personality, Maslow speaks about cognitive needs, materialized 
in the desire to know and understand. As he points out, even if this category of needs were seen 
as ‗techniques for the achievement of basic safety in the world, or for the intelligent person, 
expressions of self actualization‘, for him, they do not represent ‗answers to the questions as to 
the motivational role of curiosity, learning, philosophizing, experimenting, and so on‘.
239
 He 
cautions against the tendency to see them as distinct from the hierarchy of needs presented above 
since ‗the desire to know and to understand are themselves conative (i.e., having a striving 
character)‘.
240
 He does not see the two categories of needs in dichotomist but rather synergic 
terms. For our present work, Maslow‘s opinions are of particular importance, with respect to 
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causes of cognition being neglected by the psychological currents of the day.
241
 In trying to offer 
an explanation for this omission Maslow points out:  
‗The main reason we know little about the cognitive impulses, their dynamics, or their 
pathology is that they are not important in the clinic, and certainly not in the clinic 
dominated by the medical-therapeutic tradition of getting rid of disease. The florid, 
exciting, and mysterious symptoms found in the classical neuroses are lacking here. 
Cognitive psychopathology is pale, subtle, and easily overlooked or defined as normal. It 
does not cry for help. As a consequence we find nothing on the subject in the writings of 
the great inventors of psychotherapy and psychodynamics, Freud, Adler, Jung, and 
others‘.
242
   
Even if he could not solve the dilemma of cognitive psychopathology and its consideration in the 
process of healing, nevertheless he had the intuition of its major importance in acquiring a 




The pyramid is considered to have a great level of generality addressing people from all times 
and places.  Maslow, following Goldstein, states that basic drives such as the physiological ones 
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have the role to ‗reduce tension‘, while selfactualization ‗often involves increasing tension‘ since 
it is ‗a painful process of struggle to grow‘.
244
 The selfactualized state may be reached through 
peak experiences
245
 and represents ‗the most profound and vibrant level of being … a period of 
intense emotion when we really feel what it is to be alive‘.
246
 Also, this process of 
selfactualization is seen by Maslow as having no end. However, despite what one might think, 
this need to selfactualize is not very common. In Maslow‘s estimation ‗only 1 per cent of people 
ever really experience the need. Yet, for those who do, it can alter profoundly the individual‘s 





2. Practice  
 
2.1 Rogers’s Person-Centred Therapy 
 
Although Maslow contributed to the development of the humanist paradigm by enhancing its 
theoretical background with major concepts, he did not, however, have a direct role in therapy. 
Instead, ‗Rogers‘s theory of personality cannot really be divorced from his approach to the 






 represented a radical move from the traditional way of doing 
psychotherapy and according to some ‗had a major impact on psychology‘.
250
 First of all, by 
replacing the in-use term of patient with client and later with person, he moved away from the 
medicalized model of psychotherapy towards a model that emphasizes human dignity, freedom 
to choose and responsibility for one‘s own actions and choices. And secondly, he produced huge 
changes in the paradigm concerning the relationship between therapist and client. In this respect, 
his system of therapy is considered as non-directive, with the therapist and the client having 
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In this therapy, our phenomenal field, the way we perceive ourselves and things around us – 
either consistent with the reality or not – is nevertheless the reality that we experience and this is 
what makes the object of the therapeutic process. The goal of person-centred therapy is to offer a 
secure environment in which the individual might explore his present situation and find solutions 
to it. In this therapy the client is in charge with improving his life and not the therapist, who 
unlike psychoanalysts or behaviourists do not possess a set of techniques in order to do things
252
 
to the client. The effectiveness of therapy is determined by the quality of the encounter between 
the two and the client‘s ability to live here and now in order to attain realness and empathy. The 
ultimate goal is to help the client regain the sense of self-actualization and move towards it.  
According to Rogers,
253
 the role of the therapist is to create a relationship of unconditional 
positive regard, which will offer the client the possibility of leaving the state of incongruence 
and move towards a more congruent position. The techniques suggested consist of listening, 
understanding, being empathetic towards the client‘s experience and the way he perceives it, 
with the therapist accepting and sharing his own experience in return. Rogers rejected 
interpretation as part of the therapeutic process because he believed that it is more purposeful to 
focus on the present or future in order to change the current situation, instead of searching for 
causes of symptoms in the past. Since, in this therapy the focus is on relationships, the therapist‘s 
personal qualities become essential. Bennet presents three such characteristics:  
‗they are integrated and genuine in their relationship with the client; they gain an 
empathic understanding of the client‘s perspective and communicate this to them; they 
provide unconditional positive regard‘.
254
 
Rogers‘s view highlights a few main characteristics of human beings such as: rationality, the use 
of free will, the need to grow and attain self-fulfilment and, more importantly, recognizes 
humans‘ ability of being in charge with their own destiny and assuming the responsibility for it, 
instead of considering humans as being victims of various unconscious drives and conditionings 
beyond one‘s control. The same responsibility is claimed from therapists who, as Kottler and 
Hazler underline, in this new therapeutic setting need ‗to be more effective models of the values 





Humanism‘s paradigmatic shift in views on human beings, on how they get ill and regain health, 
on the type of relationship that should exist between doctor and patient were so different and 
                                                          
252
 Rogers mentioned in: Ibid., p. 56 
253
 Cf. Rogers, C.R., Client-Centered Therapy, (Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951) 
254
 Bennet, op. cit., p. 56 
255
 Kottler, Jeffrey A. and Hazler, Richard J., ‗The therapist as a Model of Humane Values and Humanistic 
Behavior‘, in The Handbook of Humanistic psychology. Leading Edges in Theory, Research and Practice, eds. Kirk, 
J., Schneider, James F.T., Bugental, J., Fraser, Pierson, (London: Sage Publications, 2001), p. 366 
74 
 
they moved so far away from the dominant medical model, that this approach received a lot of 
criticism and rejection from clinical specialists working in the field which seems to have 
continued to the present. Elkins, himself a clinical psychologist, explains that:  
‗Contemporary clinical psychology is committed to the medical model – the same model that 
dominated psychiatry in the 1940s. Most clinical psychologists view themselves as ―doctors‖ 
who ―diagnose‖ ―mental disorders‖ and ―administer treatments‖ to ―patients‖. Thus, Rogers‘ 
view that psychotherapy is not a set of medical-like procedures but, rather, an interpersonal 
process that frees clients to grow and actualize their potentials is a threat to contemporary 
clinical psychology … Our profession is so dominated by the medical model that in many 
clinical settings one‘s professional competence is judged by one‘s ability to speak medical 
jargon and to describe what one does in medical terms … Thus, the politics of clinical 
psychology, including its medical model ideology and system of professional and economic 
rewards, makes it difficult for clinical psychologists to embrace Rogers‘ views even if they 




2.2 Frankl’s Logotherapy  
 
The focus on existence as a source of analysis and scientificity in psychology made John Rowan 
state that: ‗humanistic psychology, in all its variants is the real home of existentialism as a 
praxis, doing justice to all that it has to offer‘.
 257
 Since, as presented at the beginning of this 
section, humanist psychology encompasses many theoretical and psychotherapeutic orientations 
that share a few common features, some of them while included in the humanist paradigm are 
labelled as existential, as is the case with Victor Frankl‘s logotherapy. From this perspective 
Rowan‘s suggestion ‗that we should talk all the time about existential-humanistic 
psychotherapy‘
258
 in order to avoid possible confusions might be an elegant way out of the 
terminological turmoil.  
Logotherapy is a kind of therapy by meaning. Rejecting Freud‘s psychoanalysis as well, to which 
he had been exposed in his early study years, Frankl claims that the main motivation of human 
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behaviour is to find meaning in life
259
 and if Freud spoke about a will to pleasure, Adler about a 
will to power, in the same way he spoke about a will to meaning.
260
 The meaning of our 
existence, as seen by Frankl, is something that each of us has to find, ‗[it] is not invented by 
ourselves, but rather detected‘
261
 and when searching for it what counts ‗is not the meaning of 
life in general, but rather the specific meaning of a person‘s life at a given moment‘.
262
 Frankl 
suggests three ways in which this meaning in life may be found: ‗(1) by doing a deed; (2) by 
experiencing a value; (3) by suffering‘.
263
 
According to Frankl, a human is a three-dimensional being consisting of Soma, Psyche and 
Spirit. If previous psychologies referred to the psychosomatic constitution of man and dwelt on 
innate drives, Frankl focused on the neglected dimension – the spiritual one.
264
 He sees 
spirituality linked directly with meaning and humans‘ ability to make choices
265
 and 
consequently assume responsibility for them,
266
 while logotherapy becomes much more than a 
classic therapy because it openly involves the idea of transcendence. Actually Frankl calls it self-
transcendence and notes that: ‗human existence – at least as long as it has not been neurotically 
distorted – is always directed to something, or someone, other than itself – be it a meaning to 
fulfill or another human being to encounter lovingly‘.
267
 Frankl‘s self-transcendence is opposed 
to the Rogersian concept of self-actualization, with the latter being only a consequence of the 
first.  
Central to his theory is the accent on suffering, since ‗our culture seems to emphasize pleasure-
seeking and the avoidance of suffering‘
268
 and consequently to find meaning depends also on the 
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way one deals with and incorporates his personal suffering. Therefore he sees suffering as being 
much more than a ‗symptom‘ that needs to be alleviated as considered by other approaches:  
‗... suffering is not always a pathological phenomenon ... I would strictly deny that one‘s 
search for a meaning to his existence, or even his doubt of it, in every case is derived 
from, or results in, any disease ... A man‘s concern, even his despair, over the 




Even more, he postulates that therapy should help people assume suffering since self-
transcendence of one might depend on it:  
‗existential analysis is called upon to make a person capable of suffering – whereas 
psychoanalysis, for instance, aims only at making him capable of pleasure or capable of 
doing. For there are situations in which man can fulfill himself only in genuine suffering, 




While searching for his own meaning in life there is also some tension associated with it, but in 
his view this tension is nothing more than merely unavoidable and healthy phenomena. He calls 
it:  
‗an indispensable prerequisite of mental health ... mental health is based on a certain 
degree of tension, the tension between what one has already achieved and what one still 




Frankl‘s therapy addresses people that present philosophical or spiritual problems, who suffer 
from an existential vacuum or problems of the meaning of life such as: death; suffering; love; 
work; or human relations. Whereas the aim of psychodynamic therapies is to clarify unconscious 
issues by making them conscious, that of behavioural therapy to re-condition the individual in a 
manner adjusted to the environment, and that of cognitive psychology to correct faulty thinking, 
the goal of logotherapy is to make the person aware of his purpose in life and accept 
responsibility for it. In doing so, Frankl understands that what used to be psychotherapy now 
becomes logotherapy since ‗psychotherapy as such is exceeding its scope in dealing with 
philosophical questions ... Logotherapy must supplement psychotherapy‘.
272
 If psychotherapy 
deals with neuroses and psychoses, logotherapy intends to cure noogenic neuroses
273
 which are 
the result of various existential problems, since logotherapy ‗is a form of psychotherapy which 
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Specific to the logotherapeutic process are two techniques: the first is termed paradoxical 
intention – which consists of wishing for the very thing you are afraid of. This is used to break 
down the vicious cycle brought by the anticipatory anxiety so often met in neuroses; another 
technique is called dereflection and refers to changing one‘s attention from one‘s own worries 
onto others. Frankl believes that once with psychoanalysis, people started to focus too much on 
themselves and this overemphasis on self-reflection is another cause of neurosis. Therefore, the 
solutions come from de-self-focusing and fulfil our lives through encountering others.
275
 But 
when approaching others, love as an existential category must always be present since only in it 
man can ultimately find his salvation as Frankl so clearly shows:  
‗… love is the ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire ... The salvation of 
man is through love and in love. I understood how a man who has nothing left in this 




We conclude this section of the chapter by pointing out that once with the humanist paradigm in 
psychology the borders with fields such as philosophy, theology, anthropology and psychology 
become very thin,
277
 or perhaps better said inexistent. Although in approaching the human being 
as a whole psychology needed to consider such aspects as free will, responsibility, freedom to 
choose and love, there is no doubt that these concepts strongly overlap with areas that 
traditionally have belonged to the above-mentioned fields. Therefore, analysis in this area can 
never be exclusively or purely psychological.  
 
 
E.  Contrasting Paradigms in Psychology 
 
As shown above, it has been claimed that ‗all psychotherapies are built on ideological and 
theoretical foundations‘
278
 which ‗developed from different historical roots and at different 
times‘.
279
 As such, as one would naturally expect, they all bear different nuances of the 
anthropological perspective in psychology. In this section we will try to contrast the main 
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philosophical differences underlying these anthropological views brought by the four paradigms 
in psychology and also identify potential similarities in our search for a unified view of the 
whole field. This is not an easy task since psychotherapy and its underlying psychology was and 
continues to be ‗a babel of conflicting voices‘,
280
 as noted by Wolpe who goes on to say that: 
‗psychotherapy presents the prescientific spectacle of viewpoints that differ on fundamentals, 
schisms within viewpoints and the frequent blossoming of new viewpoints‘.
281
 Ungersma 
presents the situation in these terms:  
‗The present situation in psychotherapy is not unlike that of the man who mounted his 
horse and rode off in all directions. The theoretical orientation of therapists is based upon 
widely divergent hypotheses, theories and ideologies ... Individual practitioners of any art 
are expected to vary, but some well-organized schools of therapy also seem to be 
working at cross-purposes with other equally well-organized schools‘.
282
 
As previously stated, modern psychotherapeutic thinking arguably started with Freud.
283
 Further 
developments in psychotherapeutic thinking will arise from either the extension of 
psychoanalytic concepts or their rejection. In other words, the limits of one approach have led to 
the emergence of the next. These approaches have all in common the study of human behaviour 
on an empirical basis. Therefore, in describing the human being, we may find some similarities 
beyond the different terminologies used by these four perspectives, but most of them appear to 
be differences, which in many of the cases are not just minor but diametrically opposed.   
Here are some contrasts in terms of the curative processes:  
1. behaviourists, cognitivists and humanists focus on current problems and behaviours while 
psychodynamic therapies on past experiences;  
2. behaviourism and cognitivism tend to be short-term therapies that focus on symptom 
elimination, while psychodynamic therapies tend to be long-term interventions;  
3. behaviourism, cognitivism and psychoanalysis – where interpretation depends entirely on 
the psychotherapist – are considered to be more directive therapies, and the goal of 
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therapy is not set by the client; cognitivists of RET orientation have been associated with 
teachers since during the psychotherapeutic session the patient is taught the principles of 
therapy, and how to reason rationally; in opposition, the humanist-existentialist paradigm 
that has as a distinctive mark the role of the therapist as a facilitator or enabler
284
 was 
titled as a non-directive therapy, hence the focus of therapy on the person or client who is 
responsible for achieving the therapeutic goals. In other words, the former are more 
paternalist in that the main responsibility of the process rests with the therapist, while the 
latter sees the therapist as a friend.  
4. If, in the first three paradigms presented, the cure appears as a result of alleviating some 
specific aspect of the inner human constitution, be it symptoms, defence mechanisms, 
abnormal thinking, or unwanted behaviours, the existential-humanists argue that the cure 
comes from freeing the innate need of individuals to grow and fulfil themselves.  
 
Differences are also in the practical area, in relation to their proposed curative techniques. Thus:  
 
1. psychoanalysis cures by making the unconscious conscious and by dealing with defence 
mechanisms, behaviourists by modifying behaviour through classical and operant 
conditioning techniques, cognitivists by changing irrational and distorted thinking into 
rational, while humanist-existentialists argue for a cure through restoring individuals‘ 
free will to choose and thus take control of their lives, and increase feelings of self-worth 
by establishing congruence between the ideal self and actual self, and ultimately by 
finding meaning in life which brings self-actualization and self-fulfilment.  
2. On the other hand, if for the majority of these paradigms the goal of a cure is to alleviate 
suffering and symptoms, for existentialists suffering may be precisely the tension 
necessary to bring and keep a person healthy and on the path to self-fulfilment. 
3. Cognitivists are involved in a process meant to change thinking and beliefs in a direct 
manner, but the intervention upon the way human beings view the world and themselves 
is present in various degrees in all other approaches.   
4. Ellis criticizes psychoanalysis for not succeeding in curing but only in explaining – and 
even that is done partially. He expresses his worries in these terms: ‗this perpetual 
stimulation is the reason that disordered behavior and emotions are not extinguished and 
that simple understanding of the origins of the disturbance, obtained through 
psychoanalysis, is not sufficient to eliminate the disturbance‘.
285
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5. Another difference noted between psychotherapy and logotherapy is in that 
‗psychotherapy uncovers the psychological background of an ideology, while 








1. Psychodynamic therapies, cognitivists and humanists elaborated their theories as a result 
of investigating psychologically troubled people, i.e. from clinical practice, while 
behaviourists from laboratory experiments on animals. The only exception to this is 
Maslow because he did not actually develop a psychotherapeutic technique and 
contributed only to theoretical developments.
287
 
2. Psychodynamic therapies and behaviourism are considered deterministic while 
humanism-existentialism emphasizes free will.  
3. Psychoanalysis, behaviourism and cognitivism are seen as reductionist in that they look 
at the human being in bits and pieces which, according to the existentialist-humanists, 
leads to dehumanization and losing the whole picture of what being human is.  
4. Humanists are idiographic, so place an emphasis on the idea that people are unique and 
choose their methods accordingly; the other paradigms are focused on being nomothetic 
by trying to uncover general rules that apply to everyone.  
5. Another major distinction is that Freudianism tried to build a psychology founded on the 
unconscious, behaviourism tried to build a psychology without consciousness, while the 
other two currents acknowledged consciousness. In connection to this idea Ralea states: 
‗As for Freudians as well as behaviourists, consciousness is a pathetic illusion, a self-
deception to be dispersed as quickly as possible. Therefore, behaviourism and supporters 
of Freudian psychology protested against the understanding of psychology as a science of 




However, various concepts that belong to different paradigms seem to be referring to similar 
aspects of the human being, such as:  
 
1. Rogers‘s state of congruence – and Jung‘s totality; 
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2. Rogers‘s concept of façade – Jung‘s shadow archetype and use of mask; 




4. Rogers‘s discussion about the need to move away from others‘ expectations and 
negatively valuing pleasing others as an end in itself is similar to Ellis‘s intervention to 
change the irrational belief that everyone has to like us;  
5. Both Rogers and Jung discussed and followed wholeness in relation to man‘s state of 
normality and health.  
 
Concerning similarities, there can be noticed various guidelines within one paradigm which may 
find themselves in congruence with or closer to another paradigm, while in contradiction with 
other tendencies from their own paradigm.  
 
1. For instance, Ellis does not think that a warm relation between patient and therapist is of 
particular importance, while Beck, although operating within the same theoretical 
framework in this concern is closer to the humanists by emphasizing the quality of the 
therapeutic relationship which has to be warm, supporting and empathetic. Instead, Ellis 
is closer to the psychoanalytic view which forbids a close relation that might intermingle 
with the objectivity of the interpretation process.  
2. Ellis also argues for a persuasive, directive, even forceful therapy while Beck considers it 
beneficial for his clients to be allowed to discover maladaptive thinking patterns by 
themselves in their own time. If Ellis comes closer to the behaviourists in practising 
persuasion and following strict steps of therapy, Beck‘s approach brings him closer to the 
existential-humanist freedom offered to the client.  
3. If RET uses various methods in order to adapt better to the client‘s needs, Beck chooses 
to adapt the method to a particular identified disorder which places him closer to the 
initial medical model promoted by psychoanalysis.  
4. Although part of the psychodynamic paradigm, Jung with his emphasis on the importance 
of the spiritual side of man‘s psyche gets closer to the existential-humanist movement, 
especially Frankl.  
 
Also, we notice that at least theoretically one theory may be used as complementary to others: 
 
1. For instance, in criticizing the cognitive paradigm that it tends to overstate the cognitive 
aspects and that from the patient‘s standpoint insight in the sense of the ability to 
verbalize self-understanding may be misinterpreted as a genuine change in attitude, this 
dilemma might be solved by drawing on Rogers‘s concept of a will to change. Thus, after 
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acquiring the proper insight, the patient needs to prove the will to change manifested in 
day-to-day activities.  
2. Logotherapy emerged from the need to answer philosophical questions which could not 
be reduced to mere psychological terms. In relation to this, Frankl states that: 
‗psychotherapy as such is exceeding its scope in dealing with philosophical questions ... 
Logotherapy must supplement psychotherapy‘.
290
 But as Patterson and Watkins fairly 
point out: ‗In actual practice, however, psychotherapy and logotherapy cannot be 
separated since the psychological and the philosophical or spiritual aspects of the 
individual are indissolubly joined and can be separated only logically. Nevertheless, in 
principle, they represent different realms‘.
291
 Thus, there is also a kind of 
complementarity in that Frankl sometimes recommends logotherapy as coming first or 




The contemporary practice of psychotherapy incorporates all these approaches to various extents 
depending on country, although the predominant perspective seems to be the cognitive 
behavioural paradigm due to ‗its effectiveness relative to the other therapeutic approaches‘.
293
 
However, attempts at integration of these theories have been made and the solution is known as 
the eclecticism/integrationist
294
 movement. The need for a unified theory of the human being
295
 
has divided opinions in two ways: some argue against the possibility of such solution to be 
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pertinent and some consider it a necessity. Thus, Goldfried and Castonguay express their doubts 
in the following words:  
 
'It is doubtful that the integration movement will provide the field with one grand 
theoretical integration. Given the epistemological differences ... it is hardly likely that this 
is possible. Moreover, we would maintain that as long as there exist theoreticians, it is 
likely that there will always be competing theories‘
296
 while others show their optimism 
by pointing out that: ‗The objective of any movement toward eclecticism or integration in 
psychotherapy must be the development of a single comprehensive system of 




While some categorically asserted that ‗an eclectic system leads directly to inconsistency and 
contradiction, for techniques derived from conflicting frames of reference are bound to be 
conflicting‘
298
 others have found valid ways of integration. Daniel David refers to such 
integration:  
 
‗… experimental cognitive-behavioral psychotherapy is an overview of all 
psychotherapy, traditional forms of psychotherapy (dynamic-psychoanalytical and 
humanistic-experiential) being reinterpreted and assimilated gradually in cognitive-
behavioral terms and framework‘.
299
 In making his point clear he goes on to state that: 
‗there is a strong attempt in cognitive science to form a bridge between dynamic-
psychoanalytic therapy, humanistic-experiential therapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy 




However, in the general practice of psychotherapy it seems that ‗eclecticism is a strategy of 
selecting whatever seems best from a variety of alternatives ... on the basis of what they think 
will work for the particular person or problem‘.
301
 Concerning the elaboration of a general 
theoretical framework meant to offer a unified view on the human being, we tend to agree with 
the assertion that theorists have imprinted a strong accent on each theoretical development which 
explains why the solution of finding common elements in all these paradigms has never been 
very popular.  
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In all the issues mentioned so far it is obvious that all therapies revisit self- and world-views of a 
person in a more direct or indirect manner. This poses the very important problem of changing 
meaning and man himself to various degrees up to Skinner‘s radical statement: ‗Give me the 
specifications and I‘ll give you the man‘.
302
 Brewin and Powert in their book on Transformation 
of Meaning in Psychological Therapies argue that:  
 
‗all psychological therapies share a commitment to transforming the meanings that clients 
have attached to their symptoms, relationships and life problems. This common purpose 
has, we believe, been obscured by the use of different terminologies, by different 
conceptualizations of meaning, and by a tendency to focus on what divides therapies 




All these paradigms in psychology have contributed greatly to understanding the mechanisms 
that produce humans‘ psychological illnesses, in a time and space
304
 where there was no other 
available, and consecutively come up with solutions to heal and cure suffering and even find 
meaning in it. Still, although huge progress has been made the psychotherapeutic field is far from 
being able to offer an integrated view on psychological illness and health, or man itself. As 
Allport puts it: ‗the trouble with our current theories of learning is not so much that they are 
wrong but that they are partial‘.
305
 And this state of affairs we think is directly connected to the 
differences between the personal anthropological views that the main proponents of various 
theories hold.  
 
The overview on the human being provided by these paradigms is that of a puzzle, but one in 
which the pieces do not belong to the same ‗puzzle game‘ but rather to different ‗games‘ and 
therefore the pieces may sometimes present some similarities and seem to fit with one another 
but in reality since they are so bound to the theoretical framework and also to the personality of 
the theorist that initially generated them, they do not really match. In this respect, we agree with 
Patterson when he states: ‗It would appear to be clear that until we can reach agreement on the 
nature of human beings, no agreement on a philosophy and theory of psychotherapy is possible. 
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II. Anthropological Perspectives in the Philokalia 
 
In this second part of the chapter we are still in the process of elaborating the phenomenon under 
review and describing the second term of the comparison which will be done in the third section. 
We will try to identify major themes from the Philokalia which have points of interaction, either 
in a direct or indirect manner, with the ones presented in the previous section and that are able to 
assist us in our comparative analysis. 
 
1. Theory  
1.1 God as the Model of Man  
The main patristic anthropological viewpoint stands between these two broad ideas: ‗before the 
fall‘, when man was created in God‘s image and likeness (Gen. 1:26-27) and ‗after the fall‘, 
when God Himself became man in order for man to become God.
307
 Therefore, according to the 
Philokalic perspective, to approach the human being anthropologically is to approach him 
Christologically.  
Although sometimes drawing on concepts developed by ancient Greek philosophy, the main 
statements of patristic anthropology are grounded in the biblical perspective brought by 
revelation which found its maximal expression in the Incarnation of Christ. The main thesis is 
that through Incarnation, the Logos, in whose image man was created, offered Himself as a 
living model in order to restore the human being and gave him the possibility of regaining health 
and attaining perfection. Saint Symeon Metaphrastis in his Paraphrase of the Homilies of Saint 
Makarios of Egypt describes the way in which Christ grows within every human soul, having as a 
premise His image which is indestructible in man
308
 and as finality its deification – ‗union with 
God through grace‘,
309
 in the following words:  
‗As the new-born child is the image of the full-grown man, so the soul is in a certain 
sense the image of God who created it. The child, on growing up, begins gradually to 
recognize its father, and when it reaches maturity, they dispose things mutually and 
equally, father with son and son with father, and the father‘s wealth is disclosed to the 
son. Something similar should have happened to the soul. Before the fall, the soul was 
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to have progressed and so to have attained full manhood (cf. Eph. 4:13) .  But 
through the fall it was plunged into a sea of forgetfulness, into an abyss of 
delusion, and dwelt within the gates of hell. As if separated from God by a great 
distance, it could not draw near to its Creator and recognize Him properly. But first 
through the prophets God called it back, and drew it to knowledge of Himself. 
Finally,   through   His   own   advent   on   earth,   He   dispelled the forgetfulness, 
the delusion; then, breaking through the gates of hell, He entered the deluded soul, 
giving Himself to it as a model. By means of this model the soul can grow to maturity 
and attain the perfection of the Spirit‘.
310
 
Christ the God-Man is not only the model, the paradigm or archetype of man, but according to 
Saint Maximus the Confessor, both ‗God and man are exemplars of each other‘.
311
 Fr. Staniloae 
acknowledges that the statement of man being a model for God may seem rather daring. In 
interpreting this passage he notes that: ‗God makes Himself similar to man, imitating man, but 
the man without sin, taking man as a model, as man overcoming sin by virtue becomes God, 
taking God as model. … There is a capacity of God for humanization and a capacity of man for 
deification‘.
312
 He then underlines that this mutual process is possible in love: God‘s love for 
humanity on one side, and man‘s love for God on the other. In this paradigm‘s understanding, 
the humanist‘s assumption of man being good and perfect outside the model represented by God-
Man is simply not possible, precisely because God became man and restored the whole human 
being to its godlike potentialities.  
God the Word is to be found not only in the Gospel,
313
 understood as an outer deed, but inside 
man
314
 by imitating His way of life, as an inner deed, and thus becoming sinless in both ‗body 
and soul, in so far as a human being can do this‘.
315
 Since Christ took flesh, what used to be the 
word of God in the Old Testament, became the Word of God in the New Testament,
316
 in 
anthropological terms this objectively means the model for a healthy nous, will, reason, desire 
etc. i.e. everything that constitutes the soul, as well as for the body. The fact that Christ shared 
out of love exactly the same conditions as any human being, remaining God and man at the same 
time, made possible man‘s deification by grace:  
‗Christ is by nature both God and man. In an ineffable and supranatural manner we 
participate by grace in Him as God, while He in His incomprehensible love for men 
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Being made in God‘s image man‘s soul is triadic
318
 and therefore in the process of deification all 
Three Persons of the Holy Trinity play a part in it. While through His incarnation Christ offered 
man the model for a saintly life,
319
 in order to find God‘s image within himself man needs to be 
‗renewed through the grace and the power of the Spirit‘
320
 and in the process of ‗giving birth to 
Christ‘ within his soul the Holy Spirit ‗in an astonishing way‘ shall ‗bring into existence what 




1.2 The Structure of the Soul 
 
In this section of the chapter we intend to deepen the patristic understanding of the psyche/soul 
and its structure. Our hypothesis is that here we might find major differences between the two 
fields accounted in this research that initially seemed to us similar in terms of preoccupation to 
alleviate suffering and cure souls. Previously, we have established that the major Philokalic 
anthropological premise is that man was made in God‘s image and that this image is Trinitarian 
as God Himself is. Next, we try to understand better this composition of man. Although we fully 
acknowledge the close relation that exists between body and soul
322
 in our work we are 
concerned with understanding the relationships that exist within the soul, between its powers that 
have the same substance and which relate directly with the practice and theory of both the 
psychotherapeutic and ascetic fields. Nowadays, the area of connection between body and soul is 
the realm of psychiatry which deals with medication meant to influence brain chemistry and 
therefore alleviate or cure psychic suffering.  
In a first classification, the human soul/psyche according to Saint John of Damascus has three 
powers:
323
 the vital or vegetative power (growth, nourishment and generation) which man has in 
common with all living beings and which can escape the control of man‘s will. In this respect, 
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psyche (psykhe) may also simply mean life;
324
 the animal power, found in both man and animals 
which traditionally consists of irascibility (thymos) and concupiscablity (epithymetikon). Larchet, 
based on patristic sources here also includes the ‗capacity for sensation and perception‘
325
 and 
‗imagination under its elementary and non-rational aspects‘;
326
 and finally, the rational power 
which is specific to man and distinguishes him from other areas of the created world. This 
classification is useful, especially to emphasize the rational and irrational aspects of the soul.  
In reference to the human being, patristic writings generally use a dichotomous soul-body model 
in order to underline the unity that exists within the human soul‘s powers. To highlight man‘s 
union with God, the Fathers sometimes use a trichotomous spirit/intellect/nous-soul-body 
model.
327
 It is only for ‗didactic‘ reasons they make classifications and use concepts to describe 
inner features of the human soul. Otherwise, they all acknowledge that in its natural state the soul 
has an intrinsic unity which makes possible communion with God and therefore deification. 
Further, we shall look closer to what constitutes the soul from a patristic viewpoint, how does it 
function and relate to God and the world. In order to keep ourselves within a patristic framework, 
we have to make this ‗dissection‘ of the soul with the following idea in mind: the human soul in 
its natural state has unity, it is seen as a ‗single entity‘, undivided although it ‗possesses many 
powers‘.
328
 The best known classification is that of the tripartite soul
329
 inherited on a platonic 
line of thought but whose content became fully Christian in a patristic context. In other words, 
the Philokalic Fathers provided the platonic ‗schema‘ with the content of the newly revealed 
knowledge that came through the Incarnation of the Son of God. According to this division the 
soul has three powers: to logistikon, the intelligent power; to thymikon, the incensive power; and 
to epithymitikon, the desiring or appetitive power. The last two are many times referred to as the 
passible (in other descriptions appetitive or irrational) aspects of the soul, emphasizing the fact 
that in their natural order these two need to be controlled and led by the intelligent power and 
that, when they do not function according to nature, are susceptible to influences from passions. 
What brings them back to virtue is the leading force of the intellect.
330
 The commanding role of 
the intellect is put in relation with both the passible aspect and the whole man represented by the 
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body-soul unity and therefore is designed to acquire the unity of the human being within a single 
will:  
‗And as the intellect, controlling the mindless impulses of the passions, directs each of 
them according to the divine will, so man, controlling the members of his body, makes 
them subject to a single will and not to many. For he does not allow the four constituent 
elements of the body, or its many members, to do what they wish, nor does he allow the 
three faculties of the soul to act, or impel the body to act, thoughtlessly and licentiously; 




Another Philokalic writer, Saint Nikitas Stithatos, for practical reasons speaks mainly of two 
aspects of soul, the noetic and passible, while acknowledging its tripartite structure as well. The 
reason he does this is to emphasize that:  
‗the noetic aspect, being in the image of the soul‘s Creator, is not conditioned by the 
senses, is invisible to them and is not limited by them, since it is both outside them and 
within them‘ while the passible aspect is ‗split up among the senses and is subject to 
passions and prone to self-indulgence … modified by what it comes into contact with, it 
is sometimes incited by impulses contrary to nature and develops disordered desires‘.
332
 
While there is a natural function of the passible aspect meant to relate the human being to the 
world perceptible to senses in order to sustain life through breathing, hunger, thirst and so on, 
this is precisely why this function may be distorted and ‗be found in the company of the passions 
… and luxuriate in self-indulgence‘,
333
 as Saint Nikitas puts it. On the other hand, the natural 
role of the noetic power is to lead over the passible power since: 
‗It is by virtue of this aspect that the soul communicates with spiritual and divine powers 
and, through the sacred knowledge of created being, ascends naturally to God as to its 
archetype, thus entering into the enjoyment of His divine nature‘.
334
 
Saint Diadochos of Photiki speaks about a perceptive faculty of the intellect,
335
 beyond the 
cognitive (intellectual) one, and this faculty is meant to sense the presence of God and His 








 Ibid.  
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spiritual realities which discerns spiritually between good and evil, just as the physical taste 
discriminates the good from the bad food. Referring to the same qualities of nous/intellect, Saint 
Gregory Palamas talks about thought and intuition which in biblical terms are traced back and 
linked to the concept of heart:   
‗The intellectual activity consisting of thought and intuition is called intellect and the 
power that activates thought and intuition is likewise the intellect; and this power 
Scripture also calls the heart. It is because the intellect is pre-eminent among our inner 
powers that our soul is deiform‘.
336
  
In another description we learn from Saint Nikitas Stithatos that the soul, similar to the body, has 
five senses: ‗intellect, reason, noetic perception, ratiocination, and noetic perception‘ which 
finally appear organized in three major psychic activities: ‗intellection, ratiocination, and noetic 
perception‘.
337
 These specific activities of the noetic part of the soul play specific roles. Thus, 
intellection is used to ‗apprehend spiritual intentions‘, which are then interpreted ‗by means of 
ratiocination‘, and noetic perception finds it way in grasping ‗the images of divine insight and 
spiritual knowledge‘.
338
 However, the finality of all noetic activities and the major role of nous 
consist in the ability to distinguish the intentions of various thoughts in order to give the assent 
only to those that are divine, and all other activities of the intellect depend on this. Deification, 
but also the cure of the three powers of the soul depends on this.  
In Philokalic writings, nous is sometimes referred to as one of the three powers of the soul, and 
sometimes as the soul itself. Saint Maximus, who is congruent with other Philokalic authors on 
this issue, notes that these three powers (intelligence, desire, and incensive power) have precise 
roles and collaborate in order to extinguish evil from the soul and acquire holiness. In this 
process all these powers are necessary but it is important for them to function according to their 
intended purpose, i.e. according to their nature:   
‗Without the power of intelligence there is no capacity for spiritual knowledge; and 
without spiritual knowledge we cannot have the faith from which springs that hope 
whereby we grasp things of the future as though they were present. Without the power of 
desire there is no longing, and so no love, which is the issue of longing; for the property 
of desire is to love something. And without the incensive power, intensifying the desire 
for union with what is loved, there can be no peace, for peace is truly the complete and 
undisturbed possession of what is desired‘.
339
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Saint Gregory of Sinai states that man‘s soul, being made in the image of God, is itself triadic 
and as there is unity between the three Persons of the Trinity, in the same way between the three 
instances of man‘s soul:  
‗In man there is intellect, consciousness and spirit. There is neither intellect without 
consciousness nor consciousness without spirit: each subsists in the other and in itself. 
Intellect expresses itself through consciousness and consciousness is manifested through 
the spirit. In this way, man is a dim image of the ineffable and archetypal Trinity, 
disclosing even now the divine image in which he is created‘.
340
 Each of these instances 
of man‘s soul has a correspondence within the Trinity: ‗the Father truly corresponds to 
the intellect, the Son to consciousness and the Holy Spirit to the spirit‘.
341
  
Careful distinctions need to be made between intellect (nous) and reason (dianoia). If nous is 
considered the purest part of the soul, the ‗eye of the soul‘,
342
 that which has access to 
understanding and receiving the divine truth, reason is the faculty that organizes and expresses 
what is understood and perceived by the nous. Saint Maximus clearly states the difference in 
saying that ‗a pure intellect sees things correctly‘ while ‗a trained intelligence puts them in 
order‘.
343
 According to Saint Maximus, nous gives birth to faith that in turn is founded upon 
spiritual knowledge. That is why faith naturally transcends reason and the relationship 
established between nous and reason is similar to the one between faith and reason, i.e. reason 
has the role of ‗translating‘ concepts that are apprehended by the pure intellect: ‗Faith is true 
knowledge, the principles of which are beyond rational demonstration; for faith makes real for us 
things beyond intellect and reason‘.
344
 
The nous, as otherwise the whole soul, may be found in one of three states: according to nature, 
contrary to nature, or above nature. When it functions according to nature nous ‗keeps the 
passions under control, contemplates the inner essences of created beings and abides with 
God‘.
345
 These three functions of nous are in connection with the three stages of spiritual growth 
necessary to reach salvation and deification: praxis, contemplation and theoria or union with 
God. The healthy or unhealthy states of nous and the consequences that each state brings on the 
soul are described by Saint Mark the Ascetic in the following words:  
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‗The intellect changes from one to another of three different noetic states: that according 
to nature, above nature, and contrary to nature. When it enters the state according to 
nature, it finds that it is itself the cause of evil thoughts, and confesses its sins to God, 
clearly understanding the causes of the passions. When it is in the state contrary to nature, 
it forgets God‘s justice and fights with men, believing itself unjustly treated. But when it 
is raised to the state above nature, it finds the fruits of the Holy Spirit: love, joy, peace 
and the other fruits of which the Apostle speaks (cf. Gal. 5:22); and it knows that if it 
gives priority to bodily cares it cannot remain in this state. An intellect that departs from 
this state falls into sin and all the terrible consequences of sin – if not immediately, then 




1.3 On Thoughts  
 
Thoughts occupy a central place in the nous‘s sickening and cure. To understand their place and 
role within the nous‘s structure will help us compare the patristic understanding on thought with 
the psychological one in the next section of the present chapter. This topic is so important that all 
Philokalic writers draw upon it more or less extensively.  
Thoughts (logismoi) are mainly linked with the activity of reason
347
 rather than of intellect. This 
is clearly stated by the Philokalic writer Ilias the Presbyter when saying that:  
‗Thoughts pertain neither to the non-rational aspect of the soul (for they do not occur in 
non-rational animals), nor to its intellectual aspect (since they are not to be found in 
angels). Being products of the reason, they use the imagination as a ladder, and so ascend 
from the world of the senses to the intellect, conveying to the latter the observations 
which they have derived from sense-perception; then they redescend from the intellect 
down to the world of the senses, communicating to it the intellect‘s principles‘.
348
  
Thus, we note the intermediary place thoughts have between senses and intellect. That is why 
Philokalic writers put a strong emphasis on the source of these thoughts. According to the same 
Philokalic writer intellection (noisis) is the natural activity of the nous through which intellect 
‗attains spiritual realities‘ in a direct manner, thought is the instrument of reason through which it 
‗grasps what is rational‘, and sense-perception ‗is involved with practical and material realities 
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by means of fantasy‘.
349
 Accordingly, it is specific to a man of spiritual knowledge to know 
when his nous is in the realm of intellection, that of thought or that of sense-perception since 




In terms of thought‘s sources there are many identified by these writers and they have a direct 
impact on the quality of information brought by thoughts and therefore lead to the sickening or 
curing of the soul. Thoughts may be ‗roused by the senses‘
351
 or ‗by passions‘.
352
 Saint 
Thalassios the Libyan presents three ways in which thoughts may arise in the intellect: ‗through 
the senses, through the memory, and through the body‘s temperament‘
353
 and from these, the 
ones that come through memory are most annoying and more difficult to oppose. Another writer 
also points to memory as a major source due to its loss of original simplicity and one-pointedness 
following corruption brought by the fall: ‗The source and ground of our distracted thoughts is the 
fragmented state of our memory‘.
354
 
Thoughts are stimulated by passions, but differ from them: ‗An evil thought is preceded by 
passion. The passion is caused by the senses, but the misuse of the senses is clearly the fault of 
the intellect‘.
355
 The conclusion we draw from here is that the sickness of the psyche comes first 
through the intellect‘s ‗ignorance‘, considered ‗the source of all evil‘
356
 and closely supported by 
‗forgetfulness‘ and ‗laziness‘.
357
 Thus, senses found un-led and unguarded turn towards the 
world and provide information for what in time will become a passion. In their turn, passions 
will permanently feed evil thoughts. The intimate relation that exists between thought and 
passion is closely examined and explained by Saint Maximus the Confessor. He states that 
thoughts may be simple or composite. Thoughts free of passions are simple, while ‗passion-
charged thoughts are composite, consisting as they do of a conceptual image combined with 
passion‘.
358
   
As in the case of Adam‘s fall, demons continue to tempt every man through thought either by 
stirring the passions which bring the conceptual image associated with it, or by first bringing to 
mind the conceptual image which in turn activates the passion.
359
 Saint Anthony the Great in 
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trying to explain the natural link that exists between God and man‘s soul and the disturbance of 
this relation brought by demons, puts it plainly:  
‗The pure soul, because of its innate goodness, is illuminated and made resplendent by 
God; and then the intellect apprehends what is good and begets thoughts that accord with 
God‘s will. But when the soul is defiled by evil, and God turns away from it, or rather the 
soul separates itself from God, evil demons enter its thought processes and suggest 
unholy acts to it‘.
360
 
Demons represent one of the major themes to be found in the Philokalia. Their description is 
vivid and personal. Initially they were angels that tried in an arrogant way to acquire the glory of 
God. Their desire to become God without communion with God naturally resulted in their losing 
true life and putting on death. Furthermore, the demons generated evil, and all evilness that exists 
in the world is the result of their actions. They are not evil by nature since God did not create 





 and ‗immaterial and sleepless, concerned only to fight against us and to 
destroy our souls through word, act, and thought‘.
363
 There are various categories of demons
364
 
which attack all the three powers of the soul with the goal of misleading man and cutting his 
relation with God. They ‗inhabit the world of our psychic powers‘,
365
 and confuse the nous in 
order to generate delusions, that come first ‗in the form of mental images and fantasies‘, and 
‗then in the form of diabolic influence which is the origin of mental derangement‘.
366
 Their main 
way of attack is through thoughts
367
 and therefore the ascetic method is careful to place a great 
emphasis on watchfulness and discrimination of thoughts as the primary method of fighting 
demons, since they become ‗powerless if exposed‘.
368
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To make a compound thought simple again, we need to separate the passion from the conceptual 
image ‗by means of spiritual love and self-control‘.
369
 This is in fact the goal of the spiritual 
warfare against demons: on one hand, to battle against passions associated with conceptual 
images but not with the things or images of things themselves, and on the other hand regain 
purity of intellect and therefore look on things dispassionately.
370
 However, if you want to 
‗destroy the passions‘, another way is to ‗shut out the senses‘
 371
 since they are the first gate for 
the entrance of sin and the thoughts associated with it.  
In a different categorization, when linked with their motivating occasions, thoughts appear to be 
fourfold: material; demonic; natural; and supernatural.
372
 Also, Evagrios the Solitary 
distinguishes between three main sources of thoughts: angelic; human; and demonic,
373
 while 
other authors identify eight main evil thoughts that comprise all others.
374
 They are termed evil 
because of their strong link with demons which are found to be their primary cause. The 
descriptions that are made of these evil thoughts and the soul‘s struggle to fight them are 
portrayed in terms of warfare. As in any battle, when the enemy is found unprepared, 
insufficiently guarded, the evil thoughts can enter the heart while the intellect is not watchful. 
The strategy assumes that first they enter ‗one by one … each in its own time‘ and once inside 
they introduce ‗a swarm of other evil thoughts as well‘ with the result of darkening the intellect 
which in turn ‗stimulates the body and provokes it to sinful actions‘.
375
  
These thoughts may disturb anybody since it is not in anyone‘s power to stop them, as they exist 
beyond one‘s intellect. But it is for the will of everyone to decide whether ‗to dwell on them or 
not to dwell on them, to excite the passions or not to excite them‘
376
 and this training of the free 
will constitutes the main concern of the ascetic method. Ascetical practice established that 
thoughts are harder to combat than things since it is much easier to isolate yourself from 
distractive stimuli than from the images of those stimuli: ‗Just as it is easier to sin in the mind 
than in action, so warfare through our impassioned conceptual images of things is harder then 
warfare through the things themselves‘.
377
 The problem of thoughts also brings forward the idea 
of inner fragmentation brought by the fall. If ‗unimpassioned thoughts arise in one living in a 
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state of unity‘ in people found in various states of division one may find ‗reasoned 
calculations‘.
378
 Thus, purity of the nous becomes synonymous with its unity.  
As mentioned before, thoughts are essential to the process of the soul‘s healing and salvation. 
That is why it is important what kind of thoughts one harbours as they are very intimate to the 
inner world of the soul. Saint Theodoros the Great Ascetic talks about the relationship between 
thoughts resulting from spiritual knowledge and the soul in this way:  
‗Let these thoughts dwell with you, sleep with you, arise with you. See that you never forget 
them but, wherever you are, keep them in mind, so that evil thoughts may depart and may be 




2. Practice  
2.1 Asceticism as a Curative Method  
 
The ascetic method is a natural development of the Philokalic anthropological perspective, which 
as we showed above is fundamentally Christological. The entire curative process revolves 
around Christ the God-Man which is both the way and the aim towards which man moves. The 
ecclesiological aspect is closely intertwined with the ascetic method and short references will be 
made whenever it proved necessary although it is beyond the goal of this research to treat this 
topic at large. However, we will consider the ascetic method by keeping in mind that it is 
essentially an intrinsic constituent of the wider ecclesiological dimension of the church. Even 
more, Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos argues in his many writings that not only the ascetic 
method but the entire Orthodox theology is ‗a psychotherapeutic method and treatment‘, not just 





2.1.1 The Three Stages Towards Healing/Deification 
 
Most Philokalic authors speak of three stages on the way to curing the soul: the practical stage 
(praktiki) which comprises the ascetic method, the contemplative stage (physiki), and theology or 
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knowledge of God (gnosis or theoria).
381
 In the present research we deal in more detail with the 
first stage, although it cannot be completely separated from the other two stages. The three stages 
are linked to each other and while it is true that one cannot acquire knowledge of God without 
praxis and contemplation, it is also true that spiritual knowledge enforces the perfect ascetic 
practice through discernment and information acquired at this stage:  
‗Ascetic practice cannot be consolidated without contemplation, and contemplation cannot be 
genuine without ascetic practice. For practice must be based on intelligence, and 
contemplation on practice. In this way evil will be powerless to disrupt practice, and 
contemplation will be prolific in acts of goodness‘.
382
 This close relation strengthens the 
principle according to which ‗ascetic practice consists not merely in managing to do what is 




2.1.2 Baptism as a Premise for Healing  
 
Saint Diadochos of Photiki underlines the importance of baptism in permeating man‘s soul and 
eliminating evil from the nous. He emphasizes that it is not possible for one to be found 
simultaneously in the presence of two contrary powers, God and the devil, and shows the 
importance of man‘s will to choose under which influences he wants to be. He states that the 
Holy Spirit through the mystery of baptism renews man‘s possibility for divine likeness found 
already as a potentiality in His image, and thus expels the devil from the nous. If this is the case, 
then the free will of man or the way one is educated towards it gains an important place in 
ascetic practice, being linked especially with the practice of obedience on one hand and 
discernment of thoughts on the other: 
‗We share in the image of God by virtue of the intellectual activity of our soul … It was 
because of this that the holy Logos of God took flesh and, being God, He bestowed on us 
through His own baptism the water of salvation, so we might be reborn … if we commit 
ourselves totally to God, we are immediately purified in soul and body by the Holy Spirit 
who now dwells in us and drives out sin … Since the form imprinted on the soul is single 
and simple, it is not possible for two contrary powers to be present simultaneously. For 
when through holy baptism divine grace in its infinite love permeates the lineaments of 
God‘s image – thereby renewing in the soul the capacity for attaining the divine likeness 
– what place is there for the devil? … the protean serpent is expelled from the shrine of 
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the intellect through the waters of baptism … although baptism removes from us the stain 
resulting from sin, it does not thereby heal the duality of will immediately, neither does it 
prevent the demons from attacking us or speaking deceitful words to us‘.
384
 
In the next paragraph, the same saint points towards the devil‘s expulsion from the soul on one 
hand, and the temptations he continues to send through the body on the other hand. As such, it is 
perfectly understandable why the entire ascetic practice insists on shutting down the gate of 
senses: ‗Satan is expelled from the soul by holy baptism, but is permitted to act upon it through 
the body. The grace of God, on the other hand, dwells in the very depths of the soul – that is to 
say, in the intellect‘.
385
 In this way knowledge of Christ‘s commandments will be easily 
connected to the inner reality of grace that dwells from the baptism in the human soul, helping 
him in his cure from both outside and inside.  
 
2.1.3 Healing the Nous – Debut of Cure 
 
Based on Philokalic writings, the corresponding image of God in man is the nous.
386
 Following 
the corruption of man‘s spiritual powers because of Adam‘s sin, in order to be cured man needed 
the restoration brought by Christ. Thus, people are good as the humanists also state, but we see 
from here that such an assertion cannot be made outside notions of good and evil and that it 
inevitably involves ‗value‘.
387
 Even more, from a Philokalic anthropological viewpoint, the 
assertion that people are good involves the fact that man was made in God‘s image and likeness, 
which became possible through His Incarnation and continued through the church‘s mysteries. 
Since the entrance gates for all sin are senses which are permanently connected with the world, 
Philokalic writers unanimously state that curing the soul means to turn the intellect towards God 
and allow it to have the leading role, with the appetitive and incensive powers following the 
intellect.  
Saint Hesychios the Priest drawing on Saint Anthony the Great asserts:  
‗As Anthony, the great servant of God, said, ―Holiness is achieved when the intellect is in 
its natural state‖. And again he said: ―The soul realizes its integrity when its intellect is in 
that state in which it was created.‖ And shortly after this he adds: ―Let us purify our 
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mind, for I believe that when the mind is completely pure and is in its natural state, it 
gains penetrating insight, and it sees more clearly and further than the demons, since the 
Love reveals things to it‘.
388
  
Therefore, intellect is in its natural state when it regains the purity owned at its creation and 
restored now through holiness. Only in this state does man become and be good objectively; 
otherwise, his goodness remains only a potentiality of his image, but one that is never objectified 
in likeness. In order to restore its noetic and divine nature intellect needs to reduce contact with 
the world of senses which turns the soul‘s attention towards a different direction. So there is not 
only a perception related to sense but also one related to intellect, which becomes active using 
this method: ‗Just as the senses of the body impel us almost violently towards what attracts them, 




Due to the fact that the soul is single, in ascetic practice it is important for all its powers to be 
purified since they naturally communicate their energy to each other, be it positive or negative. 
In consequence, the soul‘s healing abundantly needs the gift of discernment for discriminating 
between the exact state of these inner powers and a cure is needed for each specific situation.   
‗In those devoted to prayer … the intellect‘s noetic activity is easily ordered and purified, 
but the power that produces this activity cannot be purified unless all the soul‘s other 
powers are also purified. For the souls is a single entity possessing many powers. Thus if 
one of its powers is vitiated the whole of it is denied; for since the soul is single, the evil 
in one of its powers is communicated to all the rest. Now since each of the soul‘s powers 
produces a different energy, it is possible that with diligence one of these energies might 
be temporally purified; but the power in question will not therefore be pure, since it 
communes with all the rest and so it remains impure rather than pure‘.
390
  
The stage of pure prayer is thus acquired only after purifying the powers of the soul and restoring 
them to their initial unity. In this process the advice of a spiritual father is essential as it will 
remain so for the length of the ascetic‘s entire life. Practising obedience towards a spiritual 
father
391
 is also linked with the idea of making best use of one‘s own free will. Since the wrong 
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will was the reason for Adam and Eve‘s deceit, now in the same way the good will becomes the 
reason for cure and salvation. It is exactly this method of submitting to another‘s judgment that 
will restore reason to its natural place of being subordinated to the nous. Ideally, the spiritual 
father is the person that has acquired the stage of theoria and from this position gives advice to 
others. Making reference to the relation between the spiritual father and his spiritual child, Saint 
Gregory Palamas points to the father‘s responsibilities when he has to:  
‗… find suitable ways of healing each of his soul‘s powers. He will cleanse its moral aspect 
with the right kind of ascetic practice, its power of spiritual apperception with knowledge, its 
power of contemplation with prayer, and in this way he will attain perfect, true and enduring 
purity of heart and intellect – a purity that no one can ever experience except through 




2.1.4 Against Passions –Towards Virtues393 
 
The main purpose of the practical stage is to keep the commandments of Christ, and acquire 
virtue since Christ‘s commandments are ‗the very will of God for every man‘ and at the same 
time ‗laws meant to ensure proper functioning for the three powers of the soul‘.
394
 Ogliari 
explains that ‗St Philotheos‘ novelty‘ is in that he assigns to each of the three powers of the soul 
a commandment from the New Testament and by respecting it, each power may regain and 
maintain its health.
395
   
The tripartite classification of the soul‘s powers allows the Philokalic Fathers to analyze various 
passions in detail and offer remedies for them. When the intelligence surrenders, passions occur 
within the passible part of the soul through the five senses.
396
 That is why the cure of every 
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passion starts from the noetic power. Passions may be bodily or of the soul, according or 
contrary to nature.
397
 Hence, the virtues to be acquired are of both body and soul.
398
  
Virtues, in a patristic understanding do not follow the Aristotelian paradigm, but are considered 
‗natural signs of godlike attributes‘
399
 and they constitute the normality of man from a patristic 
anthropological viewpoint. That is why the ascetic method is oriented towards obtaining these 
virtues understood not simply as an ethical key but as direct participation and union with God. In 
order to acquire virtue, the ascetical method provided by the similars of God
400
 requires giving 
up the world and the flesh.
401
 As passions seem to accompany man from birth
402
 and ‗we easily 
revert to the passions of the flesh‘
403
 unless their causes are not constantly cut off, it is only 
through a genuine love for God that we can keep them at a distance 
 
since this love makes one 
‗choose Him rather than the world, and the soul rather than the flesh, by despising the things of 




2.1.5 A Short Account of Suffering  
 
A major characteristic of the cure proposed by the ascetic method includes approaching the 
matter of suffering in a specific key. In line with its anthropological framework, the Philokalia 
highlights the close relation between the sufferings of Christ and the inevitability of those of the 
man who chooses to follow Him. Thus, suffering assumed in Christ is part of the medicine that 
needs to be taken for inner healing since man only through ‗bitter separation (with much 
suffering of the heart)‘
405
 can separate himself from his passions. On the other hand, it is 
considered that ‗nothing pleases God more than sufferings or bodily privations for His sake; and 
nothing attracts His loving kindness more than tears‘.
406
   
The suffering appears also associated with one’s cross, and even with the folly of the cross that 
provides true wisdom ‗which resides not in fine words but in the power of the Cross that is active 
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as an actual reality in those found worthy to achieve such wisdom‘.
407
 In order to become 
‗coheirs of Christ‘ one needs to assume ‗the cross, or death to the whole world, the afflictions, 
the trials and the other sufferings undergone by Christ‘
408
 and ‗if we want to share His 




However, the next quote from Saint Symeon the New Theologian seems to summarize the main 
points made in the Philokalia on the issue of suffering and its final transformation into joy, and 
later in this work we will see the same matter applied practically in relation to the passions of 
fear and dejection:  
 
‗Fear of torment and the sufferings of the heart it engenders are salutary to everyone who 
begins life in God. A man who hopes to lay the foundations of righteous life without such 
sufferings, or to free himself from the bonds of fear, lays the foundations of his work on 
sand and dreams to build his house in the air without groundwork, which is of course 
impossible. At the same time, very soon these sufferings turn to joy, these bonds sever 





To conclude this section of the chapter we would like to emphasize three main ideas: first, the 
curative process is one meant to restore man to his state before the fall and gain a divine likeness 
through a process of unification between all the soul‘s powers;
411
 second, the natural course of 
this process is that ‗the truly physician-like intellect is one that first heals itself and then heals 
others of the diseases of which it has been cured‘;
412
 and ultimately, although the effort towards 
cure is supported by man‘s own free will, in the end ‗only the Holy Spirit can purify the intellect, 
for unless a greater power comes and overthrows the despoiler, what he has taken captive will 
never be set free‘.
413
 Man‘s effort is perfected by the intervention of the Holy Spirit which places 
the ascetical practice within a pure Christian mystical framework and not simply a process 
coordinated by one‘s own or someone else‘s reason.  
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2.2 Ascetical Methods – A Short Description  
 
Asceticism is a method in itself containing many other sub-methods which address the entire 
complexity of the human being seen in its unity of body and soul: fasting; vigils; guarding the 
intellect; singing; reading; prayer and so on. Either closer to praxis or nepsis,
414
 according to 
Saint Thalasius the Libyan they all aim ‗to produce a clear conscience‘.
415
 Next, we will describe 
some of the methods that may look similar to ones found in modern psychotherapeutic 
paradigms and which will support our comparative efforts made in the third section of this 
chapter.  
 
2.2.1 Inner Analysis  
 
Generally speaking, this is one method used the whole way towards deification in various forms 
and degrees. It is linked with the necessity of one to know oneself which is addressed to 
everybody and is meant to accompany man through the three stages of ascetic practice, 
contemplation and theoria. This inner analysis will ultimately uncover the image of Christ which 
is hidden within each soul. Thus we might say that inner analysis is in close connection with the 
fulfilment of Christ‘s words: ‗But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness; and 
all these things shall be added unto you‘ (Mt. 6:33) and ‗the kingdom of God is within you‘ (Lk. 
17:21).  
The kind of inner analysis described in the Philokalia has a few characteristics:  
1. First, it is guided by observing and keeping Christ‘s commandments since ‗Christ is 
hidden in the Gospel‘
416
 and second, by the advice previously offered by those who 
attained the stage of spiritual knowledge following this path. That is why many Philokalic 
authors naturally quote other authors that preceded them. To mention just a few 
examples, Hesychios the Priest draws on Saint Anthony the Great,
417
 Saint Peter of 
Damascus on Saint Isaac the Syrian and Saint Maximus the Confessor,
418
 Saint John of 
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Damascus on Saint Mark the Ascetic.
419
 The examples here are far too many to mention 
them all.  
2. This kind of inner analysis is put in relation to humility, considered one of the greatest 
virtues.
420
 Saint Nikitas Stithatos makes this connection very clear: ‗―Know Thyself‖: this 
is true humility, the humility that teaches us to be inwardly humble and makes our heart 
contrite. Such humility you must cultivate and guard. For if you do not yet know yourself 
you cannot know what humility is, and have not yet embarked truly on the task of 
cultivating and guarding. To know oneself is the goal of the practice of the virtues‘.
421
 At 
the end of this process of inner analysis, ‗your consciousness of the knowledge of God 
will grow lucid and you will begin to contemplate the mysteries of the kingdom of 
heaven and the inner essences of created things … Correspondingly you gain knowledge 
of your own limitations and recognize the weakness of human nature; at the same time 
your love for God and your fellow beings waxes until you think that sanctification flows 
simply from a greeting or from the proximity of those with whom you live‘.
422
 Therefore, 
to know yourself in the Philokalic understanding is not simply a rational process meant 
solely to improve knowledge of yourself, but it takes you to the state of truthful being and 
puts you in agreement with the image of Christ in you. Also, it is the way towards theoria 
and the complete curing of the soul – deification.  
3. It is done under supervision from a spiritual father and closely connected with the 
practice of obedience.
423
 This practice is important since, in Saint Maximus the 
Confessor‘s words, ‗the result of obedience is virtue‘ and ‗obedience leads to keeping the 
commandments and to union with Him who gave them‘.
424
 
4. The final target of this analysis is to ‗give birth‘ to Christ within one‘s soul425 and thus 
restore the soul to its natural stature and cure it. This process is succinctly described by 
Saint Maximus in this way: ‗The Logos of God is like a grain of mustard seed (cf. Matt. 
13:31): before cultivation it looks extremely small, but when cultivated in the right way it 
grows so large that the highest principles of both sensible and intelligible creation come 
like birds to revive themselves in it. For the principles or inner essences of all things are 
embraced by the Logos, but the Logos is not embraced by anything. Hence the Lord has 
said that he who has faith as a grain of mustard seed can move a mountain by a word of 
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command (cf. Matt. 17:20), that is, he can destroy the devil‘s dominion over us and 




2.2.2 Watchfulness (nipsis) 
 
Inner analysis starts with what Philokalic writers call watchfulness, a method of being attentive 
to oneself. Which of the powers of the soul should do this activity and how to be attentive to 
yourself? To this question we receive an answer from Saint Gregory Palamas:  
‗―Be attentive to yourself‖, says Moses (Deut. 15:9 LXX) – that is, to the whole of 
yourself, not to a few things that pertain to you, neglecting the rest. By what means? With 
the intellect assuredly, for nothing else can pay attention to the whole of yourself. Set this 
guard, therefore, over your soul and body, for thereby you will readily free yourself from 
the evil passions of body and soul. Take yourself in hand, then, be attentive to yourself, 
scrutinize yourself; or rather, guard, watch over and test yourself, for in this manner you 
will subdue your rebellious unregenerate self to the Spirit and there will never again be 
‗some secret iniquity in your heart‘ (Deut. 15:9)‘.
427
 
The translators of the Philokalia into English draw our attention to the central role assigned to 
watchfulness by Saints Makarios and Nikodimos,
428
 the compilers of this collection. Its central 
role derives from being a natural companion on the entire way to attaining purity of mind and 
heart, rearing a constant attentiveness over inner thoughts and fantasies. To be in a niptic state 
for the Fathers of the Philokalia means to be in a healthy state of self-defence, necessary to 
protect against the devil which is ‗immaterial and sleepless, concerned only to fight against us 
and to destroy our souls through word, act and thought‘.
429
 
Saint Symeon the New Theologian talks about three ways of attentiveness and describes the 
method of watchfulness by using the house as a metaphor. He considers that the ‗house‘ of the 
soul must be ‗watched‘, starting from its foundations when ‗we must watch over the heart and 
curtail passions arising from it‘, then we must build its walls through the second form of 
attentiveness when ‗we must repulse the turbulence of the evil spirits that fight us by means of 
external senses‘ and then put on the roof by ‗detaching ourselves entirely from all things and 
give ourselves wholly to God‘.
430
 Hence, it accompanies the soul from the beginning of ascetic 
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practice until the end of bodily life. Even if one may attain the stage of theoria, watchfulness still 
remains the guardian of the heart, keeping the attentiveness of the hesychast on prayer and other 
noetic activities. Watchfulness is therefore put in connection with ‗the noetic work‘ of the soul 




2.2.3 Discrimination of Thoughts  
 
The result of practising watchfulness is ultimately discrimination of thoughts. This method is 
connected with the virtue of discernment and because of its importance for our present research 
it will be developed in more detail in another chapter of this research. Here we intend to 
emphasize its relation with the soul‘s powers, that is, to place it not so much ‗functionally‘ as 
‗structurally‘.  
Discrimination of thoughts is preceded by truth and has its origin in humility.
432
 It is linked with 
the noetic power of soul and depends on its mode and healthy way of functioning. Saint Nikitas 
Stithatos, a real painter of the inward realities of the soul and a deep psychologist of the 
Philokalic writings, describes with the accuracy of a true and rightful scientist the movements 
within the soul‘s noetic faculty, showing which one depends on which. Hence, he ascertains that 
the role of the nous is to:  
‗clearly distinguish the intentions of its thoughts and in its purity gives its assent only to 
those that are divine‘, the aim of reason is to ‗interpret the physical movements of the 
whole visible creation – that is to say, can clearly elucidate the inner essences of things‘ 
while integrated into a general noetic vision, and also the nous ‗can perceive heavenly 
wisdom and spiritual knowledge‘.
433
 
If discrimination of intentions of thoughts is the function of the nous, reason‘s task is to interpret 
them and if necessary ‗translate‘ them into words. Beyond these two functions, Saint Nikitas also 
mentions the noetic perception whose purpose is to ‗grasp the images of divine insight and 
spiritual knowledge‘.
434
 Through these concerted and simultaneous activities of the nous, 
strongly sustained by the soul‘s incensive power or will,
435
 one may reach the state of purity of 
heart which ‗consists simply in our not letting evil droughts enter the soul‘.
436
 Found in the state 
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of purity of heart one may also receive what is known in patristic vocabulary as the gift of 
discernment which will be extensively discussed in a different chapter, in relation to the ability to 
diagnose. To conclude, discrimination of thoughts ‗structurally‘ belongs to nous’s activity, while 
‗functionally‘ depends on nous’s purity.  
Beyond the ascetic methods which we shortly described here as being in direct connection with 
our current research, asceticism recognizes three main methods: fasting; vigils; and prayer, 
which are extensively treated with full explanations and arguments from patristic writers by 
Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos. He also emphasizes the importance of true faith for any kind 
of ascetic practice since ‗we know that when faith is distorted, the cure is automatically 
distorted‘.
437
 So, faith embodied in spiritual knowledge is not only a problem of theological 
dogma, but also of medicinal preservation. Issues related to faith or the capacity to trust and 
entrust will be discussed later on this research in connection with anxiety.  
 
III. Anthropological Perspectives: Comparison 
 
In the third section of the chapter we will analyze various travelling concepts that have been 
theoretically presented earlier from both viewpoints. We tried to choose a single major topic for 
each psychotherapeutic approach, which represented the ‗very‘ major theme of that approach and 
that contributed greatly to the developments of the concept of illness analyzed further in the 
second part of this work. This is the case of the discussion on unconscious, habit, thoughts, self 
and Christ-actualization. In addition, we treated the topic of the tripartite structure of the soul 
which represents a major theme in the Philokalia and tried to see if the psychotherapeutic area 
has an awareness of such a perspective. The last two issues focused on wholeness to see if there 
is a common understanding of the topic and the cure through grace which constitutes a very 
distinct landmark for the Philokalic perspective but for which modern psychotherapy was proved 
to be able to account for. The conclusions were formulated following the techniques described in 
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1. The Problem of the Unconscious  
 
The unconscious remains a reference point and a key concept for the field of psychotherapy 
regardless of how it is dealt with from one paradigm to another. The unconscious psyche has a 
central place in psychodynamic theory which is centred on the idea of inner conflict found 
outside one‘s awareness and thus generating psychic illness. According to Freud ‗nonconscious 
processes are the norm in mental life‘
438
 and therefore in his topographical model
439
 represented 
as an iceberg the unconscious has the biggest proportion which is hidden under the water‘s 
surface. Adler‘s focus on the unconscious was given by his emphasis on striving for superiority, 
hence power,
440
 from where a conflict producing dynamics might result.  
Jung deals with the personal unconscious in terms of the shadow side of man, prolonged within 
the collective unconscious through the archetype of persona – the mask. Persona and shadow‘s 
archetypes are somehow intermingled in producing a kind of evil inside and outside the 
individual. As Meeks notably points out there is a permanent tension between the need of the 
individual to achieve personal unity and that of the society which emphasizes the collective 
representations in individuals with the result of mediocrity. He concludes from Jung‘s quote ‗the 
morality of society as a whole is in inverse ratio to its size; for the greater the aggregation of 
individuals, the more the individual factors are blotted out‘
441
 that ‗true morality is discouraged, 
for morality requires freedom‘.
442
 Thus, Meeks identifies the vicious circle that is created 
between man and society. On one hand, society forces the individual to assume one kind of 
persona with the result of repressing the individual psychical characteristics and therefore results 
in formation of the personal unconscious. On the other hand, found in this situation the human 
being will project his unconscious contents onto society which will ‗take on collective force 
within culture‘ and as such ‗the evil that has been denied within the individuals of a culture 
breaks forth in acts of warfare, genocide and other atrocities committed by a civilized, proper 
people‘.
443
 He goes on then to emphasize that it is also every human being‘s obligation ‗of 
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Jung‘s archetype of persona – the mask seems to echo the concept of façade used by Rogers. 
Rogers did not theorize much on this issue but he used it to explain the need of both therapist and 
client to relate to each other in an honest and open way. Humanists did not particularly focus on 
the unconscious because they adopted the here-and-now principle, things that need to be changed 
in the present. Nevertheless, the unconscious is always implied in the way they see the human 
being, first because most humanist therapists had initially trained in psychoanalytic therapy and 
as such gained its theoretical background, and second because they acknowledge the presence of 
repression and defence mechanisms which block the access of the person to becoming what it 
truly is.  
On the other hand, cognitivists in dealing with irrational beliefs (Ellis) or automatic thoughts 
(Beck) that need to be changed, indirectly contribute to the fulfilment of the same openly 
proclaimed psychodynamic goal: to make the unconscious conscious, or to cure unreason by 
reason, as they articulate it. Even the behaviourists‘ radical rejection of the unconscious, 
paradoxically, succeeded in highlighting once more its very presence. However, for the 
psychotherapeutic approaches discussed in the first section of this chapter, even if the focus on 
the unconscious, in terms of how they understand (theory) and deal with it (method) is different, 
the unconscious remains one of the major dimensions in relation with their anthropological 
perspective.  
The unconscious, as conceptualized by modern psychotherapeutic paradigms, has not been a 
subject matter for Philokalic writers per se, since their primary goal was ‗concerned with the 
advancement of the life of prayer and finding spiritual salvation‘.
445
 Still, the Philokalia abounds 
in information concerning the unconscious of humans. The difference is that they point towards 
unconscious realities but do not use this term to describe them. In their attempt to reach union 
with God, its writers had to deal first with what constituted an obstacle in this process, hence 
passions
446
 which are to be found in the terrain of the psychoanalytical unconscious. Praxis, the 
first spiritual stage, is particularly concerned with the fight against passions in order to restore 
the soul‘s powers to their natural state. However, the unconscious realities as pointed to in the 
Philokalia in particular and patristic literature in general, have a broader understanding than that 
of the psychotherapeutic unconscious. Larchet is the first to have done an analysis of the 
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problem of the unconscious as found in the Fathers in a book called L’inconscient spiritual.
447
 
The next presentation is indebted to and broadly based on the results of his research.  
Larchet introduces the idea of the existence of a spiritual unconscious, by spiritual, i.e. noetic, 
meaning ‗everything creates in us a relation with God‘.
448
 As in this relation is usually 
recognized a conscious dimension, Larchet shows that there is an unconscious dimension to it as 
well. Derived from the relation with God which may be positive or negative, there are two kinds 
of unconscious: l’inconscient theophile consists of ‗everything [that] relates and unites man with 
God, directing to Him without man being aware of it‘ and l’inconscient deifuge consists of 
‗everything [that] breaks up and removes man from his relation with God, directing him in an 
opposite direction, again without him being aware of it‘.
449
  
Thus, for the man that has no spiritual concerns l’inconscient spirituel is large, while for the man 
that involves himself progressively in an ascetic process there is a reduction of it on both 
sides.
450
 The more a person becomes aware of himself
451
 alongside the three stages of spiritual 
knowledge, the more he will become conscious of the presence of God within and consequently 
of the passions that obstruct the way to perfect union with Him. As Larchet rightfully notes:  
‗For the holy man, who came to deification, the negative part of the spiritual unconscious 
disappears, and so does the positive, to leave place for the full consciousness of what he 
is, as a creature, in relation to God‘.
452
  
Thus we might explain why the Philokalia does not focus on unconscious workings of the soul as 
an end in itself, but only in an indirect and intermediate manner, because the more the man 
accesses l’inconscient theophile, l’inconscient deifuge naturally disappears. Ascetics struggle to 
enter directly the kingdom within in order to meet God and become uninterested in the world 
within which is comprised by l’inconscient deifuge. Thus they talk to God and ignore other inner 
voices. Psychodynamic therapies do the opposite.   
Larchet‘s findings are endorsed by another author, namely the Archimandrite Simeon 
Kraiopoulos from Mount Athos. Founding his statements on the long tradition of neptic and 
Philokalic Fathers he concludes that the similars to God do not possess an unconscious or 
subconscious because, through ascetic practice, their souls have become fully conscious
453
 and 
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that this is in fact the stage of deification. To exemplify the archimandrite‘s view we will offer 
the next quote from his book:  
‗As God is simple and not complex, so He built man. God made man simple. Before the 
fall, man did not have hidden in his depths dark cellars. His entire existence was in the 
face of God and his naked and exposed conscience. All were clean and clear. These 
layers that disturb man and which he finds difficult to grasp were created by sin. We see 
that saints, who enter this ascetic labour, believe in God‘s help, always have God‘s grace, 
never turn back, just because: ―it is clear that man can deify!‖ … The blessed time comes, 
when the holy one – that is God‘s blessed man, who took things seriously – becomes 
entirely conscious, i.e. his whole soul is conscious. He does not have subconscious, 
unconscious, dark cellars, repressed feelings, and unconscious, uncontrolled or 
autonomous states. That is why anything he would say is holy, whatever he does is holy, 
whatever his behaviour his work is sacred, his entire life is sacred‘.
454
 
Thus, Arch. Simeon, rooting his observations in the ascetic practice and Philokalic tradition, 
reaches the same conclusions in regard to the problem of the unconscious. In addition, building 
on Philokalic anthropology, which is biblical in essence, he advocates that man does not possess 
a negative unconscious
455
 and that its existence in the structure of man is an ‗accident‘ and 
objectively, only a result of the fall.  
As part of l’inconscient theophile, Larchet includes a few arguments. First, the logos of human 
nature which constitutes the fundament of this kind of unconscious and according to which man 
was endowed with specific faculties was implanted through creation in his own nature. These 
powers allow him naturally to reach the finality of his logos, i.e. deification through grace. 
Second, drawing on the teaching of Saint Maximus the Confessor, Larchet discusses the 
distinction between image and likeness where he underlines that image relates to nature, while 
likeness to hypostasis; thirdly, he points towards grace which is found within human nature and 
may take various forms but is one in essence.
456
  
L’inconscient deifuge is constituted from the soul‘s sin or illnesses, which are first rooted in the 
lack of knowledge concerning humanity‘s fall. Referring to the soul‘s illness, Saint Mark the 
Ascetic mentions ignorance as one of the three giants of all sin and passions:
457
 ‗ignorance the 
source of all evils, forgetfulness, its close relation and helper; and laziness‘
458
 which are in his 
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views ‗the mother and nurse of every vice‘.
459
 This type of unconscious in the way it is described 
by Philokalic writers presents many similarities with the observations made by modern 
psychotherapy. There will be differences as well, in terms of terminology used, aetiology, and 
methods of treatment, but as far as the description of these illnesses is concerned, it does greatly 
overlap as we will probably discover in the chapters dedicated to anxiety and depression.  
One major point of interaction between these two fields is that they both consider of major 
importance a kind of inner analysis and that this is part of every curative process concerning our 
inner being. The major difference is in how we proceed to this adventure. And the how depends 
on what the content of the unconscious is considered to be. As showed earlier, for the Philokalic 
Fathers the descent into the unconscious is not a goal in itself as in modern psychotherapy but a 
travel towards the image of God within the depth of the soul. The target is to know God and 
become similar to Him and in order to accomplish this, all obstacles, consisting of various forms 
of inner illnesses, need be overcome. Therefore, ‗in the therapeutic process, our inconscient 
theophile awareness is accompanied by awareness of our inconscient deifuge’
460
 but without a 
specific focus on the later. One may consider talking about contents of inconscient deifuge only 
if he is granted the gift to heal which involves being himself healed
461
 and is also given the grace 
of the Holy Spirit.
462
 Probably, that is why the vast majority of writers of the Philokalia, and of 
patristic literature in general, have also been proclaimed as saints.  
The focus is put on the positive part of the unconscious which relates man to God, while the 
negative one is naturally eliminated by replacing passions with virtues, i.e. illness with health. 
What for modern psychotherapy is the goal, to make the unconscious conscious, for the ascetic 
method it is only the means to accomplish the goal, which is to attain a likeness to God and union 
with Him. While it is true that one cannot attain likeness without overcoming unconscious 
matters, it is also true that an awareness of the unconscious without a higher finality may leave 
one prisoner in deeper distress and illness, since the negative unconscious content once 
becoming conscious has no place to go and therefore remains within one‘s self without the 
possibility for such an awareness to be transformed or turned towards something good.  
The ascetic method has as a model of normality virtues which are the soul‘s powers that function 
according to their created purpose, and virtues which were all embodied by Christ the God-Man, 
The Archetype. In contrast, the modern psychotherapeutic model lacks such a model of 
normality. As in the case of every science, in the Philokalia in order to attempt this conversion of 
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the unconscious into the conscious one uses the knowledge accumulated and offered by previous 
scientists of the soul, knowledge that covers both sides: Who is the God towards which one goes 
and what are the inner obstacles that stand in the way of knowing and loving Him personally? If 
knowledge concerning God is traditionally considered the realm of theology, the second part, 
knowledge about the inner mechanisms of illness which is overlapped by modern 
psychotherapeutic approaches tends to be assimilated nowadays to the realm of science.
463
 
However, as we have seen above, in the Philokalic perspective to know these mechanisms of 
inner illness accurately depends on accurately knowing God. This view strongly contrasts with 
modern psychotherapeutic approaches which in the vast majority started their study of the human 
soul having as a model the sick person or comparisons with animals. The only exception is the 
humanist-existential paradigm which grew out of the need to reject what they considered a 
negative view on man and brought a positive perspective on him but which, as we will see, 
shares essentially the characteristics of a Christian theology without Christ.  
 
2. The Tripartite Structure of the Soul  
 
In close relation with the matter of unconscious is the tripartite structure of the soul which is in 
one way or another considered by both fields examined in this research. Thus, a first 
classification is Freud‘s topographic and dynamic model consisting of three ‗progressively 
deeper layers of mentation‘:
464
 the conscious; preconscious; and unconscious systems. The 
second Freudian tripartite classification known as the structural model, elaborated in 1923, 
divides the mind into three intrapsychic classes. First is the id, which is motivated by one of the 
two biological drives: sex or aggression. It operates according to the pleasure principle which 
means that it seeks pleasure and avoids pain, and is entirely unconscious. Second is the ego, ‗a 
term Freud often used synonymously with self‘,
465
 which operates according to the reality 
principle and emerges as the child grows up, involving logical cognition, language, problem 
solving, and its aim is to find socially acceptable ways of satisfying the id‘s urges.
466
 Finally, 
there is the superego or conscience which develops from the ego and from the introjections of 
moral caregivers‘ values, and has the goal of using moral ways to satisfy the id‘s desires. Jung‘s 
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system of thought also comprises a tripartite model made of three psychic instances: the 
conscious; personal unconscious; and collective unconscious.
467
 
On the other side, the tripartite principle appears in Philokalic writings in a few combinations. In 
a first classification we have the vital or vegetative power, common to all living beings, the 
animal power consisting of irascibility (thymos) and concupiscablity (epithymetikon) that man 
shares in common with animals, and the rational power, specific only to man, which makes man, 
man. In another tripartite taxonomy man appears as having a trichotomous spirit/intellect/nous – 
soul – body constitution. This is used only to emphasize man‘s relation to God through the nous, 
considered the eye of the soul; otherwise a body-soul dichotomous model is generally preferred 
because it stresses the perfect unity that exists within the soul‘s powers. This specific 
classification is echoed by Frankl‘s therapeutic philosophy that views the human being in the 
triadic terms of Spirit – Psyche – Soma and thus justifies logotherapy as a therapy that addresses 
the spiritual being of man, which is complementary to other psychotherapies that in his view 
attend to man‘s psyche. A third Philokalic classification presents the three main powers of soul: 
the intelligent; incensive; and desiring or appetitive powers.  
Is there any relation or connections we can make between these various tripartite views on the 
human being? To answer this question is not an easy task, and it would probably take another 
research to explore this subject in depth. Therefore, in the next few pages my aim is only to 
attempt to identify a few lines of thought that appear obvious at this level of analysis, and which 
may open the possibility for further research. 
1. The id‘s two biological drives of sex (also known as Eros associated with life and 
creativity) and aggression (or Thanatos representing the destructive forces in man) 
described by Freud may be connected with the desiring and incensive powers from the 
Philokalic description. Even if not understood in identical terms, generally speaking, it 
seems obvious that both the id’s drives and these two powers of the soul refer to what the 
Philokalic Fathers tackled as the appetitive part of the soul, i.e. the part of the soul which 
if not under the control of the nous that restores it to rationality, becomes irrational and 
gives rise to passions.
468
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2. The ego may be partially put in connection with the rational power of the soul, and 
particularly with that part which is represented by reason, in psychodynamic terms 
logical cognition meant to connect man to reality through the reality principle. Since 
through the ego’s logical cognition one is linked with the reality of senses and the 
information that comes from them, as one might expect, modern psychodynamic 
therapies do not consider at the theoretical level the existence of the nous, which in 
Philokalic terms is the highest and purest part of the soul able to apprehend the divine 
truth. Even if not considered theoretically, we believe that the nous may be empirically 
observed in practice. For example, in the psychodynamic therapeutic alliance ‗between 
the clinician and the observing ego of the patient (the conscious parts of the person‘s ego 
and superego that can describe feelings, thoughts, impulses, actions and ideals) … both 
parties would examine the client‘s experiencing ego, especially its defensive patterns‘.
469
 
Our hypothesis is that this activity of the observing ego that examines the experiencing 
ego is not done by reason (dianoia) but by nous (intellect) and its specific means of 
intellection. Nous is that instance that observes and sees things and reason expresses 
them in concepts. However, the quality of these observations directly depends on the 
purity of the nous since ‗a pure intellect sees things correctly‘ while ‗a trained 
intelligence puts them in order‘.
470
  
3. What is the relation between Freud‘s structural model and the dynamic of conscious and 
unconscious processes? And, is there any connection between the unconscious superego 
which according to Freud in the human being relates to the realm of moral values, hence 
to the idea of good, and l’inconscient theophile? To answer the first question we notice 
that the id is considered by Freud entirely unconscious since it is seen as the repository of 
all repressed urges and forbidden drives. The ego and superego were considered partially 
conscious and partially unconscious.
471
 In order to answer the second question, we note 
that the unconscious superego relates to the negative part of the spiritual unconscious as 
identified in Philokalic writings since, as described by Freud, its contents are the self-
punishing behaviours that imply a sense of guilt. Although having to do with morals, 
Freud‘s superego does not imply spirituality as entailed by the Philokalia, since its 
constituents are mere introjections of the caregiver‘s values which may be extremely 
relative varying from person to person, as well as ego elaborations meant to adapt the 
individual satisfactorily to the social and ‗ethical‘ requirements of his time. Rather, the 
superego is seen as having a prohibitive role upon the id‘s urges, and therefore helping to 
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entertain the pressure that keeps them unconscious and unsatisfied.
472
 As such, the 
superego does not transcend man but rather remains in the realm of what the Philokalia 
termed as man’s fallen nature. The solution offered by the Philokalia is neither to repress 
innate drives into the unconscious (thus letting them produce illness) nor to express them 
freely as they are, because in both these situations the powers of the soul would work 
contrary to their nature. Instead, the solution would be to transform and allow them to 
work according to their nature and thus humanize them, which in Philokalic terms means 
actually to Christ-humanize them.  
4. Based on empirical and clinical studies Freud identified the Id‘s pleasure principle 
according to which man seeks pleasure and avoids pain. The Id‘s drives are moderated by 
the developing Ego whose role is to nurture psyche according to the reality principle. In a 
famous quote Freud explains that ‗an ego thus educated has become ‗reasonable‘; it no 
longer lets itself be governed by the pleasure principle, but obeys the reality principle, 
which also, at bottom, seeks to obtain pleasure, but pleasure which is assured through 
taking account of reality, even though it is pleasure postponed and diminished‘.
473
 Thus, 
even if postponed and diminished pleasure is still sought by the ego as well. The 
discovery of the pleasure principle is not new at all. In the Philokalic tradition this 
principle was known and defined as one related to flesh or what is considered the fallen 
nature of man. For example, related to this topic, Saint Maximus the Confessor, in the 
seventh century asserted that man ‘directs his whole effort towards pleasure and does all 
he can to avoid pain. He struggles with all his might to attain pleasure and he fights 
against pain with immense zeal‘.
474
  
Thus, even if the ego obeys reality principle, the psychodynamic anthropological view on 
man is still placed in the direction of pleasure seeking and the avoidance of pain and it 
remains at this level. The same saint seems to offer an explanation for this: ‗By fulfilling, 
out of concern for the body, that worship which causes corruption, and by thus acquiring 
self-love, man became subject to the unceasing action of pleasure and pain; eating always 
from the tree of disobedience – the tree of the knowledge of good and evil – in this way 
he acquired experientially through sense-perception a knowledge in which good and evil 
were intermingled. And it would not be untrue to say that the tree of the knowledge of 
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good and evil is the visible created world. For this world is by nature subject to that 
alteration which produces pleasure and pain‘.
475
   
From a Philokalic anthropological perspective it becomes obvious that psychodynamic 
therapies could not go more in depth on this matter since they operate within the field of 
sense-perception experientially acquired but they lack the clear distinction between good 
and evil, i.e. created and uncreated which is provided only by a pure nous. Thus, the 
maximum that could be done at this level was to identify empirically and experientially 
the existence of such a law within human nature, but without the possibility of 
understanding that this law belongs to fallen nature, and not to the healthy man, the one 
that lives according to his nature.  
Perhaps here becomes most obvious the subtle but strong disagreement that essentially 
exists between these two anthropological perspectives on man: they both noticed the 
existence of the pleasure principle, but what psychodynamic therapies consider as being 
the nature of man, the Philokalia sees as being fallen nature and the soul‘s illness. That is 
why, from the Philokalic perspective the cure of this fallen nature has as a remedy the 
entire ascetic practice, followed by contemplation and unification with God, because 
‗casting off desire for pleasure and fear of pain, we are freed from evil self-love and are 
raised to a spiritual knowledge of the Creator‘.
476
 Hence, the cure of the soul comes from 
cultivating the opposite of what is the norm of fallen nature, i.e. to renounce pleasure and 
fight against the fear of pain by embracing pain in what constitutes the paradox of the 
cross.  
5. Another line of research could be represented by the fact that both fields identified a 
common area of comparison with animals advanced on one hand by behaviourists and by 
ascetic writers on the other. They acknowledged the animal power of the soul consisting 
of irascibility (thymos) and concupiscablity (epithymetikon) which is common to both 
humans and animals. Nonetheless, the distinctions might come from the fact that the 
animal power, for Philokalics, may never be treated without reference to the rational 
power since due to unity of soul they naturally communicate their energies to each other, 
whatever the energy, while behaviourists analyze behavioural reactions without 
consideration of any conscious processes.  
6. Even if psychodynamic therapies lack a model for what a healthy human being is, as do 
others, the need to have such a model still exists. In order to understand who man is this 
paradigm went very far in grasping man‘s inner constitution although without reaching its 
very essence, if it is to look at it through Philokalic eyes. Kohut, for example, sees as 
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central for a healthy development the experience of mirroring self-objects and idealized 
self-objects: ‗mirroring self-object experiences are those in which the child feels 
recognized, appreciated, and emphasized with by a person who is experienced as a partial 
extension of self … An example of an idealized self-object experience would be the 
momentary sense of pleasure and power that the child feels as he vicariously acquires a 
sense of strength from his father when his father hold him on his shoulders‘.
477
 He 
noticed in clinical observation that chronic failure in parental empathy is the main cause 
in psychopathology. As a consequence of this observation, the natural conclusion was 
that the more mirroring the child experiences, the healthier he will be as an adult. The 
same clinical observations tell us that this experience of mirroring is never perfect and 
therefore able to generate a perfect healthy adult since none of us was mirrored perfectly 
so as to be capable of mirroring someone else perfectly as well.  
The mirroring theory proposed by Kohut, in our view is a clear example which expresses 
the fact that man becomes human in the presence of another on one hand, and seen at a 
deeper level, it shows the need of a model for a healthy constitution against which one 
must be compared or contrasted, on the other hand. This mirroring model, as many others 
in modern psychotherapy, is a theoretical construction which does not always overlap 
practical realities. Looked at from a Philokalic perspective the mirroring concept may 
find a solution if it is understood in terms of man being created in Christ‘s image. Thus, a 
healthy mirroring may be obtained if people mirror Christ‘s image from themselves, or 
Christ‘s image from another. In other words, to have a perfect mirroring experience one 
must mirror himself in the perfect mirror within himself or others, a mirror which in this 




3. Behavioural Conditioning and Habits in the Philokalia 
 
The Latins noticed that: Consuetudo quasi altera natura.
479
 Behaviourists confirmed this proverb 
when focusing on the theory of classical and operant conditioning according to which all 
behaviour is learnt from the environment and gets automatized and becomes a habit. As such, to 
change a certain behaviour becomes possible through the range of techniques proposed as part of 
the therapeutic process. Philokalic writers too confirmed this proverb when they spoke about the 
force of habit, its relation with the soul‘s illness and the need to change these habits as a natural 
                                                          
477
 Kohut mentioned in: Wolitzky D.L., op. cit., p. 70.  
478
 Cf. St Justin Popovich, Man and the God-Man, (Alhambra: Sebastian Press, 2008) 
479
 Habit is a second nature.  
119 
 
part of the curative process. Next, we want to see in what way these two views on behaviour are 
similar or different. 
Classical conditioning emphasizes the importance of external stimuli in learning behaviour, 
whereas Skinnerian operant conditioning ‗relies on the organism‘s initiating an action that is 
followed by some consequence‘
480
 and therefore internal stimuli may elicit behaviour as well, as 
a result of past internalized experiences. In other words, operant conditioning becomes a type of 
learning where future behaviour is determined by the consequences of past behaviour.  
Hence, conditioned behaviour, a repeated sequence of internal or external stimuli that generate a 
certain behavioural consequence, which is considered normal or abnormal, may be put in 
connection with the Philokalic concept of habit, which in a similar way is related to a healthy or 
unhealthy habitude of functioning i.e., virtues and passions. Saint Theodoros the Great mentions 
‗the ingrained influence of habits running counter to virtue‘
481
 and resulting in passions. Saint 
Maximus points out the easiness of sinning ‗through the force of habit‘
482
 and Saint Theodoros 
talks about the difficulty of healing the soul which was once cured but ‗has been wounded anew‘ 
due to the ‗influence of bad habits‘.
483
 Another Philokalic writer describes the mechanism of 
habit either applied to virtues or passions in the following words:   
‗For a long-standing habit assumes the strength of nature; but if you do not give way to it, 
it loses strength and is gradually destroyed. Whether a habit is good or bad, time 
nourishes it, just as wood feeds a fire. Thus, so far as we can, we should cultivate and 




Both fields coincide in terms of describing mechanisms of habits or behavioural conditionings. 
They also identified the importance of will in trying to change unwanted, respectively bad 
behaviours, which was initially inoculated through external environmental stimuli and later 
strengthened through the internalized external stimuli. Some of the behavioural 
psychotherapeutic methods meant to train the power of the will so as to oppose negative 
behaviours and enforce positive ones echo in some ways those used in the ascetic practice.  
1. Systematic desensitization indicates as the end of a curative process the disappearance of 
symptoms while in the presence of the feared situation or object that created it. The same 
is emphasized by Saint Maximus the Confessor when he makes the distinction between 
being delivered from sinful thoughts and from passions: ‗Frequently a man is delivered 
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from such thoughts when the things which arouse his passions are not present. But the 
passions lie hidden in the soul and are brought to light when the things themselves are 
present‘.
485
 Thus, he advises towards a permanent watching over the intellect since 
passions, these unnatural habits of soul, do not disappear with the thoughts that initially 
produced them. Both methods invite man to confront his fears and the thoughts or 
feelings that produced them.  
2. The aversion, implosion and flooding therapy used especially to treat all kind of 
addictions by associating unpleasant stimuli with the undesired behaviour or by abruptly 
exposing the patient to the phobic-inducing situation are considered highly unethical in 
regard to the affirmed principle of psychotherapy that is meant to alleviate and not 
produce distress of any kind. The Philokalic anthropological perspective which offers a 
different perspective on suffering, in principle, may be considered consistent with these 
types of psychotherapeutic methods where the soul may become healthy only if it freely 
embraces a certain amount of suffering, such as is sometimes the bitter medicine that 
must be taken to cure our bodies. In fact, the process of inner healing, as mentioned in the 
previous section, is impossible to consider without some degree of suffering. The major 
point is to identify between these types of suffering since not everyone is meant to heal 
the soul and this discrimination is done using discernment.
486
 
3. In behavioural therapy the therapist helps the client to train his will which is needed to 
change present undesired behaviours and teaches him some techniques to control it. In 
the Philokalia, training of the will involves methods meant not only to change unhealthy 
habits – passions - but also to prevent their occurrence by reconciling the will of man to 
the specific will of God for that person, thus eliminating the possibility of future inner 
illness.  
Generally, this is done following the method of obedience, or simply by directly testing 
one‘s conscience through the method described by Saint Peter of Damascus:  
‗Such a man does not dare to act according to his own volition or to depend on his 
own ideas without first questioning those with experience. For what does a person 
gain by choosing to do or to think something that does not contribute to his bodily 
life or to the salvation of his soul? And if he does not know what wish he should 
abandon and what thought he should put aside, let him test every action and every 
thought by holding back from it with self-control and by seeing how that affects 
him. If its realization brings pleasure, but resisting it brings pain, then it is 
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something bad and he should reject it before it takes root; otherwise he will find it 
hard to overcome it later, when he sees what damage it does‘.
487
 
Thus, behavioural techniques are devised to change an undesired observed behaviour and 
consequently change thoughts and ways of inner functioning that sustain it, for which 
reason behavioural techniques coupled with cognitive ones in becoming what is now 
known as cognitive-behaviour therapy, whereas Philokalic techniques promote both 
prevention regarding healthy inner functioning and healing of the already present 
passions of the soul.  
4. The cure of unwanted behaviours is seen differently: behavioural techniques involve 
practising relaxation and facing one‘s fears in the presence of the therapist, followed by 
homework to be done by the patient alone, while the cure in Philokalic terms aims ‗to 
keep one‘s vision intently fixed on divine things until the will acquires the habit of doing 
this‘
488
 and also to ‗call upon the Almighty to restrain the impulses of our passions and 
not to permit us to sin against Him or against any man, so that we may find in this way 
salvation through His grace‘.
489
 Again, anthropologically, we notice that the aims of the 
two are different: in behavioural terms there is the need to get rid of observed disturbing 
behaviours that affect the present life of the patient making him inefficient in his family, 
social, or professional life while in Philokalic terms there is the need to acquire a likeness 
with God, and consequently obtain inner health in the process, since as we shall further 
see in this anthropological paradigm deification and salvation of soul is equivalent with 
its normality and health. The major difference is between a horizontal or vertical 
reporting criterion.  
 
4. Thoughts in the Cognitive and Philokalic Paradigms 
 
The cognitive approach by challenging and changing what was identified as automatic thoughts, 
cognitive distortions or irrational core beliefs, is considered nowadays one of the most efficient 
of the psychotherapeutic perspectives in treating psychological illness. Looked at from a 
Philokalic perspective the efficiency is to be expected, because by drawing on the idea of 
thoughts as the causation of emotional disturbance cognitivists indirectly drew closer to the 
Philokalic anthropological background, even if not overlapping it entirely. Still, on the 
descriptive level there are obvious analogies between the ways the two fields treat the matter of 
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thoughts. Next we shall examine similarities and differences in approaches towards this matter in 
both areas based on information previously provided.   
1. Both fields speak about thoughts but they do it in different ways. For cognitivists, 
cognition is a meditational process between input (informational stimuli) and output 
(behaviour) and they try to analyze thought pathology within the framework of a 
cognitive schema. For Philokalic writers, thoughts (logismoi) represent more than simply 
a cognitive activity of the human mind and are associated with passions since ‗no passion 
is born without a thought‘,
490
 whereas passions are associated with evil.
491
 The same is 
emphasized by Professor Louth when he points out that in the Byzantine ascetic tradition 
the term passion ‗nearly always indicates something evil‘.
492
 Therefore, in this second 
case, thoughts may be considered evil or demonic as opposed to divine ones, according to 
the source that produced them. Cognitivists use such descriptions as, disruptive, 
automatic thoughts, illogical, faulty, erroneous or distorted thinking, cognitive 
distortions, irrational beliefs which emphasize on one hand the departure from some 
certain norm, which is not clearly stated though, and on the other hand the involuntary 
character of these thoughts, something that escapes conscious control. Generally 
speaking, this description is consistent, at least in form, with observations offered by 
ascetic practice on this topic. The difference concerning the language employed is that 
cognitivists use a rather technical language whereas the Philokalia has a much more 
personal approach to the terms which comes from their anthropological perspective.  
2. On a close content analysis of thoughts that are subject to change throughout the 
cognitive behavioural therapeutic process, we notice that they are consistent with 
Philokalic statements. For example, the series of must sentences like I must always be 
achieving, competent, loved by others or I must have everything I desire easily and 
quickly etc., that govern man‘s inner cognitive space and lead to emotional disturbances 
or various forms of psychological illness, are echoed by the thoughts of various vices or 
passions described in the Philokalia.
493
 
3. However, if on the descriptive and observational level similarities are obvious, when we 
analyze these thoughts in depth differences appear. For instance, this irrational belief that 
‗others MUST treat me kindly, fairly, and properly when I want them to do so. It is 
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terrible when they don‘t‘
494
 is challenged through cognitive techniques so that the client 
becomes aware that this wish he has is not realistic and can be satisfied only with a few 
people treating him kindly, which does not necessarily happen in the precise situations or 
ways he expects. The Philokalic perspective on such a thought employs a different 
meaning because it is rooted in a different anthropological perspective.  
Thus, looked at through Philokalic eyes the solution in this case is to do well always, and 
expect evil. This is so, because the Philokalic perspective looks at this thought not only 
on a horizontal level, where the human soul meets the environment (either inner or social) 
but as part of a more complex process which involves the human being in a vertical 
growth, which indirectly implies the awareness that the human being is changeable and 
cannot be taken as an absolute norm. The difference between these two perspectives 
consists in the sources ascribed to these thoughts on one hand, and in the presence or 
absence of a norm against which these thoughts can be analyzed, on the other. 
The only one whom one controls is himself and, therefore he may act in such a way as to 
do good always, that is to conform with Christ’s revealed norm, but he needs have no 
expectations concerning others since it is possible that they do not conform to the same 
norm, in which case the expectation is deluded. By always expect evil, it is not meant that 
one should see other people as evil, but rather to distinguish between the fact that all 
people are intended by God to be good but through deceit they might reiterate Adam‘s 
mistake over and over again.   
In terms of thoughts‘ sources cognitive psychotherapy is scarce. The main idea revolves 
around the cognitive schema which is made of all one‘s informational experiences since 
birth. To sum up, all thoughts belonging to the cognitive schema come through sensorial 
input of one kind or another. The Philokalic paradigm identifies as the main root of evil 
or disturbing thoughts ‗the obvious vices, which we keep trying to justify in our words 
and actions‘.
495
 In a different text, the same Philokalic writer names two sources which 
may be placed inward or outward: ‗One kind of evil dwells in the heart through long-
continued prepossession; another kind attacks our thoughts through the medium of 
everyday things‘.
496
 However, in this paradigm disturbing thoughts are actually 
associated with evil spirits, even if they are installed for a long time within one‘s heart or 
come by means of the senses as daily occurrences.   
The lack of a norm against which thoughts in the cognitive paradigm can be analyzed is 
related to a more general situation specific to the entire psychotherapeutic field that lacks 
a model of normality, i.e. an absolute norm. As mentioned in previous sections of this 
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chapter, the Philokalia anthropology is basically Christology and therefore the norm for 
inner functioning of thoughts is given by Christ who acts as a model.  
4. Since Ellis‘s psychotherapy particularly dealt with changing rational and irrational 
beliefs, we intend to see if the Philokalic perspective upon them is the same. Thus, for 
Saint Antony the Great the rational soul, i.e. intelligent/noetic in Philokalic terms, is the 
one who attains spiritual knowledge and is described by him in these words: ‗Men are 
often called intelligent wrongly. Intelligent men are not those who are erudite in the 
sayings and books of the wise men of old, but those who have an intelligent soul and can 
discriminate between good and evil. They avoid what is sinful and harms the soul; and 
with deep gratitude to God they resolutely adhere by dint of practice to what is good and 
benefits the soul. These men alone should truly be called intelligent‘.
497
 Hence, 
rationality relates to health and irrationality to illness. In this case, we have no reason to 
think that the two perspectives on rationality and irrationality are completely opposed, 
even if not identical due to referencing different anthropological frameworks. Taking into 
account these distinctions, we would consider Saint Anthony‘s perspective as being 
larger and naturally incorporating Ellis‘s view, rather than contradicting it.   
5. While acknowledging that irrational thoughts may be automatic as the cognitivists have 
also pointed out, the Philokalia connects this involuntary automatism to their sources: 
‗We have a love for the causes of involuntary thoughts, and that is why they come. In the 
case of voluntary thoughts we clearly have a love not only for the causes but also for the 
objects with which they are concerned‘.
498
 As a consequence their curative method will 
consist in fighting against the causes of such thoughts by focusing on their opposites and 
prayer. 
Beck‘s cognitive system of therapy ‗attempts to reduce excessive emotional reactions and 
self-defeating behavior by modifying the faulty or erroneous thinking and maladaptive 
beliefs that underlie these reactions‘.
499
 From a Philokalic perspective, although this 
strategy may be considered consistent with its methods, it is not sufficient and complete 
because ‗we can neither rid ourselves of evil thoughts apart from their causes, nor of their 
causes without ridding ourselves of the thoughts. For if we reject the one without the 
other, before long the other will involve us in them both at once‘.
500
 This might explain 
both the relapse of patients into their previous psychological conditions
501
 after a short 
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period of time from the psychotherapeutic treatment, as well as the high success rate of 
this short type of psychotherapy. Therefore, curing means not only eliminating thoughts 
but rather their causes. Or, to discriminate causes is to consider all possibilities they 
might have, including God and the devil.  
In our opinion, if Beck‘s therapeutic procedure could be integrated into a noetic 
therapeutic programme
502
 as understood by the Philokalia it will probably lead to long 
term efficacy by uprooting not only thoughts but the causes of these thoughts. This is an 
assumption done only theoretically because in practice it would be impossible to follow 
unless one enrols in an ascetic practice which by nature has a different and higher 
motivation than getting rid of emotional disturbance or evil thoughts, but also attains this 
in the process.  
Some connections and considerations were made up to now concerning thoughts as viewed in the 
light of the two paradigms. However, we might have perhaps a final conclusion on this topic if 
we refer to the relationship between reason/cognition and nous/intellect. For the cognitivists, 
cognition is ‗a general term used for the higher mental processes by which people acquire 
knowledge, solve problems, and plan for the future‘ and includes ‗attention, perception, thinking, 
judging, decision making, problem solving, memory, reasoning and linguistic ability‘.
503
 As 
described here, the patristic equivalent for cognition is reason (logos) which includes ‗thinking 
(ennoia, dianoia), reflection (dianoia), judgement (krisis), discernment (diakrisis), and interior 
discourse (endiathetos logos) from which come both language and memory‘.
504
 As we notice up 
to here the descriptions of the contemporary cognitive paradigm are almost similar to the 
patristic ones. However, there is a major difference brought by the patristic view, according to 
which cognition is not the highest mental process but merely a subordinated part of nous/intellect 
which is considered the highest power of the soul.   
Previously in this chapter, we showed that reason, whose main instruments are thoughts, has an 
intermediary place between the nous and the world of senses. The main patristic and biblical 
thesis is that before the fall, reason and its products, i.e. thought, were in its natural state led by 
the nous which is the eye of the soul, but after the fall, it turned towards senses, thus 
subordinating the nous and obliterating its natural function. Vlachos describes this process and 
makes the following distinctions:  
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‗Man‘s nous was confused, hidden by the passions and overcome by impenetrable 
darkness. The word, not having to express the experience of the nous, was identified with 
the mind. Thus the intelligence was raised above the nous and now holds sway in fallen 
man. In fact this is the sickness of the word and of the intelligence. The intelligence is 
overnourished, it has been raised to a greater position than the nous and has captured the 
word. The overnourished intelligence is the source of great abnormality‘.
505
  
Comparing the two paradigms on the problem of cognition and thought, it seems that the 
Philokalic view on the human being is much broader since a man with a pure nous, a possessor 
of spiritual knowledge knows when his nous is in the realm of intellection, that of thought or that 
of sense-perception as these places exclude each other: ‗when it is in the realm of thought it is 
not in that of intellection‘.
506
 Therefore, information that comes only from reason, without a 
correlation with the nous and discernment offered by it, may have only a partial validity. 
According to Philokalic anthropological views only a pure nous may provide a comprehensive 
description of what is happening within the human soul since, even if guided by reason man 




5. Self-actualization versus Christ-actualization 
 
Once with the humanist-existentialist paradigm, psychotherapy moves towards a new era. The 
perspectives they bring seem to be radically different. If previous paradigms focused on some 
parts of man considered the subject matter of psychology, humanists propose man as a whole to 
become its object. If psychoanalysis focused on the unconscious, behaviourism on behaviour, 
cognitivists on cognition to try to make sense of what troubles the human being and how it may 
be cured, humanists focused on existence which is the new-found object of scientific inquiry. If 
psychodynamic therapies centred on the past, humanists emphasized the present and looked 
towards man‘s future with unshakable optimism.  
They underlined the moral implication of every human activity, including science, and showed 
that as far as we address humans, from whatever perspective, none of their actions can be truly 
value free
508
 and therefore psychotherapy should not insist in following the model of natural 
science, but assume the courageous task of scientifically studying man per se, in his uniqueness 
and wholeness. They highlighted the necessity to account for meaning both in terms of the 
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motivating force of behaviour and an existential cure. Completely unsatisfied with previous 
approaches which derived their views on man from studying neurotics and laboratory rats, they 
proposed the study of individuals that display the highest level of human functioning (Maslow). 
At the first glance, compared with previous psychotherapeutic approaches, all these proposals 
advanced by the humanist-existentialist paradigm seem broadly to correlate with the Philokalic 
anthropological view. Next, we shall highlight similarities and differences between these two 
perspectives to see how far or close they are to each other.  
1. The first to mention is that the humanists‘ stress on experience as the scientific study of 
psychology overlaps with the Philokalic science of the soul which is also based on 
experience. The humanist‘s scientific criterion of intersubjective verification which is, 
according to Rogers, no different from other scientific methods ‗since science depends on 
agreement among observers (for example, in using replicability as a test for the accuracy 
of experimental results)‘,
 509
 is the same method used to test for ‗scientificity‘ and 
coherence of knowledge provided by Philokalic writers for centuries, which continues in 
an uninterrupted manner to the present in the Orthodox Church, the home of Philokalic 
writings. The coherence of knowledge for centuries is provided in this second case by 
unity within the same Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, this modern psychotherapeutic view on 
science indirectly ‗legitimates‘ the older Philokalic psychotherapeutic view on the soul as 
being the science of sciences and art of arts. On the other hand, together with this 
methodological approach of the psychotherapeutic discourse, the much-discussed and 
famous opposition between science and faith/religion seems to diminish or even vanish.  
2. In direct connection with the first point is also the much-discussed problem of values in 
psychotherapy which should supposedly be avoided by a scientific approach to man. 
Humanists, instead of trying to avoid this discussion by designing conceptual frameworks 
to leave values carefully outside, openly affirmed and included them in their system of 
thought. In the same time they highlighted that all other paradigms in psychology as in 
any human activity have direct moral implications
510
 and cannot be truly value-free.
511
 
The Philokalia‘s relation to moral commitments and values is obvious, hence results in a 
mutuality of viewpoints on the topic of values, which in this case are Christ-centred.   
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3. The humanist‘s accent on the present while looking towards the future without 
disregarding the past though, is also consistent with a Philokalic perspective on the soul‘s 
therapy. The temporal focus is the same but their targets are different. Thus, the 
humanist‘s future goal is self-actualization, the achievement of one‘s full potential, while 
the method of the Philokalia, based on its anthropological view, aims towards Christ-
actualization, since man was created in His image which he now needs to uncover within 
the depths of his soul and through the grace of the Holy Spirit reach his full stature in 
Christ.
512
   
4. Existentialist-humanist therapy considers as an integral part of the treatment the quality 
of the encounter between therapist and client. That is why the personal example offered 
by the therapist, his ability to be genuine, the realness and empathy offered by the 
therapist are considered crucial for the success of the therapy: ‗to be more effective 
models of the values we espouse to others. It seems only fair that we practice in our lives 
that which we ask of others‘.
513
 In the same way the ascetic method states that: ‗the truly 
physician-like intellect is one that first heals itself and then heals others of the diseases of 
which it has been cured‘.
514
 In other words, the focus of this therapy is not on a certain 
method meant to alleviate a specific symptom but is, as Rogers states, person centred, 
and focused on the quality of the encounter between two persons who have an equal 
status. Unlike the traditional therapeutic medical model where the doctor is the 
authoritative figure that leads the curing process, in the humanist perspective the therapist 
is only a facilitator and the therapeutic process is controlled by the client. The focus is 
ultimately on the personal qualities of the therapist who ‗uses his own inner world as a 
means to approach the disturbed inner world of the other person‘.
515
 Thus, the role of the 
psychotherapist becomes partly similar to that of a priest or spiritual father,
516
 a fact 
mentioned previously by Jung once with the emergence of his analytical psychology. The 
Philokalia also places a great emphasis on person and therefore personal and unique 
relations that are established between every two people.  
5. Both humanistic and philokalic paradigms refer to the reality of humans as persons, but 
they do it in very distinct manners as a result of their different anthropological views. For 
humanists, the whole therapeutic process is person-centred, with the client addressed as a 
whole, unique individual whose natural actualizing tendency once active guides him 
towards self-fulfilment. As one might expect for the ascetic tradition of the Philokalia the 
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notion of person is linked with that of man being created in God‘s image and meant to 
attain likeness. Vlachos, who dedicated an entire book to this topic, creating some 
connections with current psychotherapeutic systems, summarizes the ascetic tradition on 
the topic in this way: ‗Just as ―in the image‖ is potentially likeness and ―in the likeness‖ 
is actually ―image‖, so also man by his biological existence is potentially man and 
person. He will become a real man when he partakes of the uncreated energy of God. As 
God is Person, it means that man becomes a person when he unites with God‘.
517
  
Another distinction in relation to person made by the Philokalic Fathers is that they 
understood person in terms of hypostasis which brings a theological perspective on to the 
concept in a direct relation with the dogma of the Trinity. A full analysis is done by the 
same author from whom we also quote here: ‗The hypostasis-person is an essence with 
distinctive features, since essence does not subsist without hypostasis nor hypostasis 
without essence. Thus the essence is what is common to all the hypostases having the 
same essence, while the hypostasis-person is the particular. For example, we can say that 
all people have common features, because they are people, but the concrete person has 




6. Derived from the person-centred perspective comes the humanists‘ focus on various 
existential dimensions like human dignity, free will and responsibility, ‗psychological 
need for love, self-esteem, belonging, self-expression, creativity and spirituality‘,
519
 
meaning, interpersonal relations – dimensions which were traditionally concerns for 
philosophers and theologians on the one hand, and are impossible to be approached with 
a scientific method in the proper sense, on the other hand. Even Freud asserted that the 
goals of life are to love and to work
520
 whereas Frankl openly states that ‗… love is the 
ultimate and the highest goal to which man can aspire... The salvation of man is through 
love and in love‘.
521
 Probably if the author of this last quote was not to be mentioned one 
might not have guessed that it belonged to a psychotherapist but rather to a theologian, 
and this underlines the similarities that seem to exist between the two paradigms not only 
in terms of anthropology but also in the language used to express it.  
If the humanist perspective is person-centred, the Philokalia we might say is Christ-
centred, so its results that it has different perspectives not only on the person as we 
previously showed but on all these concepts enumerated above. For exemplification we 
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will shortly refer to just two of them. Thus, the matter of free will, i.e. freedom to choose 
and self-determination is one of the key concepts used by humanists to combat the 
determinism of previous paradigms in psychology. Still, from a Philokalic perspective the 
possibility to choose between what one considers good or evil for himself is deterministic 
in itself and shows an imperfection in man‘s nature. Their perspective takes into account 
the distinction between created and uncreated: ‗since man has been created, he does not 
have absolute freedom. But within the limits he can, as far as possible, acquire absolute 
freedom, only when he is reborn in Christ, when he becomes a dwelling of the Trinitarian 
God and a Temple of the Holy Spirit, when, that is to say, he becomes a person‘.
522
 Then 
drawing on the teachings of Saint Nikodemos the Hagiorite the same theologian 
concludes that ‗by grace, he becomes uncreated, indeed he becomes fatherless, 
motherless and without genealogy‘.
523
 Hence, man becomes truly free when he follows 
the will of God and chooses a likeness to God in whose image was created. That is, man 
is truly free only when he chooses the good.  
For Philokalics to talk about love is to talk about God since ‗God is love‘ (1 John 4:8). 
Thus, it is only in relation to being or becoming a person that man acquires love; love is 
also connected with the soul‘s powers being purified and functioning according to nature 
or above nature, otherwise what is experienced is a form of love contrary to nature, which 
in fact stops being love. Since God is love and man is made in his image it is just natural 
for their relation to be best characterized by love, a matter expressed by Saint Maximus in 
these words: ‗Theologians call the divine sometimes an erotic force, sometimes love, 
sometimes that which is intensely longed for and loved. Consequently, as an erotic force 
and as love, the divine itself is subject to movement; and that which is intensely longed 
for and loved it moves towards itself everything that is receptive of this force and love. 
To express this more clearly; the divine itself is subject to movement since it produces an 
inward state of intense longing and love in those receptive to them; and it moves others 
since by nature it attracts the desire of those who are drawn towards it. In other words, it 
moves others and itself moves since it thirsts to be thirsted for, longs to be longed for, 
and loves to be loved‘.
524
 In contrast with the humanists, love is seen here only in relation 
to God and cannot exist outside it because love is God Himself, and all other loving 
relations between people occur within God as a result of their personal relation with Him.  
7. Humanists are considered to have developed what was termed as selfist language, 
characterized by one experimental psychologist as a ‗distressing symptom of the spread 
of selfist ideas throughout our culture‘.
525
 Terms such as self-actualization, self-
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fulfilment, self-image, self-evaluation, and self-esteem made up the humanist frame of 
reference, i.e. ‗a mental perspective used to interpret events‘,
526
 which led to a radical 
cultural shift in the way people perceive themselves and the world. Paul Vits, an 
American academic and experimental psychologist, formerly an ardent student of 
humanist theories, looks at it from a Christian viewpoint and the result is a sharp criticism 
of this psychotherapeutic approach. His main observation supported by various 
arguments throughout his book is that ‗psychology has become a religion, in particular a 
form of secular humanism based on worship of the self‘.
527
 In the Philokalic frame of 
reference all these terms are put in relation to Christ. Hence, instead of self-actualization 
one might speak of Christ-actualization, instead of self-fulfilment, fulfilment in Christ, 
instead of self-image, Christ-image, instead of self-evaluation, evaluation against Christ-
commandments and so on.  
Accordingly, opposing the humanists who limit ‗the ontology of man to self in itself, to 
the person of man‘, the Philokalic ascetic perspective considers that ‗the ontology of man 
is to be found in his Archetype, in the God Who created him, since man is made in the 
image of God‘.
528
 For the Philokalia, the authentic humanism is God-manhood, while 
humanism which is reduced to man alone is a feature of the fallen nature of man meant to 




On the other hand, the existential-humanist paradigm abounds both in theological terms 
and concerns, since the humanist psychotherapeutic practice is at its core a spiritual 
practice focusing on themes such as love, free will, meaning, choice, fulfilment in life 
etc. In our view this focus is explained by the fact that Carl Rogers, the father of the 
humanist movement in psychology, had been initially trained in Protestant Christian 
theology which he later abandoned due to its rigidity.
530
 Still, he remained deeply 
attached to its optimistic and luminous theological values, and his entire theory and 
person-centred therapy stands as plain evidence. Due to humanism‘s unclear and vague 
terms and position, being neither a scientific approach as conceptualized in the 50s nor a 
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declared religious current, this approach attracted a lot of criticism from other fellow 
psychologists: ‗Selfist psychology emphasizes the human capacity for change to the point 
of almost totally ignoring the idea that life has limits and that knowledge of them is the 
basis of wisdom. For selfists there seem to be no acceptable duties, denials, inhibitions, or 
restraints. Instead, there are only rights and opportunities for change‘.
531
 Indeed, due to 
its lack of ‗terminological calibration‘ for the traditionally theological terms used, as 
those described above, humanism may give this impression. By contrast, the Philokalia 
presents the same terms ‗calibrated‘ through the Incarnation of Christ the God-Man.  
8. Another point of analysis is the special place held by Frankl‘s system of thought and 
logotherapy within the current of existential-humanist psychotherapy. Logotherapy 
obviously moves the therapy of the psyche towards the transcendent element of human 
existence by primarily considering will to meaning as its directing principle and love as 
its main cure. Logotherapy is the psychotherapy that addresses people with philosophical 
and spiritual problems, generally defined by Frankl as problems of living or existential 
problems. Frankl sees the logotherapist‘s role as that of an ophthalmologist who cleans 
and cures the patient’s eye so that he might responsibly and clearly see the goal of his 
life.
532
 Hence, his intervention is placed not so much at the psychological level but at the 
spiritual level (in his own three-dimensional classification of Soma, Psyche, and Spirit) 
and that which he cures is the eye of one’s inner being, which in a Philokalic 
understanding is referring to the nous of a person.  
The neptic tradition of the Orthodox Church and logotherapy presents many common 
points,
533
 as well as major differences, underlined by Vlachos in his books. In his view, 
the main point the two perspectives share in common is Frankl‘s emphasis on noogenic 
neuroses, and their distinction from the psychogenic neuroses. The difference is that from 
a neptic perspective, noogenic neuroses consist in man‘s nous being darkened and 
identified with reason
534
 while for logotherapy they relate to man‘s lack of meaning in 
life and are considered a form of mental illness. Thus, due to their different 
anthropological perspectives, for logotherapy noogenic neuroses, even if different from 
the psychogenic ones, are subordinated to the general realm of ‗mental illness‘, while for 
the ascetic tradition all other illnesses of soul are subordinated to these noogenic 
neuroses, and as such, the soul‘s healing starts with cleaning the nous, regardless of the 
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soul‘s part that has been sickened. As previously shown in this chapter, in the Philokalic 
view the main problems of the soul are first rooted in the darkness of the nous, with 
reason taking the leading role, while its natural function would be only to express the 
experience of the nous, and as a result all the other powers of the soul are distorted and 
create illness. In the following chapters when discussing the matters of 
depression/dejection and anxiety/fear which in relation to our work will be considered as 
case studies, we shall see if this assumption is confirmed or rejected.  
A major turn in the psychotherapeutic field brought by Frankl is that he demedicalizes 
suffering. First of all, he restores its place within the realm of general life problems and 
experience and does not see it as a ‗mental disease‘. Second, he proposes a radically 
different perspective on it by emphasizing its great importance in organizing inner 
experience and finding meaning in life. Existential analysis is called upon making one 
able of assuming suffering, as opposed to psychoanalysis which intends to make one 
capable of pleasure or of doing. In this point, logotherapy is fully consistent with ascetic 
tradition which focuses on accepting suffering as a healing principle,
535
 with the latter 
resulting in what is commonly known as the ‗theology of the cross‘. But it is in this very 
point that a major distinction appears. The difference consists in the way suffering is 
understood and assumed, as well as the goal of its acceptance. Thus, if for logotherapy to 
assume suffering is to generate meaning of one‘s life, whatever that might be, and which 
in turn will alleviate distress and produce inner growth and healing, for the hesychast 
tradition man‘s meaning in life is deification, a call that was made to all, and is revealed 
through the incarnation of Christ, The God-Man. Suffering is always assumed in Christ 
as the One Who took it upon Himself for all humanity and is the Archetype of every man. 
If deification is the meaning of all people that come into life, the very individual and 
unique way this is acquired relates to the mystery of person and hypostasis as described 
by Orthodox Theology. Deification is closely linked with the Church which is seen as the 
mystical Body of Christ, and is acquired though grace – the uncreated energy of God. To 
put it plainly, in logotherapy man is alone in front of suffering while in the hesychast 
tradition man ‗has company‘ and suffering is assumed by Christ within one‘s soul, by 
constantly helping man along his inner way.
536
 
9. The last issue to compare is how existential-humanists and Philokalics approach 
experience. For humanists, experience and man‘s inner phenomenological world are key 
factors involved in cure. As such, the therapeutic environment is designed so that one 
may have the healing experiences meant to put him in connection with his inner self, get 
out of the state of psychological incongruence and reach congruence, activate the 
potential for self-actualization, find meaning in his suffering and in his life in general, 
                                                          
535
 To mention only one example: St Maximus, On Love, III, 82-83, EPH 2, p. 96 
536
 Cf. St Peter of Damascus, A treasury of Divine Knowledge, Book 1, EPH 3, p. 94 
134 
 
and develop features of openness, genuineness and trust. The possibilities of cure depend 
on the quality of the encounter between client and therapist and on the measure in which 
the therapist proves within the therapeutic relationship that he lives the values and 
qualities he promotes. That is why this therapeutic paradigm emphasizes so much the 
qualities of the therapist. In other words, the cure comes within a shared experiential 
space and depends on the quality of this experiential exchange.  
The Philokalia also emphasizes experience but it is about a shared experience with a 
personal God. For Philokalics, God is not a logical deduction, a philosophic concept, a 
product of imagination, or merely a protection for existential anxiety. For them God is 
experience, someone they see personally as a result of purification from passions and 
rejection of fantasy which clears the way towards the vision of God. Vlachos, from whom 
the next lengthy quote is taken, offers a synthesis of this issue from a patristic 
perspective: ‗In the whole biblico-patristic tradition it is evident that God is not an object 
of conjecture and logical understanding, but a matter of participation, of revelation, that is 
to say, of experience. Of course when we speak of experience we do not mean individual 
experience such as we find in Eastern religions, but the experience of the Church, as the 
Prophets, Apostles and the deified of all times lived it. The philosophers usually make 
conjectures with their minds, while the Fathers formulate what they have seen and heard 
as far as it can be formulated. In hesychast theology, as St. Gregory Palamas expresses it 
and develops it more extensively, one can see the methods which the saints employ in 
order to participate in the glory of God. They renounce association with the world and 
creation, they live the apophatic experience, that is to say, the nous returns to the heart 




For Philokalics cure comes in the context of this shared experience with God alongside 
all stages of spiritual life, starting with observing His commandments, where He is 
hidden (Saint Mark the Ascetic), and ending with the vision of God in the stage of 
theoria. Access to this experience is given by self-denial, as opposed to self-indulgence. 
The consequence of this approach is that such a person does not design healing 
experiences for himself or exposes himself to healing experiences designed according to 
various theories, because for him, God is experience to be found both inside and outside 
himself and following His path found entirely preserved in the Church, everything 
becomes a healing experience for the soul.  
As a result of contrasting issues from the existential-humanist paradigm in psychology 
considered here and the ascetic method, we notice that both language and practical approach 
overlap and tend towards a kind of formal identification, although as presented above due to their 
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distinct anthropological views, inevitably, major differences exist. Hence, at the top of this 
comparison we have two opposite perspectives: Frankl‘s logotherapy on one hand, ‗a secular 
therapy and medical practice‘
538
 as he himself states, which addresses people beyond their beliefs 
either religious or agnostic, and the perspective of various orthodox theologians and mental 
health professionals on the other hand, who conceptualize orthodox theology in terms of a soul‘s 
cure (which includes the spiritual and psychological). Viewed from a patristic perspective, the 
existential-humanist paradigm seems to offer the image of a theology per se, but a theology 
without Theos.  
 
6. Cure - by Wholeness and/or Holiness? 
 
The psychotherapeutic paradigms considered in this research are concerned with the topic of 
wholeness in a direct or indirect manner. In fact, the eclectic movement in modern 
psychotherapy, extended nowadays with integration of methods such as meditation and prayer 
and which were traditionally associated with various religious practices, was born out of the 
practitioners‘ need to deliver an integrated curative scheme meant to address the human being as 
a whole.  
One major common point between the Philokalic and modern psychotherapeutic paradigms is 
their account on the fragmented state of the human soul and its need to reach a state of 
unification which is seen as a state of health and normality. At a first glance, these views 
converge, but when looked at more closely they greatly diverge in how they see unification and 
how it is acquired based on their different anthropological backgrounds. The Philokalic 
perspective cannot consider wholeness outside holiness while modern psychotherapy approaches 
the matter of wholeness without taking into account holiness or even openly rejecting it.
539
  
Behaviourists and cognitivists touch on this matter only implicitly, contributing towards man‘s 
attainment of wholeness by changing maladaptive behaviours and irrational thoughts which in 
turn reduce feelings of inadequacy and offer a more adaptive perspective on one‘s behavioural, 
cognitive and emotional life. Instead, psychodynamic and existential-humanist paradigms 
approach it explicitly. Jung‘s view on wholeness is by far the most prominent in the context of 
psychodynamic therapies since in his system of thought it is a central concept. Wholeness is 
found in close relation with Self and constitutes the target of individuation process.  
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Larchet carried out extensive research on Jung‘s analytic psychology in his book concerning The 
Spiritual Unconscious,
540
 and some of the following conclusions are indebted to his analysis of 
the topic from a patristic perspective.  
As shown earlier in this chapter, for Jung to reach the state of wholeness presupposes a union of 
both conscious and unconscious, integration of the shadow as part of our selves, and of evil as 
part of God. In saying that Self is ‗God within us‘
541
 Jung equates the archetype of Self with that 
of God. As a consequence of this process of equivalence, in his understanding the archetype of 
God, similar to self, is a symbol of completeness and wholeness. As such, he makes the 
assumption that we should acknowledge evil as part of God the same way we have to obtain an 
awareness of the shadow as part of our personal selves. Failing to do so means for Jung not only 
exclusion of the undesired part of our selves represented by the shadow, but also exclusion of 




Self-fulfilment in Jungian terms is obtained by reaching completeness, i.e. totality, which does 
not involve a transformation of evil into good, but an acceptance of both light and dark sides of 
one‘s personality. Thus, man cannot reach totality without the integration of evil, which is to be 
found both within himself and within God, as ‗Self and God are indistinguishable‘
543
 realities, 
and overlap each other in the Jungian system. As Larchet pointed out, Jung was influenced in 
designing these theories by dualistic ideas such as Gnosticism, alchemy and oriental 
philosophies, particularly by Hinduism,
544
 which takes them far away from a Christian and 
Philokalic framework. In the therapeutic process, Jung is interested only in awareness and 
acceptance of one‘s dark side, i.e. shadow, which in his view brings balance of the conflicting 
forces within Self, without providing a norm to distinguish between good and evil, or the 
spiritual and ethical meanings of these forces.
545
 
For humanists, wholeness is not only a central concept of both theory and therapy but the person 
seen as a whole was even proposed as the object of psychology. Thus, the concern of every 
therapy should not be some separate aspects of man – be it behaviour, unconscious or thoughts – 
but the entire person. The main philosophical assumptions and practice revolve around this 
concept. For them wholeness is similar to a state of inner congruence between various psychic 
forces and relates to the process of self-actualization. As in Jung‘s case wholeness is seen as a 
final point of one‘s travel towards health.  
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The Philokalia, based on its anthropology, speaks about a division between the soul’s powers 
brought by the fall and the need of their unification in order to restore health and normality of 
their functioning. The journey to inner unification takes one through the three spiritual stages: 
praxis; contemplation; and theoria. Unlike Jung‘s completeness, the inner unification proposed 
by the Philokalia does not include union with evil or the dark side of one‘s self in any form but a 
transformation of dark into light and a restoration of the soul‘s powers, functioning according to 
their nature (cf. 2 Cor. 6:14; John 1:5). This process of inner unification follows a norm, a model, 
which in this case is revealed, a model that allows a clear distinction between good and evil, dark 
and light. Christ is the model of the unified man, followed by the similars of God, those people 
that accepted His proposals and thus became unified inside through union with Him.   
Maslow‘s intuition to try and find a norm for a healthy psyche by looking for ‗normal‘ people 
within society seems to have been accomplished by the ascetic tradition through the direct access 
it had to such people who followed the revealed rules by faith and came to know them by 
experience, an experience which they shared with those around them in various contexts. The 
Philokalia provides an anthropological framework in which man‘s inner unification cannot be 
accomplished outside God and outside union with Him: ―The saints‘ union with God has 
resounding implications for mankind. This union is not of a moral, psychological or social 
nature, but purely theological, which means there are unambiguous criteria for sanctity. Because 
man is made up of soul and body, God‘s grace is transmitted through the soul to the body as 
well, so unmistakable tokens and proofs of holiness exist‘.
546
   
For all Philokalic writers, deification or holiness is the final target of life
547
 since God created 
man for the purpose of becoming god by grace and adoption
548
 but not by nature.
549
 This 
distinction is found in connection with the one that is made between the energies and essence of 
God. Accordingly, man can acquire deification by participating in the divine energies, but not in 
the divine essence.
550
 Deification is empirically proved by the presence of God‘s uncreated 
energy, usually called grace, in some people whose bodies after death emit fragrance as a sign of 
their holiness.
551
 Thus, for the Philokalic anthropological paradigm to attain wholeness is not a 
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target in itself but rather the result of all the soul‘s powers functioning according to nature which 
is obtained following the ascetic practice. The aim of the ascetic method is not the direct 
acquisition of health but deification, unification and participation in God‘s energy (cf. 2 Pet. 1:4).  
The soul‘s health and wholeness are a natural result of man‘s journey towards a likeness to God, 
which is done by imitating Christ, not ‗outwardly or morally, but sacramentally and 
ascetically‘.
552
 Drawing on Saint Maximus‘s explanation of the process, Vlachos underlines that 
‗this imitation takes place inwardly, that is to say, Christ is born within us and we are born 
according to Christ‘.
553
 For Philokalics to become whole involves becoming holy or deified since 
only imitating Christ all the soul‘s powers may be restored to their initial intended purposes and 
natural functioning. Jung‘s completeness, a term which he prefers against that of wholeness, is 
found in opposition to this view, since it involves a unification of contraries, good and evil, on 
one hand, and because he rejects Christian holiness as a norm for the soul‘s health and fulfilment 
in God, on the other hand.
554
 
Humanists‘ wholeness is a feature of the fully functioning person as a result of the process of 
self-actualization. As showed in a previous paper where we contrasted the humanist‘s pyramid of 
needs with examples from saints‘ lives, self-actualization, from the Philokalic perspective, is 
actually a process that takes man to self-deification
555
 which is found in direct opposition with 
the process of Christ-actualization and deification in Christ followed by the ascetic method, as 
described earlier in this chapter.  
Hence, we notice that cure in relation to wholeness and holiness is seen differently by the two 
fields. If the Philokalia in its way towards holiness naturally gets and involves wholeness, 
modern psychotherapy is interested in wholeness and ignores or even firmly excludes holiness as 
understood in patristic terms.  
 
7. Cure by Grace?  
 
In the previous section concerning the anthropological profile of the Philokalia, we offered a 
short account on the importance of grace received through baptism in the process of inner 
healing. In this final section we intend to explore the matter further and bring in our comparative 
analysis a personal account of a professional working in the area of mental illness. The fact that 
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the Philokalia talks about the grace of the Holy Spirit as playing an essential role in inner healing 
most probably does not amaze anyone, but the fact that the very phenomenon of grace has been 
identified and integrated in the healing process by an American psychiatrist and psychoanalyst
556
 
through the ‗doings‘ employed by his clinical practice, is not a very common matter. Next, we 
will try to see how close are these two experiences of grace, as healing instrument, in the 
description of the two areas addressed by the present research.  
Peck argues that grace is to be found in the collective unconscious of one‘s soul,
557
 that it is 
naturally involved in any therapeutic process of inner healing but that unfortunately in order to 
access this resource people need to confront their real selves, which not many choose to do and 
therefore very few are healed.
558
 To him the signs of mental illness are in fact mere warnings of 
grace that something is not well with the path we are on and new adjustments are required.
559
  
Peck‘s statements are confirmed by the Philokalic experience according to which divine grace 
‗dwells in the very depths of the soul‘, ‗in its infinite love permeates the lineaments of God‘s 
image‘, and ‗although baptism removes from us the stain resulting from sin, it does not thereby 
heal the duality of will‘.
560
 Thus, from both sides it is recorded that grace is found deep within,
561
 
all the time available to man, and it is in his power to choose whether to collaborate with it or 
not.  
Both Peck and the Philokalia emphasize the difficulty of answering such a message conveyed by 
the hidden treasure in ourselves, the exertion of involving in such a painful and demanding effort 
of inner healing, but also its inevitable requirement, if one wants to be cured. Further on, Peck 
mentions the so-called resistance to health that often appears in therapy and explains it in this 
way:  
‗Many aspects of the reality of the world and of our relationship to the world are painful 
to us. We can understand them only through effort and suffering. All of us, to a greater or 
lesser extent, attempt to avoid this effort and suffering. We ignore painful aspects of 
reality by thrusting certain unpleasant facts out of our awareness. In other words, we 
attempt to defend our consciousness, our awareness, against reality. We do this by a 
variety of means which psychiatrists call defense mechanisms. If in our laziness and fear 
of suffering we massively defend our awareness, then it will come to pass that our 
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understanding of the world will bear little or no relation to reality. Because our actions 
are based on our understanding, our behavior will then become unrealistic. When this 
occurs to a sufficient degree our fellow citizens will recognize that we are ‗out of touch 
with reality‘, and will deem us mentally ill even though we ourselves are most likely 
convinced of our sanity‘.
562
  
Bringing plenty of examples from his clinical practice he shows that few people chose to end the 
therapeutic process due to the inherent suffering it brings and the strength required to endure it. 
On the other hand, for those who accepted and took upon them the difficult task of facing 
themselves, the freedom and the strength they acquire is so marvellous that ‗even if they emerge 
from therapy without a belief in God, such successful patients still generally do so with a very 
real sense that they have been touched by grace‘.
563
 
Related to the ascetic method that involves prayer and various other works towards obtaining 
virtue, i.e. inner health, the Philokalia depicts this painful struggle with oneself almost in the 
same terms:  
‗… We must use force. A man labours and struggles, and so by the use of force he 
escapes from destruction, always striving to raise his thoughts to holiness. We are not 
forbidden to resist force with force ... if we preserve in unceasing prayer and the other 
virtues, there will come upon us a mighty force, infinitely stronger than any we can exert. 
This force cannot be described in human language; in its great strength it overcomes our 
worst faults of character and the malice of the demons, conquering both the sinful 
inclinations of our soul and the disordered impulses of our body‘.
564
 Again, both 
perspectives present the struggle as well the unexpected strength and marvellous sense of 
growth that comes with it.  
An important part of Peck‘s observations relate to people oscillating between two contrary 
forces, one called entropy (laziness), that makes people uninvolved in their becoming and 
ultimately brings them to illness, and an opposite force identified with grace,
565
 which helps 
them go against the comfort of the status quo position and assume the ‗fearful state of affairs‘ 
where ‗we have no one to blame except ourselves‘.
566
 Actually, here he identified the presence of 
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the same forces which the Philokalic text describes as ‗the two spirits, that of light and that of 
darkness‘ which ‗are at work in the same heart‘.
567
  
Grace is seen by both fields as attending with infinite care to man‘s inner recovery from 
every kind of affliction he may suffer. Thus, Peck speaks about grace in terms of a  
‗powerful force originating outside of consciousness which nurtures our spiritual growth‘
568
 
while the Philokalia calls it ‗the common mother of us all‘.
569
 While nurtured in such a loving 
manner to grow inwardly man needs a laborious effort which was compared with the task of 
learning ‗a field of knowledge through a PhD program‘.
570
 But on the other hand, Peck saw that 
there is more to grace than only our personal effort:  
‗While on one level we do choose whether or not to heed the call of grace, on another it 
seems clear that God is the one who does the choosing. The common experience of those 
who achieved a state of grace, on whom ‗this new life from heaven‘ was bestowed, is one 
of amazement of their condition. They do not feel that they have earned it. While they 
may have a realistic awareness of the particular goodness of their nature, they do not 
ascribe their nature to their own will; rather distinctly they feel that the goodness of their 
nature has been created by hands wiser and more skilled than their own. Those who are 




In other words, the phenomenon of grace is a synergic one, there needs to be a collaborative 
union between the will of God and the will of man for the healing process to be accomplished. 
We believe that is precisely this synergy that is accomplished at its utmost within the ascetic 
practice demarche, since the path to grace is already a given by revelation and a proved fact by 
experience. Confirming entirely Peck‘s observations concerning the synergic effort present in 
healing, the next quote from Saint Symeon Metaphrastis seems to add what is missing so that the 
picture can be complete:  
‗We do not reach the final stage of spiritual maturity through divine power and grace 
alone, without ourselves making any effort; but neither on the other hand do we attain the 
final measure of freedom and purity as a result of our own diligence and strength alone, 
apart from any divine assistance. If the Lord does not build the house, it is said, and 
protects the city, in vain does the watchman keep awake, and in vain do the labourer and 
the builder work (cf. Ps. 127:1-4)‘.
572
 In agreement with its Christ-anthropology, and 
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drawing on the tradition of the Psalms, the Philokalia asserts openly the need for an inner 
structure built on the thoughts-commandments left by Christ to humanity as a way 
forward for healing, and therefore deification.  
Most of Peck‘s experiences and insights resulting from his professional practice present a 
particular interest for our work due to their closeness with viewpoints expressed by the 
Philokalia. Some other of his findings, addressing the concepts of health and illness, their 
relation with grace or entropy, as well as the criteria he provides in order to discriminate between 
various inner states, will be discussed in other sections of this research. For the time being we 
will complete this section with a few considerations: 
1. Both Peck and Jung draw on the idea of inner duality between good and evil but they 
have approached it differently. For Jung, uniting them is necessary in order to reach 
totality, and involves only acceptance, not transformation, while Peck emphasized the 
complete opposition between the two. In his view, one either evolves towards growth or 
entropy, but cannot be in both simultaneously. This perspective is closer to Freud‘s view 
on Eros and Thanatos, but it goes further in that it identifies God as the final target of this 
growing-in-love process, with God-grace being the very ‗source of the force that pushes 
us to ascend the ladder of human evolution‘ while entropy is the opposing power, ‗that 
causes us to resist that force‘,
573
 and is represented by the same type of evil that led to 
loss of communion with God. Viewed from a Philokalic perspective Peck‘s contribution 
seems to have left the area of the created and grasp the ‗flavor‘ of the uncreated. Had he 
had knowledge of the distinctions between created and uncreated energies, we believe he 
would probably have found his professional experience similar to the patristic assertions 
on this matter. Most probably they would have added extra nuances and have brought 
more clarifications in regard to his own discoveries.   
2. Nevertheless, as far as our in-depth research in the field of modern psychotherapies has 
taken us, we find his position as being unique and a direct result of a personal process of 
inner growth. That is why his considerations are not to be confused or identified with the 
existing theories in psychiatry or psychoanalytic therapy
574
 in which he professed. No 
doubt they offered him the necessary support for his practice but within this framework 
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3. In our opinion,  his contribution in relation to grace‘s power of healing is particularly 
important, especially because it offered a contemporary approach to the topic coming 
from the perspective of the practitioner that has to deal daily with various forms of inner 
illness. The theological language to which the book turns in some of its parts is only a 
result of the fact that what was known and experienced, Peck found it could not be best 
and most accurately described in any other terms.  
As a concluding observation of this part of the research we remark that if Freud was said to have 
essentially talked about a will to pleasure, Adler about a will to power, Rogers about a will to 
change, Frankl about a will to meaning, Peck about a will to grow, the Philokalia seems to have 
spoken mainly about a will to love. Nevertheless, we will follow this idea in the second part of 





















COMPARATIVE ILLNESS  
 
CHAPTER 4 
DIAGNOSIS AND DISCERNMENT 
 
 
The various psychotherapeutic approaches presented in the first part of this research are currently 
applicable in various settings: organizations (with and in), large clinical settings (such as the 
NHS), community (services which are provided directly in the community), the voluntary and 
independent sectors, and private practice.
576
 In our attempt at comparing illnesses we found it 
necessary to approach the topic of diagnosis first since, from a broader clinical perspective, we 
cannot discuss illness without first understanding how we come to define it.  
This chapter introduces the concepts of diagnosis and discernment, i.e. the processes used by the 
psychotherapeutic and Philokalic paradigms to guide us in discriminating between the contents 
of our inner world. From the perspective of our comparative methodology, they were identified 
as being the travelling concepts that relate to the common phenomenon of inner discrimination 
or differentiation which leads to naming. Therefore, in the first two sections below, there is a 
short account of these two travelling concepts followed by a border comparative analysis in the 
third.  
I. The Diagnosis  
As presented in the first part concerned with anthropology, the various models of abnormal 
behaviour differ widely in their aetiology, assumptions, and treatments, and so too in their 
approach to diagnosis.
577
 The psychotherapeutic perspective on diagnosis varies widely between 
these two main positions: a) the need to diagnose since ‗it seems elemental that rational 
treatment cannot be planned and executed until an accurate diagnosis has been made‘;
578
 and b) 
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its uselessness since it ‗is not necessary for good therapy‘
579





In the clinical settings, there is an inevitable interference and pressure exercised by the 
psychiatric upon the psychotherapeutic diagnosis which is emphasized by McWilliams in a 
recent book:  
 
‗… the psychiatric descriptive diagnosis, the basis of the DSM and ICD systems, has 
become normative. … Although inferential/contextual/dimensional/subjectively attuned 
diagnosis can coexist with descriptive psychiatric diagnosis (Gabbard, 2005; PDM Task 
Force, 2006), the kind of assessment described in this book has become more the 
exception than the rule. I see this state of affairs with alarm‘.
581
  
As a result, a recent study examines whether the psychiatric diagnosis is relevant for 
psychotherapeutic intervention and concludes that: 
 
‗Such a view of diagnosis is not workable for psychotherapy. The exclusion of personal 
experiences associated with symptoms and complaints is problematic and the referent 
that recent psychiatric classification uses, that is, brain processes, is not compatible with 
the referent that psychotherapeutic theories use. Case formulation can be seen as an 




As such, each approach designed its own way of diagnosing congruent with its therapeutic goals. 
1) The psychodynamically oriented therapies use a psychoanalytically-informed interview to get 
a clear picture of the clients‘ ‗inner world and the way it functions, and try to understand the 
nature of the distress they are presenting with‘.
583
 A diagnostic formulation is generally 
considered ‗doing therapy‘ and a process where the client can assess the analytic process in his 
own way while the therapist tries to identify ‗the crucial areas of style of relatedness, tone of 
interventions, and topics of initial focus‘
584
 which inform the advice given about treatment. The 
psychoanalytic diagnosis is character-focused and starts by identifying a person’s habitual 
defensive pattern. 2) The cognitive-behaviourtherapy gathers diagnostic information through 
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clinical interviews, self-monitoring data provided by the patients, self-monitoring scales, 
structured diagnostic interviews, and reports from the patient‘s family or other treatment 
providers. In addition to diagnostic procedures, they use case formulation in order to guide 
treatment planning and clinical decision making. Throughout the process various feelings, 
thoughts, behaviours and situations are assessed in the form of origins or precipitants.
585
 
According to other sources, diagnosis also involves in properly indentifying dysfunctional 
schemas, beliefs and negative thoughts.
586
 3) The humanistic-existential dimension traditionally 
displays a non-diagnostic perspective which is rooted in three main assumptions: a) behaviour is 
caused by and the psychological cause of behaviour is founded on the client‘s way of perceiving; 
b) the psychological change can be brought about only by the client who agrees to change his 
perceptions, and therefore even if the therapist knew precisely the cause of the distress he could 
not make effective use of it; c) the client can produce a change in perception as rapidly as he is 
able to bear the pain and the identified conflicts can be tolerated by the self.
587
 In their 
perspective, if there is something to be diagnosed, than this will be the quality of the therapeutic 
interaction as shown by the research evidence.
588
  
Thus, disagreement in aims is bound to result in disagreement in outcomes. An analytically 
oriented therapist will aim to enhance client autonomy, resolution of unconscious conflict, 
character change, achievement of insight, and getting clients in touch with their inner feelings; a 
cognitive-behaviourist will focus on the elimination of symptoms, non-medical symptoms, or the 
‗presenting problem‘, while the more cognitively oriented aims to change cognitive and 
emotional patterns; the existential-humanist therapist will seek to improve the quality of the 
therapeutic encounter by striving to make it empathic and genuine.
589
  
Therefore, different anthropological assumptions result in different aetiologies, which lead to 
different approaches towards diagnosis and treatment, which in their turn will have a different 
outcome. Since their efficacy was not easy to be assessed it was proposed that it should be tested 
‗relative to the outcome criteria of that paradigm‘
590
 and not in relation to a specific problem. In 
an attempt to identify a ‗deeper and theory-neutral criterion that can be used to evaluate the 
various criteria of competing paradigms‘
591
 it was proposed that the criterion of irrational and 
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defective desires might correspond. However, later analysis showed that what one client 
considers intrinsically good is different from another, and that clients do not always want what is 
best for them, and as such consensus could not be found.
592
   
A much-discussed issue in relation to diagnosis concerns the values it follows. The naturalistic 
scientific approach to psychotherapy claims that values can be separated from the person during 
the psychotherapeutic process.
593
 Other studies found them ‗intrinsic or built into scientific 
rationality‘
594
 and permeating the entire psychotherapeutic process, ‗entering into the goals and 
methods of every theory or approach‘.
595
 Sadler states that values are found behind every 
approach to psychological disorders even if they are not addressed directly. The need to be 
discussed openly is not only a matter of philosophical interest but mainly a matter of practical 
consequence.
596
 The discussion of values, even when applied to science, is essentially 
philosophical and one cannot avoid categories of good/evil when approaching them.  
In Sadlers‘ words many of the aspects of the present clinical practice are based on ‗the belief in a 
set of beliefs‘ that belongs to different promoters from the field. Belief is always involved in 
clinical experience and appears to be present at one end in the process of defining psychological 
illness (causes, symptoms, treatment) and at the other end by the fact that the client accepts the 
definition made by the specialist and its consequences even if he does not know how exactly that 
definition was reached. The patient has only one ‗certain‘ thing, his symptoms, and he is not very 
much interested if those specific symptoms are defined as being anxiety, depression, psychosis, 
or something else. What he seeks is healing. The final aim of the practitioner is the same: to heal. 
But in order to do this the specialist needs first to define the problem accurately which starts with 
correctly identifying its multiple causes.  
 
II.  Discernment/Diakrisis  
 
Throughout the Philokalic writings, various terms are used in relation to discernment: 
discernment of spirits; diakrisis; diakrisis logismon; discernment of evil thoughts; diakrisis 
pneumaton;
597
 discrimination; discretion; and right judgment. According to the Philokalia, the 
matter of discernment is discussed in the context of the pathology of human knowledge
598
 
brought about by the fall. As showed in the anthropology section, the healing of the soul starts 
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with the recovery of the nous since as Saint Gregory Palamas asks: ‗How could a rational soul be 
healthy if its power of knowledge is ill?‘
599
 Discernment is necessary throughout the entire 
process of recovery and maintenance of the nous‘s health. Saint Maximus the Confessor explains 
in relation to the categories to be distinguished in the process: ‗As health and disease are to the 
body of a living thing, and light and darkness to the eye, so virtue and vice are to the soul, and 
knowledge and ignorance to the intellect.
600
 
Discernment relates on the one hand to the discriminative power of intelligence,
601
 and on the 
other hand with the gift of discernment which is ‗the queen and crown of all virtues‘.
602
 




 As Saint John Climacus points out 
‗discernment … is found only among those who are pure in heart, in body, and in speech‘.
605
 The 
link between discernment and purification is described by Fr. Dumitru Stăniloae in a note on 
Saint John Climacus‘ Ladder:  
‗Discernment is not only theoretical knowledge, but knowledge and feeling in the same 
time of what is good or evil and therefore depends on the purity of the one who holds it. 
Only the one who is pure in heart perceives what is pure and feels aversion towards what 
is impure. And pure in heart is the one who complies with God‘s commandments, 
convicting himself; or the one who is merciful towards the whole creation; or the one 
who is free from hidden passions. And pure with the body is the one who is free from the 
bodily uncleanness and with his mouth speaks the truth‘.
606
 
It consists in the power to discriminate in himself or in others what is being done after the will of 
God, from the devil’s deceit or in a natural way and knows a few stages:  
‗among beginners, discernment is real self-knowledge; among those midway along the 
road to perfection, it is a spiritual capacity to distinguish unfailingly between what is 
truly good and what in nature is opposed to the good; among the perfect, it is a 
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Diakrisis is used to discriminate between thoughts that pass through the mind,
608
 people and 
situations. By means of mental watchfulness those thoughts which are good and originate in God 
are kept, while those which are evil and originate in the devil are cast out.
609
 The resistance 
manifested by the latter thoughts might be so strong that Saint Philotheos describes it in terms of 
‗warfare‘:  
‗It is by means of thoughts that the spirits of evil wage a secret war against the soul. For 
since the soul is invisible, these malicious powers naturally attack it invisibly. Both sides 
prepare their weapons, muster their forces, device stratagems, clash in fearful battle, gain 
victories and suffer defeats‘.
610
 On the other hand, a great subtleness is associated with its 
unseen nature: ‗just as it is easier to sin in the mind than in action, so warfare through our 




The thorough knowledge of causes which discernment provides allows one to make a sharp 
distinction between the suffering and the sufferer, and to love the sufferer but hate that which 
harms him. Since diakrisis is linked with the purity of heart and humbleness, it is not used to 
make critical judgments upon people since that would be detrimental of purity. As Price notes: 
‗Diakrisis thus provided a critical faculty, but it was not critical to others; a distinction lost in 
modern English usage
612
 where criticism generally has a negative recognition‘.
613
  
According to Saint John Climacus, discernment is ‗a solid understanding of the will of God in all 
times, in all places, in all things‘
614
 and as such provides insight into the truth of a matter and 
into how to act for the best. Discernment is essential in acquiring health
615
 and ‗a discerning man 
is a discoverer of health, a destroyer of sickness‘.
616
 Saint Diadochos of Photiki highlights that 
true knowledge represents the power to discriminate without error between good and evil, and 
that spiritual knowledge is acquired ‗so that henceforward it will grow more and more confident 
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III. Diagnosis and Discernment: Comparison  
 
In line with their anthropological assumptions and distinct methods implied, diagnosis and 
discernment might be said to represent two ways of knowledge: diagnosis links with the 
reasoning activity based on observation and deductive reasoning, while diakrisis with the noetic 
activity being the result of a pure heart.   
At a first look, they might be different in their proposed finalities: one points towards unification 
with God and deification, while the other towards the identification of the most efficient 
therapeutic intervention method, in the form of pharmacotherapy, psychotherapy, or both, in 
regard to ameliorating or eliminating the symptoms presented by the patient, and restoring 
psychological balance. However, as presented in the first part on anthropology, the theology of 
the Philokalia constitutes a soul‘s healing method, which links the created and uncreated.
618
 At 
the same time, acquiring health and having a precise identification of illnesses‘ causes is so 
important that discrimination is even considered a destroyer of sickness that brings health. 
Hence, even if applied within different methodological frameworks, they are concerned with the 
same subject matter, i.e. the human soul‘s sickness and health, and in practice as we have seen 
they both distinguish between various categories of thoughts, feelings, people‘s motivations and 
their meanings.  
Thus, if the Philokalic perspective brings one in contact with categories analyzed by current 
therapeutic practice, we shall see that in the same way the psychotherapeutic activity may put 
one in contact with spiritual categories, as was argued by Peck
619
. Using the same clinical 
diagnostic methodology he pointed towards the opposed reality which he termed as evilness, that 
is as present in one‘s psyche as grace. For example, one of the cases described in his book, which 
apparently could easily fit into the category of obsessive-compulsive neurosis presented features 
that made the case impossible to be understood and treated through conventional means, and 
Peck had to explore and accept the influences upon the patient coming from an external agency. 
The case actually describes how an external force was brought to ‗existence‘ by the patient 
through choosing ‗the easy way out‘ and avoiding the legitimate suffering he was supposed to 
assume.
620
 These states of affairs Peck terms as evilness, and brings evidence from his 
psychotherapeutic practice to support his claims. At the end of his book Peck proposes evilness 
as a nosological category and attaches to it a methodology of love.
621
 The insight offered by Peck 
enforces the hypothesis that psychotherapists usually meet the reality of evil along their practice 
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and may display three kinds of reactions to it: they observe it and try to find reliable solutions to 
it; they notice but do not have a name for it; or they are not aware of it at all.  
In terms of values, the Philokalic perspective brings them into the wide open so that anyone has 
the chance to know, challenge and adhere to them or not, while in the psychotherapeutic field 
only the humanistic-existential approach acknowledges and considers them part of the curative 
process. However, the general efforts made by psychotherapy to operate outside categories of 
good/evil, and to separate itself from any relation with the moral space, have increased the 
possibility of misdiagnosis due to the exclusion of an important aetiological factor for 
psychological illness, as Sadler notes by explaining the causes: ‗today, however, the general 
demand for, and euphoria about, scientific objectivity, empirical truth, and emerging therapies 
tends to obscure the evaluative roots of what it means to be ill – mentally or otherwise.
622
 
Nevertheless, in practice many of the professionals from the field observe that there is a close 
link between the psychological and spiritual aspects and that a sharp delimitation between the 
two is difficult to make.  
The ascetic method ‗classifies‘ the thoughts according to their source: nature, God and devil and 
by this it implies a difference between the created and uncreated
623
 at all times, which constitutes 
one of the main differences from the clinical psychological diagnosis which might be considered 
to operate only in the area of the created. Researching the topic with a comparative effort in 
mind, our general impression is that somehow in the current psychotherapy, the initial categories 
of psyche‘s health and sickness dealt with in the past were ‗diminished‘ so as to eliminate the 
categories of good and evil, while the ascetic method remained coherent with the entire 
wholeness presupposed by these categories. Our implicit research question is if a clear 
distinction between the psychological and spiritual does actually exist when operating on the 
same inner content such as thoughts, feelings, unconscious motivations, desires and so on. We 
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NORMALITY AND ABNORMALITY 
 
 
While the focus of this research is on illness and abnormality, we also need to understand what is 
health or normality, as inferred by both perspectives. We are interested to see if we can identify 
a criterion for normality/health to which, logically, the presupposed abnormality/illness should 
be identified against. Respecting the general format of the research, in the third section we 
present the comparative analysis of the travelling concepts based on arguments provided in the 
first two sections. In the conclusive part of this chapter we will also try to see if normality may 





I. The Modern Psychotherapeutic Perspective 
 
 
In the psychotherapeutic field the issues of normality and abnormality are intertwined and tend to 
be defined through one another: normality is the lack of abnormality and vice versa. Modern 
psychotherapy, as previously showed in the chapter on anthropology, developed without having 
a clear and defined model of normality against which to be built, but emerged as a discipline 
formed conceptually around clinical psychopathology, from which ideas about normality were 
inferred. It is precisely this reverse development that is underlined by the evolution of the 
psychotherapeutic theories from psychodynamics to behavioural, cognitive, and then culminating 
with the existential-humanist approach which tried to de-pathologize the field and focused on 
positive ‗healthy‘ concepts such as self-actualization rather than illness.  
The terminology of the disciplines that deal with these concepts, both theoretically and 
practically, varies along time and includes abnormal psychology, psychopathology, psychiatry, 
clinical psychology, health psychology, psychotherapy, counselling, and the professionals that 
apply them correspond to the above categories to which nurses, social workers, and clerics are 
added.
625
 In other words, the psychological concepts that were initially produced by specific 
psychotherapeutic approaches are now intrinsic to the various fields mentioned above and 
applied by the professionals attached to those fields. In time, many disciplines contributed to the 
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debate and therefore the definition of what is normal or abnormal oscillates between medical, 
psychological, or social constructs. Next we shall go through such assumptions.  
 
 
1. Defining Normality  
 
 
It has been claimed that ‗normality and abnormality cannot be differentiated objectively‘ since 
‗all such distinctions … are in part social constructions and cultural artifacts‘
626
 as well as value-
laden.
627
 However, some attempts at differentiation have been made. For example, Sabshin sees 
normality in terms of three distinct ‗ideologies‘: somatotherapeutic; psychotherapeutic; and 
sociotherapeutic, that relate to ‗profound differences in the concept of the independent variables 
involved in the etiology of various psychological illnesses and in the processes required for 
therapeutic effectiveness‘.
628
 By somatotherapeutic, Sabshin refers to the role of biological 
systems in the aetiology and treatment of psychological illness specific to the psychiatric medical 
field.
 629
 Other views on normality include: normality as a statistical concept, ideal mental 
health
630
 or fully functioning behaviour.
631
 The first criterion relates to the Gaussian curve where 
the middle values are considered normal and the ones found on the extreme abnormal. So, 
whatever tendencies appear to be more frequent in the population at a specific moment in time 
might be considered normal. The second criterion views normality as being an ideal state
632
 
which implies the necessity to define this ideal state. For example Jahoda,
633
 lists six criteria: 
balance of psychic forces; self-actualization; resistance to stress; autonomy; competence; and 
perception of reality. After trying to make a short description of these criteria he draws the 
conclusion that is easier to define abnormality than normality. The critics of this approach 
sustain that the ideal nature of normality excludes too many persons, the goals set are too vague 
and abstract and also that the ways of adjusting to the world and gaining happiness are too many 
in order to be categorized. The third criterion for normality, closely related to the previous one, is 
considered very restrictive since very few people might be said to have achieved the level of fully 
functionality, which was aimed at especially by the humanists, and as such very few are normal.  
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The psychotherapeutic ideology highlighted psychological factors as causative for psychological 
illness. Psychoanalysis had a great impact on the concept of normality although ‗not often stated 
or acknowledged in clear terminology‘ and the paradigmatic shift it produced was due to the 
assertion of ‗the universality of the development of at least some form of minimal pathology.
634
 
This perspective upon illness and its indirect effect on the concept of normality, resulted in the 
overdiagnosis of psychological illness.
635
 The behaviourist perspective brought the concept of 
normality out of the intrapsychic structure and placed it in the environment considered to be 
primarily involved in maintaining the abnormal behaviour, while the cognitive approach brings 
it back inwardly and sees it in terms of negative cognitive-emotional functioning that should be 
replaced with a more positive-adaptive one.
636
 The existential-humanist approach, without 
providing a definition of normality, had tried to focus on it through the person-centred therapy 
developed, whose goal was to attain the state of congruence, self-actualization, and existential 
meaningfulness. As shown in the anthropology part, Maslow even looked for some models of 
normality from which to derive standards for a self-actualized person.  
 
The last category of sociotherapeutic ideologies supported the role of social variables, be they 
familial, cultural, group, or societal variables, in producing psychological illness. Therefore, in 
order to diminish illness ‗alterations of these systems were necessary‘
637
 and Sullivan‘s 
interpersonal perspective, which argues that ‗personality is best conceptualized as the social 
product of interactions with significant others‘,
638
 came to fill in the gap. The major impact of 
this perspective on the concept of normality is reflected in the need to investigate individuals‘ 
social environments in order to diagnose, and the ‗move‘ of the treatment‘s location into the 
client‘s community (family, friends, workplace, and community centres).
639
 Recent approaches 
that address the re-focusing on the normal individual so as to infer routes for cure, rather than on 
psychopathology, have also been attempted with a view ‗that values, not unconscious 
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2. Defining Abnormality  
 
 
To define abnormal behaviour is a complex issue in itself, but the psychotherapeutic field being 
primarily concerned with it offers much more information on the subject in opposition to 
normality for which information is scarcely and indirectly acquired, and almost always by 
reference to abnormality. Criteria to define abnormality include: abnormality as deviation from 
the average; abnormality as deviation from ideal mental health; and abnormality as 
maladaptiveness,
641
 which have already been discussed in relation to normality. Other criteria 
comprise: abnormality as deviation from the norm, understood not in its statistical sense but as 
socially established norms which are bound to change across times according to different 
economic, political, and moral factors; abnormality as personal distress and disability seen as 
impairment in one or more areas of life;
642
 abnormality as others’ distress which suggests its 
interpersonal nature on one hand and its potential outcome in discomfort and unfulfilling social 
roles, on the other. The discussion here is that not all abnormal behaviour causes distress, as is 
the case of an individual with borderline personality disorder violating social norms without 
feeling guilt or remorse. On the other hand, not all distress presupposes the presence of an 
abnormal behaviour as in the case of a mother giving birth to a child. The major weakness of this 
criterion is that it gives us no standard for evaluating the behaviour itself. People are the ones to 
judge their own behaviours but the major psychological symptoms of illness are experienced as 
egosintonic, and therefore not reported as problematic; abnormality as unexpected behaviour 
refers to unpredicted reactions but usually relates only to excess, as in overreaction, but not with 
deficit as in under-reaction, which makes this criterion partial and inefficient; and the final 




Next we further approach the matter of psychological illness in an attempt to capture a 
comprehensive definition as much as possible. There are many terms used in relation to this 
concept: ailment, malady, sickness, illness, or disorder;
644





 or the four D’s: deviance (from the norm), distress, dysfunctional and 
dangerous.
647
 According to the various theoretical orientations one of these terms is preferred 
over others, and consensus is not firmly established. However, the medical model with its 
conceptualization of psychological illness as ‗disease‘ is still dominant in terms of definition and 
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classification, and as such the term ‗mental illness‘ is preferred in this area,
648
 but is not 
dominant in terms of aetiology and treatment where the psychotherapeutic paradigms seem to 




The way psychopathology is conceptualized determines how we treat it
650
 and when the 
aetiology of an illness is known a cure is possible. All forms of psychological illness 
conceptualizations, that have emerged from current psychotherapies, might basically be reduced 
to one concept as to the locus of aetiology, description and treatment implied. Thus, 
psychodynamic therapies understand illness in terms of the unconscious wherein lies the cause 
for abnormal behaviour, which is described in reference to unconscious processes, and the 
suggested treatment also refers to unconscious dynamics that need to be transformed into 
conscious content; the same applies to behaviour for behaviourists, and to cognition for 
cognitivists; the exception is represented by existential-humanists who, by focusing on the 
person as a whole, employ a variety of causative factors but without approaching them 
systematically. They also engage in a multitude of curative solutions, depending on the free 
choice of the individual. However, some unifying concepts for the humanist-existential approach 
may be found in the self-actualizing tendency and in defining one’s personal life meaning. An 
attempt at a unifying operational definition of psychological disorder is suggested by Wakefield 
who asserts that it:  
‗lies on the boundary between the given natural world and the constructed social world; a 
disorder exists when the failure of a person‘s internal mechanisms to perform their 
functions as designated by nature impinges harmfully on the person‘s well-being as 
defined by social values‘.
651
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The discussion on the existence or inexistence of psychological illness
652
 brought to the fore 
another current debate related to stigma attached to psychological illness in the clinical area. 
Defenders of the medical model have argued that psychological illness implies that something 
happened to the patient and he cannot be held responsible for that. Thus, they have preferred the 
label of sick or ill, considered more acceptable than the view of the person as bad, judged to be 
more stigmatizing. But as some voices argue, ‗the stigma attached to mental illness may actually 
be greater than that attached to labels of ―bad‖, because our fear of mental illness is even greater 
than our fear of becoming involved in crime or other immoral activities‘.
653
 This statement seems 
to be also sustained by the fact that stigma ‗has been proposed as one of the main burdens of 
mental illness and there are now international programs aimed at reducing it‘,
654
 and some 
general measures were implemented to replace other terms with that of service user for anyone 
accessing a mental health service and also whenever possible to apply the supervised treatment 
within the community, rather than at a hospital.  
 
We conclude this section by specifying two things. First, for our purposes, we will prefer the 
terms of psychological illness over others, since it emphasizes the dimensional and psychological 
aetiology as opposed to syndrome classification and organic aetiology outlined by the medical 
perspective and the terms of normality-abnormality as highlighting the departure from a norm. 
Second, as with Millon, we see normality and abnormality as residing on a continuum on which 
one might slowly transform into the other. He explains the process in this way:  
‗Because personality disorders are composed of maladaptive traits, there are two ways 
that personality pathology becomes more severe when moving along the continuum from 
health to pathology. First, single traits can become more intense in their expression; 
assertiveness can give way to aggression, for example, or deference can give way to 
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However controversial and indefinite these concepts are, the constant that Alexander points to in 
relation to normality, i.e. that it ‗does not imply being just like one‘s friends but it does imply 
having something in common with one‘s enemies, if they are normal‘,
656
 might be applied to 
abnormality as well. Our endeavour to find the criterion for normality as provided by the modern 
psychotherapeutic approaches was not very successful. Although attempts have been made, the 
goals of the various therapeutic paradigms and the way they see the human being are so diverse 
that they could not provide criteria for a unified image of a psychologically ‗normal‘ person.  
 
II. The Philokalic Perspective  
 
This section of the chapter deals with the concept of normality and abnormality in the Philokalia. 
The present discussion is a direct development of the material presented in the first part 
concerned with anthropology and revolves around the concepts of man functioning according to, 
contrary or above nature. The state of normality is associated with virtue, and abnormality with 
passion. At the end of this section a short account of normality and abnormality as a state of 
existence or inexistence will be offered.  
 
 
1. Defining Normality  
 
 
In the Philokalia, normality is linked with ‗bringing Christ to birth within yourself‘
657
 and as 
such represents a ‗journey‘ that starts with being made in the image and develops towards 
acquiring likeness. Along the Christ-actualization process man struggles towards acquiring and 
maintaining virtue. The following discussion will focus on the origin, definition, classification 
and finality of virtue as a state of normality.  
 
As conceptualized by various Philokalic writers, virtue has its origin ‗in the soul‘s voluntary 
estrangement from the flesh‘
658
 or in other words ‗the soul‘s deliberate detachment from the 
senses‘,
659
 ‗a good disposition of the will, that is to say, an aspiration for goodness and 
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 and these are originated in ‗faith‘ or ‗Christ, the rock of faith, who is the principle and 
foundation of all virtues‘.
661
 So, virtue‘s origin, whether conceptualized in negative terms that 
relate to the laborious process of transforming passions, or in positive terms pointing towards 
their finality, ultimately has Christ as the foundation for all, as a result of man‘s being created in 
His image. Virtues are also found to originate and relate to the three powers of the soul: ‗For the 
ground and principle of the four cardinal virtues, both natural and divine — sound 
understanding, courage, self-restraint and justice, the progenitors of all the other virtues — is the 
divine Wisdom‘.
662
 Saint Theodoros the Great, drawing on Saint Gregory the Theologian, links 
virtues with the tripartite structure of the soul:  
‗Virtue, when established in the intelligence, he calls discretion, understanding and 
wisdom; when in the incensive power, he calls it courage and patience; and when in the 
faculty of desire, he calls it love, self-restraint and self-control.‘
663
  
It is argued that virtues are implanted in man from his creation,
664





 are considered equal and ‗together reduce themselves to one, thus constituting 
a single principle and form of virtue‘.
667
 The only exception is represented by the virtues of 
‗divine love, humility and divine patience‘ which ‗are greater than others, embracing and 
comprising as they do a large number or even all of the rest‘
668
. There are various ways of listing 
or classifying virtues in the Philokalia. Thus, some writers speak of four principal virtues where 
they list intelligence, courage, self-restraint, and justice which are said to constitute the ‗image‘ 
of the ‗heavenly‘ man;
669
 another classification includes stillness, prayer, love and self-
control,
670
 while another writer refers to just three virtues that are ‗all-embracing, namely, total 
shedding of possessions, self-control and humility, and five deriving from them, namely, purity, 
gentleness, joy, courage, and self-belittlement – and then come all the other virtues.
671
 Some 
other classifications refer to virtues as being natural, which do not transcend nature, or 
supernatural, ‗which is energized only by the primal source of beauty‘;
672
 another description 
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includes practical virtues which are products of our resolution, natural that are built in us at our 




The Philokalia offers a few extended lists of virtues which outline the multitude of human features 
covered by them. Saint John of Damascus offers such a list and speaks about two categories of 
virtues, those ascribed to the soul and to the body: the first category includes the four cardinal 
virtues ‗courage, moral judgment, self-restraint and justice‘.
674
 These four give birth to the 
other virtues of the soul. The bodily virtues are seen as instruments of the former and when 
noetically used they bring one to dispassion.
675
  
Virtue is said to be acquired in three stages: first, one needs to reduce passions and conquer them, 
then to acquire virtues properly, and last, to preserve with watchfulness the fruits of the virtues 
previously acquired.
676
 In this process, the nous has the leading role in having to control the 
desiring and incensive powers of the soul
677
 and to transform the senses into instruments of 
virtue.
678
 The intellect is described as meeting four main obstacles in acquiring virtue, out of 
which three relate to the worldly and bodily attachments and the fourth to the influence of 
demons:  
‗First, there is prepossession, that is, the ingrained influence of habits running counter to 
virtue … Secondly, there is the action of the senses, stimulated by sensible beauty and 
drawing the intellect after it. Thirdly, there is the dulling of noetic energy due to the 
intellect‘s connection with the body … The fourth of the obstacles impeding the intellect 
in its acquisition of virtue is the pernicious influence of unclean and hostile demons.‘
679
 
It is in this process of overcoming various blockages that discrimination between good and 
evil is absolutely necessary for the acquisition of virtue.
680
  
The finality of virtue is practical in that it strives towards detachment by controlling the 
appetitive part of the soul, a detachment that is not an end in itself, but as Professor Louth points 
out is ‗only so that, in their purified state, they can be reintegrated into the whole human 
being‘,
681
 and is also theoretical with a view of acquiring ‗eternal blessings‘.
682
 However, to 
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acquire and stabilize in virtue there is a need for a synergic effort between one‘s freely 
undertaken ascetic practice and the participation of grace:  
‗The pursuit of the virtues through one's own efforts does not confer complete strength on the 
soul unless grace transforms them into an essential inner disposition … For just as a living 
soul activates the body‘s members, so the grace of the Holy Spirit activates the virtues. 
Without such grace the whole bevy of the virtues is moribund; and in those who appear to 
have attained them, or to be in the way of attaining them, solely through their own efforts 




2. Defining Abnormality  
 
Abnormality is linked in the Philokalia with what is not according to nature,
684
 and is mainly 
connected with the matter of passions, which was previously considered in our work in relation 
to thoughts (logismoi) and will later be detailed when approaching the passion of fear and 
dejection. Although in Philokalic anthropology the discussion on abnormality is related to all the 
‗evils into which we have fallen‘ that are ‗demons, passions, sins‘
685
 between which there are 
obvious links, we focus our discussion mainly on passions, since they are directly connected with 
the concept of ‗sickness‘.
686
  
The following presentation somehow mirrors the above discussion on normality. Thus, if 
normality is a result of the soul‘s powers functioning according to and above nature, 
abnormality results from functioning contrary to nature; if normality results from detachment 
from the world, abnormality from attachment to it and to the world of the senses,
687
 where 
passions have their origin;
688
 if normality has its origin in actualizing Christ who is considered 
its very foundational principle, abnormality results from departure from Him;
689
 to every virtue 
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there is an opposing passion;
690
 as virtues are interdependent, in the same way passions are and 
beget one another.  
They are classified in the same manner; some are listed as the three primary or root passions, 
such as ‗love of sensual pleasure, love of praise and love of material wealth‘
691
 or the three giants 
that beget all the other passions forgetfulness, laziness and ignorance;
692
 opposing the four 
virtues presented above are the four passions of stupidity, cowardice, licentiousness, and injustice 
that offer the ‗image‘ of the ‗earthy‘ man, according to Saint Maximus;
693
 the same writer 
identifies self-love as ‗the mother of all vices‘ which he describes as being a ‗mindless love of 
the body‘.
694
 They may also be passions of the soul or body. We exemplify the extensive area of 
their psychological coverage by quoting the lists presented by Saint John of Damascus and 
which oppose the list of virtues presented above. Thus, the soul‘s passions which affect the three 
powers of the soul are considered the direct result of the nous‘s darkening and are represented 
by:  
‗impiety, false teaching or every kind of heresy, blasphemy, wrath, anger, bitterness, 
irritability, inhumanity, rancour, back-biting, censoriousness, senseless dejection, fear, 
cowardice, quarrelsomeness, jealousy, envy, self-esteem, pride, hypocrisy, falsehood, 
unbelief, greed, love of material things, attachment to worldly concerns, listlessness, faint-
heartedness, ingratitude, grumbling, vanity, conceit, pomposity, boastfulness, love of 
power, love of popularity, deceit, shamelessness, insensibility, flattery, treachery, 
pretence, indecision, assent to sins arising from the soul‘s passible aspect and dwelling 
on them continuously, wandering thoughts, self-love, the mother of vices, avarice, the 
root of all evil (cf. 1 Tim. 6: 10) and, finally, malice and guile‘. 
695
  
The passions of the body are said to impact directly on the intellect by making it cloddish and 
not allowing it to rise towards the divine.
696
 
According to Saint John Climacus, depending on the lifestyle of oneself, some passions come 
from within and manifest themselves in the body, as is the case of those living in stillness, or 
come from outside as is the case for more active people.
697
 A passion results from ‗a 
combination of some perceived object, a sense faculty and a natural power ... whose natural 
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function has been distorted‘.
698
 As such, the healing process led by the intellect consists in 
restoring each of the three to their natural state by reducing the passion to its constituents. Thus, 
one may see the sensible object in itself without the impassioned connection with the sense faculty 
or the power of the soul. However the stability of this kind of disconnection between the three 
constituents of the passions could be achieved only when ‗Christ the Lord has come to dwell in 
the mind‘
699
 and this is achieved through prayer, perhaps the most important of the ascetic 
methods, which brings one towards ‗a state rather than an activity‘
700
 as Professor Louth 
notices. In other words, prayer in time becomes a way of being, which relates one to Christ from 
within. In terms of finality, the presence of passions in the short and medium term may lead 
even to deadness of soul, but from which one may recover through spiritual knowledge and the 
afferent intellectual activity that goes with it,
701





3. Concluding Remarks  
 
Virtue is seen as standing in the middle between two extremes, between what is too much or too 
little, or between excess and defect, which are both associated with passions.
703
 Values of evil 
and good are directly involved in producing passions and virtues since: ‗If by nature the good 
unifies and holds together what has been separated, evil clearly divides and corrupts what has 
been unified. For evil is by nature dispersive, unstable, multiform and divisive‘.
704
 The matter of 
normality and abnormality is also put in relation with the state of existence and inexistence. Saint 
Dorotheos of Gaza states that evil is related to nothingness, it has no being or substance, but ‗the 
soul deviating from virtue is in a state of violence and this is what makes evil; therefore it suffers 
injury at its own hands and is deprived of that state of rest which by nature it should have‘
705
 
while the state of being or existence relates to the actualization of Christ in man.
706
 The entire 
Philokalia argues that the unification of one‘s soul is done by means of love and that it is love 
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While abnormality relates to what is contrary to nature, normality relates to what is according to 
nature, which is the basis for acquiring that which is above nature and constitutes the finality of 
man‘s life, i.e. to become deified or a god by grace. As Saint Maximus states ‗deification‘ is 
acquired by the union ‗of his real authentic origin with his real authentic consummation‘.
708
 In 
other words, from a Philokalic perspective, man ‗travels‘ throughout his life from image to 
likeness, or from what is according to nature to what is above nature, and when he is found to 
undertake this journey he is found in a state of normality, while when departing from the King’s 
highway either to the left or to the right he is found in a state of abnormality, hence contrary to 
nature.
709
 Since ‗nature does not contain the inner principles of what is beyond nature any more 
than it contains the laws of what is contrary to nature‘,
710
 grace is needed to pass from nature to 
what is above nature.
711
 According to Father Staniloae, the saint is the human person that 
possesses in all its depth the image and likeness of God and that his transformation took place in 
the Church which is seen as ‘the laboratory in which the Spirit of Christ makes us saints’.
712
 
Drawing on the writings of Saint Gregory of Sinai, Metropolitan Hierotheos Vlachos identifies a 
few characteristics of deification: the goal of man‘s life is deification;
713
 deification would need 
to be experienced to a greater or lesser extent starting with this life, if one were to enjoy the 
kingdom of heaven in the next; there are different degrees of deification; and that it enjoys a 
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III. Normality and Abnormality: Comparison  
 
Based on the different anthropological frameworks they present, one might expect the two 
perspectives presented to be different in how they approach normality and abnormality. Drawing 
on the arguments presented above, we shall try next to infer the similarities and differences we 
found between the two. Our aim is to try to find as much common ground as possible but to keep 
a constant reference on their different anthropological backgrounds in mind. We shall start with 
the differences which strikingly impose themselves on us, and we shall advance to look for more 
and more similarities.  
Approached theoretically, at a first look there are almost no similarities one might find. Since 
what may be in common between the Philokalic perspective that bases its criteria of normality 
and abnormality on the process of giving birth to Christ within one‘s soul or the departure from 
it,
715
 and the current psychotherapeutic perspective according to which: ‗given its social basis, 
normality is probably best defined as conformity to the behaviors and customs typical for an 
individual‘s reference group or culture‘ while pathology is ‗defined by behaviors that are 
uncommon, irrelevant, or alien to the individual‘s reference group‘?
716
  
Another striking difference is that modern psychotherapy developed right from the urge to cure 
the psychopathology it had to deal with daily but without a clear reference to a criterion of 
normality, while the Philokalia derived its entire ‗psychopathology‘ from having such a criterion, 
and even more, a revealed criterion. As we have seen above, the question of defining normality 
is still unanswered in current psychotherapy, although attempts to find some criteria have been 
made. Freud simply defined normality as the capacity to work and to love, without developing 
any further interest in the matter.  
When we look at the Philokalic viewpoint from the current psychotherapeutic perspective, such a 
thing as giving birth to Christ within or the departure from it as a criterion for normality and 
abnormality simply does not exist. At the same time, the critics of most criteria proposed by 
current paradigms to define normality come from within the practice, since none of them was 
successful in defining normality. 
Using the lens method we previously established that modern psychotherapy has no awareness of 
Christ as an inner norm and as such provides no insight on the matter. Now we intend to look at 
the currently proposed clinical criteria from the Philokalic perspective. Here, there are a few 
things to be observed. First, the ascetic method cannot consider as valid criteria the deviation 
from the average or norm, which varies according to the social factors against which they are 
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measured. This falls in the category of what Philokalic writers describe as worldly attachment. 
Second, the criterion of personal or others‘ distress does not fit the Philokalic perspective. 
Confirming contemporary observations it also notices that not all abnormal behaviour causes 
distress,
717
 and on the other hand not all distress is abnormal. Third, abnormality as unexpected 
and unpredicted behaviour cannot be considered since there is a category of people, termed as 
fools-for-Christ which, based on the ascetic method, developed such intentional behaviour as a 
way of maintaining their normality and that of those around them.
718
  
The last two criteria, which see normality as an ideal or utopian psychological health and 
derived from it the state of full functionality, might present a particular importance. With current 
perspectives, critics of these two criteria include the fact that they exclude too many people, the 
goals set are vague and adjustment to the world follows a lot of ways and they cannot be 
categorized, while full functionality is too restrictive given that not many people might acquire it. 
When analyzed in the psychotherapeutic universe of discourse these critics seem justified, but 
when analyzed within our research universe of discourse which includes the Philokalic 
perspective as well, it might just be that it provides the answer to this unfound ideal 
psychological health. Our hypothesis is that the Philokalic perspective brings forward this type 
of ideal psychological health, whose efficiency and practicability is exemplified by the deified. It 
also answers all current critics: it does not exclude anyone, and everyone is called to normality 
and deification; the goals set, the stages involved, and the methods are well-defined by a science 
of the soul that has about two thousand years of history; the ways to attain it are various but 
always having the same absolute criteria in Christ;
719
 and full functionality is acquired through 
the process of deification.
720
  
When advancing in our comparative effort, we find that both perspectives might approach 
normality and abnormality from the perspective of a continuum on which various psychological 
features may slowly fade into the other. The inner components are conceptualized as maladaptive 
traits, in one field, and the soul‘s powers or faculties in the other. As showed above, Millon 
explained how psychopathology becomes more severe when moving along the continuum from 
health to pathology. However, the reverse movement on the continuum is not approached.
721
 As 
presented above, the Philokalic perspective seems to go more in-depth as to where one might 
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reach when going one way or another on the continuum,
722
 and clearly defined criteria are used: 
through passions one reaches sickness, deadness of soul and eternal punishment; through virtues, 
one acquires health, various degrees of deification, and eternal blessings.  
If we go further with our analysis and come to the level of the lived fact we will find more 
similarities. Next, we intend to contrast Peck‘s findings derived from his psychotherapeutic 
practice with the Philokalic writers‘ statements derived from their experience on two topics: the 
locus of psychological illness, and the role of grace in healing. Some of Peck‘s findings were 
presented earlier in the last section from the first part of this work concerned with anthropology, 
and what we intend to do next is to unravel more of his results since they offer much common 
ground for future research in our area. In relation to mental illness, Peck brings a completely new 
approach as to their locus. If starting with Freud their place was considered to be the unconscious 
mind, Peck states that ‗the conscious is the seat of psychopathology and that mental disorders are 
disorders of consciousnesses‘.
723
 He explains this fact by putting it in relation with his views on 
the collective unconscious, which in opposition to the predominant theories in the 
psychotherapeutic field is found to be the place where God and grace resides,
724
 and the personal 
unconscious is seen as the interface between the spiritual unconscious and conscious which 
refers to man as an individual. He goes on by stating that: ‗It is because our conscious self resists 
our unconscious wisdom that we become ill. It is precisely because our consciousness is 
disordered that conflict occurs between it and the unconscious which seeks to heal it. In other 
words mental illness occurs when the conscious will of the individual deviates substantially from 
the will of God, which is the individual‘s own unconscious will‘.
725
 This perspective on 
psychological illness seen as a disorder of consciousness corresponds with the Philokalic 
perspective which identifies as a primal cause of all the soul‘s illnesses the darkening of the 
intellect, which is the eye of the soul.
726
 In both the views of Peck and the Philokalia, there is a 
struggle of the individual to get rid of the patterns that make him avoid the necessary suffering 
brought by allowing all of one‘s inner being to become self-aware.
727
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In addition to the previous discussion concerning Peck‘s view of the painful symptoms of mental 
illness as manifestations of grace
728
 we will next present some similarities we found between 
Peck‘s results of working with patients and the Philokalia, in regard to the relationship between 
psychological health and grace. Thus, Peck‘s work with patients towards psychological health 
involved: developing inner discipline – as opposed to laziness, the entropic tendency of one to 
avoid suffering and find the easy way out; and struggling to activate the willingness of one to 
extend one‘s self, i.e. to become loving. These two processes represented, in his opinion, an 
indirect preparation for welcoming grace:  
‗… while we cannot will ourselves to grace, we can by will open ourselves to its 
miraculous coming. We can prepare ourselves to be fertile ground, a welcoming place. If 
we can make ourselves into totally disciplined, wholly loving individuals, then even 
though we may be ignorant of theology and give no thought to God, we will have 
prepared ourselves well for the coming of grace. Conversely, the study of theology is a 
relatively poor method of preparation and, by itself, completely useless‘.
729
  
Saint Maximus seems to point towards the same reality outlined by Peck in relation to 
symptoms of psychological illness as signs of grace, when he states the following in connection 
with the pain experienced by man when he acts contrary to nature:  
 
‗This pain God naturally produces in the unworthy when He is united to them in a manner 
contrary to grace. For God is united with all men according to the underlying quality of 
their inner state; and, at the creation of each person, He provides each person with the 
capacity to perceive and sense Him when He is united in one way or another with all 
men at the end of the ages‘.
730
 The same writer emphasizes that man cannot become god by 
grace and a son of God, ‗unless he is first through his free choice begotten in the Spirit by 
means of the self-loving and independent power dwelling naturally within him‘
731
 and in 
another place asserts that ‗we passively experience deification by grace as something 
which is above nature, but we do not actively accomplish it; for by nature we do not 




Putting all these together, we believe that Dr. Peck found without knowing only by 
‗reading the signs‘ which are naturally implanted in us, a method based on inner discipline 
and truthful love, similar in some parts with the ascetical method, that could open man to 
grace.  
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In trying to get closer to our research topic concerned with psychological and spiritual 
illnesses, and the categories of relations that are established between them, if any, we draw on 
the research undertaken by Roland Littlewood, a British psychiatrist and cultural 
anthropologist. In his comparative research in which he brings together psychiatric and 
anthropological literature to account for various case studies such as hysteria, agoraphobia, 
post-traumatic stress, eating disorders, chronic fatigue syndrome and self-poisoning, he argues 
that Western psychiatric illnesses are themselves ―possession states‖-patterns. Thus, for example 
he states that ‗rather than follow psychiatrists in labeling possession as hysteria, we can approach 
hysteria through the idiom of spirit possession‘.
733
 This approach is possible because both states 
of possession or psychological illness are similarly conceptualized in terms of an alien, external 
intrusion, with the effect of displacing individual agency ‗which thus provides personal 
exculpation from immediate responsibility, while the recognition of this by others constrains 
them to restitution through restoring us to moral agency‘.
734
 He concludes by saying that ‗both 
possession and disease replay and confirm the moral values within which such action is 
possible‘.
735
 Furthermore, he also argues that studies of anthropological psychiatry should also 
look at the ways in which cultural values are acted out by people.  
Concerning our inquiry, Littlewood‘s research brings closer the ‗psychological‘ and ‗spiritual‘ 
factors found in illness by identifying resemblances between the two. In the following chapters 
concerned with anxiety and depression we will see if similar findings might be found, although 
our work does not deal with states of ‗possession‘ as such, but the Philokalia openly involves the 
spiritual factor. Another important point is that his work also reaffirms the inevitability of the 
involvement of moral values in any kind of psychological illness and the responsibility 
underlying it.  
The last point to consider in this comparative section is the ongoing debate in the field concerned 
with: psychological illness or problems of living? Strictly speaking this is a one-sided debate 
maintained by people who advocate that the vast majority of cases of ‗mental illnesses‘ are 
actually problems of living.
736
 He argues that if the aetiology of the psychological illness is 
organic, and he believes some of them are, then they should be properly termed as ‗diseases of 
the brain‘ and to eliminate the confusion between a physical dysfunction and ‗problems of 
living‘ a person might face that which must be addressed rather from an ethical and social 
perspective. 
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A second viewpoint, which builds on Szasz‘s statements, is offered by a clinical psychologist 
who draws on Biblical and Christian arguments to assert that ‗psychological illness‘ and current 
psychotherapy deal in fact with problems of living. His main statement throughout the many 
books written on the subject is that current psychotherapies deal with the same areas of concern 
already dealt with in Scripture, i.e. with all non-organic mental-emotional-personal problems of 
living:  
‗Since God has given an Instruction Book on how to live, all ideas about the why‘s of 
behavior and the how‘s of change must be viewed as religious in nature. Whereas 
the Bible claims divine revelation, psychotherapy claims scientific substantiation. 
Nevertheless, when it comes to behavior and attitudes and morals and values, we 
are dealing with religion, either the Christian faith or any one of a number of 
other religions including that of secular humanism‘.
737
  
The same observation had been made by Jung himself long before the Bobgans, when stating that the 
psychotherapist has in fact the role previously held by priests, and therefore termed them as 
contemporary priests:  
‗Religions are systems of healing for psychic illness ... That is why patients force the 
psychotherapist into the role of a priest, and expect and demand of him that he shall 
free them from their distress. That is why we psychotherapists must occupy ourselves 
with problems which, strictly speaking, belong to the theologian‘.
738
 On the other 
hand by drawing on Szasz‘s statements, the Bobgans also emphasize that the content 
of dealings in psychotherapy has originally been derived from the religious field, but 
which has been dismissed by psychotherapy at the same time: ‗Contrition, confession, 
prayer, faith, inner resolution, and countless other elements are expropriated and renamed 
as psychotherapy; whereas certain observances, rituals, taboos, and other elements of 
religion are demeaned and destroyed as symptoms of neurotic or psychotic ―illness‖.‘
739
  
In mentioning these various viewpoints we do not intend to develop a critical approach as to whether 
psychotherapy is a religious system or not, which would be a distraction from our research concern that is 
focused on psychological and spiritual illness, and would most probably require a different 
methodological design. Instead, the first point we want to make is that, as usually happens, 
practitioners in the clinical area are the first to notice this kind of resemblance between the religious 
and psychotherapeutic realms; second, these resemblances determined further research, such as the 
one of Littlewood‘s mentioned above which brings together in the same conceptual framework the 
states of possession and mental illness, for example. In some other cases, the very same resemblance 
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provided a conceptual framework for a clinician such as Peck to make sense of his empirical 
observations; and third, we are interested to see if some of the claims which relate directly to our 
work might be confirmed or refuted by the findings of this inquiry.  
In the light of the present comparative work on psychological versus spiritual illness we cannot 
yet infer any final conclusions as to the type of relations that exist between them. Before 
attempting to draw any conclusions we need to analyze more deeply the subject of psychological 
illness as considered by current psychotherapies and respectively the spiritual illness as 
approached in the Philokalia, by drawing on two comparatively analyzed ‗case studies‘: 
anxiety/fear and depression/dejection.  
However, the above comparative discussion on normality and abnormality seems to have offered 
enough information to sustain the claim that normality might be conceptualized as ‗what the 
conservative hopes to return to‘ in reference to the various currents of thought that advocate 
against the current understanding of mental illness, and what ‗the progressive hopes to 
establish‘
740
 in the form of the efforts undertaken by the current psychotherapeutic field to find 
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FEAR AND ANXIETY 
 
 
In this chapter we intend to contrast the two perspectives on fear and anxiety respectively. 
According to our proposed border research methodology the conceptual pair fear/anxiety has 
been identified as representing a travelling concept which is going to be checked, compared and 
contrasted at the border. Our analysis takes into account definition, aetiology, classification and 
the cure of fear/anxiety. Consistent with our comparative method in the first section we present 
the modern psychotherapeutic viewpoint by drawing on the four major paradigms presented in 
the first part of this research which is concerned with the anthropological framework, then we 
look at the Philokalic texts on fear, so as to identify differences, similarities between the two and 
draw some conclusions following the pattern described in the methodological part.  
 
 
I. The Modern Psychotherapeutic Perspective on Anxiety 
 
 
1. Description  
 
The diagnostic cluster known as anxiety disorders (AD) is by far ‗the most prevalent of the 
psychiatric disorders in both the developed and developing countries‘.
741
 Anxiety disorders are 
generally defined as ‗an exaggerated response to stress‘,
742
 ‗a matter of alertness or 
watchfulness‘,
743
 that usually relates to specific physiological, cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural responses to the perception of anticipated danger. They link to such terms as being 
tense, nervous, afraid, worried, scared and the like.
744
 Fear is considered a normal emotional 
response when we react as a result of facing a real danger: ‗the flight-or-fight response is an 
activation of the sympathetic nervous system designed to allow the organism to fight off or flee 
from a perceived threat‘.
745
 The difference in anxiety disorders is that this type of response is 
activated when there is no real threat. People presenting a mixture of symptoms from various 
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types of AD are usually referred to as being neurotic, a term coined by the psychoanalytic 
movement. Although not used officially in diagnostic manuals nowadays, the terms of neurotic 
and neurosis are still frequently used outside clinical environments, producing even nowadays an 
impressive amount of literature. Their use is explained by their conceptual widespread 
distribution and the possibility they offer for a major distinction between the areas of neurosis 
and psychosis.  
Anxiety neuroses usually begin in early adult life and are classified
746
 as: generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD), a continuous, persistent, uncontrollable, unfocused, ‗free-floating‘ worry and 
fear; panic disorder: episodes of acute, severe anxiety, accompanied by ‗feelings of terror and a 
fear of dying‘
747
; specific phobias: marked, persistent and unreasonable anxiety related to 
specific objects (e.g. spiders) or situations (e.g. agoraphobia, social phobia); obsessive-
compulsive disorder (OCD): anxiety related to obsessional, intrusive, difficult-to-control 
thoughts and mental images, and compulsive ritual behaviours, either physical or mental acts, 
meant to avoid the presupposed outcome of the distress-producing obsession which it tries to 
avoid; reactions to stress or trauma: including adjustment reactions and post-traumatic stress 
disorder (PTSD). PTSD develops when one experiences or witnesses a trauma related to actual 




The symptoms of these anxiety disorders overlap with each other, with depression, and with 
normality (i.e. they are not qualitatively different from the ones found in normal people). For 
example: GAD and depression are found to present a common genetic vulnerability; panic 
disorder is usually accompanied by agoraphobia
749
, other anxiety disorders, substance abuse or 
depression; social anxiety disorder overlaps with avoidant personality disorders and other 
anxiety or depressive syndromes; OCD mainly includes depressive symptoms, as well as other 
anxiety disorders. This is why a critique of the concept of anxiety disorders, coming from a 
social-cognitive perspective,
750
 shows that this concept lacks construct validity and is formally 
invalid since it is highly correlated with other disorders such as anxiety and modestly correlates 
to the same diagnostic label. It is argued that anxiety disorders do not correspond closely to 
psychological reality and mental illness/disorder as a scientific concept distorts our view of 
psychological responses in various ways and therefore fails to account for comprehensive and 
long-term curative solutions. Instead, a focus on problem dimensions rather than on abstract 
disorders is preferred by this perspective. By contrast, advocates of the medical model used in 
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clinics emphasize that a focus on syndrome rather than symptom is more beneficial to clinical 
practice and preferred.
751
 We mentioned Williams‘ social-cognitive viewpoint since this 
approach will allow us to focus on psychological dimensions rather than disorders when 




In terms of aetiology, anxiety varies according to various paradigms in psychotherapy. In general 
terms, they all emphasize a few sources: ‗hereditary dispositions, history of past experiences 
that would affect learned reactions or biological systems, and current situational factors
752
 as 
well as ‗anticipation of future events, memories of past events, or ruminations about the self‘.
753
 
Anxiety results and manifests in real life as a combination of all or some of these triggering 





In psychodynamic terms anxiety is thought of in terms of neurosis determined not only by 
external dangers but also by a conflict due to ego‘s failure to respond to id‘s request in line with 
the reality principle. Ego‘s inability is experienced as threatening, either due to the collapse of 
defence mechanisms or to the entrance of forbidden content into the consciousness. There are 
two identified roots to anxiety, both found on the two extremes of a continuum: either too 
rigorous or excessive punishment, or over-protection.
755
 Freud initially thought defence 
mechanisms caused anxiety, later that defence was produced by the emergence of anxiety.
756
 
Thus, the various defence mechanisms become ‗a way of dealing with aspects of the self, which, 
if consciously experienced, might give rise to unbearable anxiety or psychic pain‘.
757
 The anxiety 
disorders employed differ only in the defensive style chosen, a theory which constitutes one of 
the strengths of psychodynamic movement. Hence, panic disorder uses displacement, 
somatization, and reaction formation, social phobia applies displacement and devaluation, OCD 
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draws on projection, acting out and undoing, whereas GAD does not elaborate any defence and 




For behaviourists anxiety is a result of faulty learning, with the most common behavioural 
symptom being ‗escape from or avoidance of the feared object, event, or situation‘.
759
 Mowrer 
proposed the theory according to which anxiety is produced through avoidance learning, and is 
the result of a two-stage process: classical conditioning followed by operant conditioning.
760
 
Thus, in the first stage, a neutral stimulus is associated with an aversive stimulus and the result is 
a fear response, classically conditioned, and maintained through avoidance of the distress 
associated with the conditioning, whereas in the second stage, the relief that occurs forms an 
operant conditioning process which reinforces avoidance of the feared object or situation and 
becomes habitual. Therefore, ‗eliminating distress by avoiding or escaping the situation can 
actually make the anxiety worse‘
761
 by negative reinforcement and ‗avoidance also inhibits the 





However, this two-stage avoidance-learning theory is useful in explaining how anxiety emerges 
but also presents limitations since ‗learning principles alone cannot explain why exposure to 
certain stimuli creates anxiety disorders in some people and not in others‘.
763
 Other authors 
simplify the matter of aetiology and classification by explaining that any fear which is so strong 
that it prevents the person from performing an action is basically a phobic reaction; specific 
object phobias are only the ‗obvious‘ fears, but there are also some subtle ones which include 




The cognitive perspective brings forward the idea that ‗a number of dysfunctional beliefs and 
cognitive distortions are associated with the development of anxiety disorders‘.
765
 GAD is 
associated with thoughts of excess worry and meta-worry; panic disorder with catastrophic 
cognitions in response to internal stimuli (physiological or psychological); OCD relates to 
recurrent, intrusive and persistent thoughts, impulses or images; whereas PTSD is associated 
with extremely painful intrusive memories related to past traumatizing events.
766
 Cognitive 
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distortions of overgeneralization and personalization are specific to various forms of anxiety, and 




Cognitivists see anxiety disorders in terms of misperception or misinterpretation of internal and 
external stimuli. Even if events are not threatening, they are interpreted as being so, and this 
interpretation results in anxiety. Often, awareness of thoughts or feelings of anxiety ‗can be so 
diffuse and vague that the affected person might fail to recognize the anxiety until someone else 
draws attention to it‘.
768
 Hence, cognitive therapy is involved in changing these dysfunctional 
patterns of thinking, through a range of techniques: cognitive restructuring and worry exposure, 
the mental equivalent of exposure treatments used in phobias is used in GAD; panic disorder 
cognitive procedures are employed to change panicogenic cognitions; and altering the 





The treatment for anxiety proposed by psychodynamic therapies consists in exposing to 
consciousness the psychic material ego uses defences against, and thus, freeing the energy 
blocked into defences and giving it more purposeful usages. The cure employs the methods 
previously described within the first part of this research, with a focus on the interpretation of 
transference and resistance. For panic disorders, shorter psychodynamic therapies are available 
such as emotion-focused treatment where patients need to confront feelings considered to be the 
root of the disorder: either the feeling of being trapped (resulting from overprotection by others) 
or the feeling of being unable to get needed help (resulting from abandonment from others).
769
 
The primary goal of psychological treatment for anxiety, within behaviour modification therapy, 
is to ‗to reverse this pattern of negative reinforcement and eliminate avoidance of the feared 
situations‘.
770
 The change of undesired behaviours is done through the methods previously 
described, of which systematic desensitization has proved most effective, although 
improvements may not be maintained over a long period of time.
771
 Anxiety and phobic 
reactions of any kind are seen as a bad habit that may change by training based on thinking, 
imagination and willingness. That which was learnt may be unlearnt and lead to better 
environmental adjustment.  
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As we explained in the first part of this research, cognitive strategies go hand in hand with 
behavioural ones, with the latter employed to teach people how to relax, to deal with 
interpersonal problems, and to organize their lives better.
772
 The general aim of cognitive-
behavioural techniques is to help individuals take control of their symptoms by rehearsal during 
sessions and then generalization to real life situations. Among the various talking cures, CBT is 
recognized by numerous empirical studies as being most efficacious in treating various types of 
disorders, and especially anxiety and depressive moods,
773
 and as such is recommended as the 
treatment of choice for these dysfunctions.  
 
Humanists consider anxiety to be the result of deviation from the pathway to self-actualization. 
People fail to accept themselves for who they are due to experiencing criticism and facing severe 
standards during childhood. As a consequence they adjust to these external standards and receive 
conditional positive regards. The extreme existential anxiety results from failing to live 
according to the real self, whereas the conditions of worth imposed by others distort the idealized 
self and play the role of a defence mechanism. Their true thoughts and personal experiences are 
deeply distorted in the process. Person-centred therapy tries to change this state of inner 
incongruence by offering the proper conditions for self-awareness and growth while logotherapy 
addresses the existential frustration of the will to meaning and existential vacuum. Logotherapy 
has devised two main techniques to deal with anticipatory anxiety: paradoxical intention in 
which the person is invited to wish precisely that which he fears; and dereflection which 
counteracts hyper-intention and hyper-reflection.
774
 Paradoxical intention is considered very 
efficacious especially for phobic conditions and OCD, works independently of the aetiological 
basis of the form of anxiety concerned, it may be the shortest therapeutic device with the 




A last issue to highlight at the end of this section is the criteria used to discriminate between 
normal or abnormal anxiety. Viewpoints on the matter vary: some consider anxiety as the first 
step on a continuum that leads to depression and as such the criteria are relative and relate 
mainly to intensity, whereas Frankl‘s existential perspective views anxiety as a ‗healthy‘ sign 
pointing to deeper noological problems and a useful energetic force to be used in the curing 
process. While the criterion that allows discriminating between normality and abnormality is not 
easy to be established by the modern clinical realm, in the absence of a model for normality, a 
solution still needed to be proposed and followed in connection with anxiety. Hence, normal or 
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abnormal anxiety is identified in clinics depending on two criteria: the functional impairment it 
produces as is evident in the case of severe OCD or phobias; and developmental age according to 
which a developmental hierarchy of fear is created. As the child grows, once with his general 
development and maturation of cognition, the number and types of various fears are supposed to 
diminish.
776
 Failure to do so may account for one form of anxiety or another.  
 
A useful existential viewpoint concerning this distinction between normal and neurotic anxiety, 
in connection with our comparative effort from the third section of this chapter, is offered by 
Rollo May. Although trained initially in neo-Freudian psychoanalysis, he later turned towards 
the existential school of psychology, from which the following lengthy quote is given: ‗Normal 
anxiety is anxiety which is proportionate to the threat, does not involve repression, and can be 
confronted constructively on the conscious level (or can be relieved if the objective situation is 
altered). Neurotic anxiety, on the other hand, is a reaction which is disproportionate to the threat, 
involves repression and other forms of intrapsychic conflict, and is managed by various kinds of 
blocking-off of activity and awareness. The anxiety connected with the ―loneliness at the top‖ 
and the ―loneliness of the long distance runner‖ which the movies tell us about can be seen as 
normal anxiety. The anxiety that comes from conforming, to escape this loneliness, is the 
neurotic transformation of the original normal anxiety. Actually, neurotic anxiety develops when 
a person has been unable to meet normal anxiety at the time of the actual crisis in his growth and 
the threat to his values. Neurotic anxiety is the end result of previously unmet normal anxiety‘.
777
 
In other words, May found that abnormal anxiety is derived from a transformation of normal 
anxiety. The cure implies a reverse of this process.  
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II. The Philokalic Perspective on Fear 
 
This section is dedicated to grasping the main themes that concern fear as presented by the 
Philokalic writers. It will highlight their perspective on aetiology, description, classifications and 





In the Philokalic understanding fear may be of two types: a good and natural fear resulting in 
virtue and a bad and unnatural fear resulting in vice or passion. Who possesses the former gets 
rid of the later. In other words, one is transformed through the other, and who does not have the 
good fear will inevitably ‗get sick‘ because of the bad fear. Being so, we ‗are forced‘ to start our 
presentation with the bad fear, since the good fear in this case is also part of the curative process. 
However, before doing so, we need to mention shortly that, like modern psychology, Philokalic 
writers do also specify that there is a natural human feeling of fear embodied by God, which is 
meant to protect the soul and the body of a person. In psychology, this type is referred to as the 
flight-or-fight response. By making use of this fear the person feels incorporated with one‘s life, 
and is afraid of everything that could destroy it. ‗The natural fear represents a power that sustains 
life by avoiding the things that could destroy it‘ says Saint Maximus the Confessor.
778
 The 
generally acknowledged formula is that of the preservation instinct.  
 
The bad fear is defined as ‗a danger tasted in advance, a quiver as the heart takes fright before 
unnamed calamity‘
779
 and is seen as a passion, which is enumerated by Saint John of Damascus 
between other passions caused by the darkening of nous.
780
 He classifies fear into six types: 
‗shrinking, shame, disgrace, consternation, panic, anxiety. Shrinking is fear of some act about to 
take place. Shame is fear arising from the anticipation of blame: and this is the highest form of 
the affection. Disgrace is fear springing from base act already done, and even for this form there 
is some hope of salvation. Consternation is fear originating in some huge product of imagination. 
Panic is fear caused by some unusual product of the imagination. Anxiety is fear of failure, that 
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In terms of aetiology, there are a few sources for fear. Saint Maximus the Confessor links the 
idea of good and bad with the temporal dimension, either present or future, from which result 
four possible situations: ‗A good which is expected in the future is called desire, and one which 
is possessed in the present is called pleasure. Conversely, an evil which is expected in the 
future is called fear, and one which is experienced in the present is called distress‘.
782
 This type 
of distress is usually identified with a form of sadness or dejection which will be treated in a 
separate chapter. Further on we are interested in the relationship between desire and fear since 
desire when fulfilled produces pleasure, and when frustrated results in distress, a distress 
which once experienced and not dealt with in a ‗healthy way‘ will become a source for the 
occurrence of anticipated evil. Thus, the absence of the expected good results in evil, 
manifested here as fear, with evil being an absence of something that should have been there, 
‗a privation of good‘.
783




Another identified cause for fear is lack of faith.
785
 The same is emphasized by Saint John 
Climacus when stating that fear is ‗a lapse from faith that comes from anticipating the 
unexpected. Fear is a loss of assurance. A proud soul is the slave of cowardice. Trusting only 
itself, it is frightened by a sound or a shadow‘.
786
 Fear is then outwardly manifested through 
relating to various events or people, while inwardly it is associated with trusting only itself and a 
loss of assurance. As a result, a vicious circle is created where man remains closed only within 
himself, an isolation which enforces and is enforced in its turn by the emergence of other 
passions. Thus, as showed above, pride generates cowardice and cowardice fortifies pride in its 
turn. It links with various other passions such as: concerns of losing one‘s wealth or fortune;
787
 
dependency on various worldly things;
788









 and various involuntary sins.
793
 Thus, we have the lack of faith, which in 
psychological terms may be translated as the inability of one to entrust in something or 
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somebody else except oneself, this results in fear that in time generates and becomes associated 
with the various passions enumerated above, which in their turn will reinforce the lack of faith, 
that is the very cycle of fear.  
 
A third cause of fear is considered to be the action of demons which intervene either directly 
upon the soul, especially during prayer when the nous turns towards God, or through the various 
weaknesses created by passions.
794
 However, the major and primary cause of fear is the one 
inherited by all humans through the fall of the first people into sin.
795
 Saint Maximus makes it 
clear; when drawing on Saint Gregory of Nyssa, he explains that fear and desire, pleasure and 
distress, together with their consequences were not part of our original constitution but ‗were 
introduced as a result of our fall from perfection, being infiltrated into that part of our nature least 
endowed with intelligence. Through them the blessed and divine image in man was at the time of 
our transgression immediately replaced by a clear and obvious likeness to animals. Once the true 
dignity of the intelligence had been obscured, it was inevitable and just that human nature should 
be chastised by those witless elements which it had introduced into itself‘.
796
 Hence, fear is not 
only associated with the idea of evil manifested in passions, but is first seen as a pure spiritual 







The philokalic anthropology framework indicates a somewhat paradoxical cure for fear which is 
connected to its identified causes. As mentioned above, the bad and unnatural fear is cured by 
the good and natural one. Thus having to speak of the good fear, we talk at the same time about 
the cure for the bad fear. The good fear is represented by the fear of God. Here are a few 
definitions and functions ascribed to it: the fear of God is the father of the soul’s purity and 
chasteness,
798
 it accompanies man all the way to dispassion,
799
 it makes one pay attention to his 
thoughts knowing they are all seen by God,
800
 it is the natural companion of the process of 
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 it ‗is a life-giving medicine‘,
802
 it detaches one from material possessions and 
wealth,
803




Throughout the Philokalic writings, the fear of God is presented in many texts as being the first 
and absolutely necessary step towards the love of God. By most writers it is presented as being of 
two kinds: impure and pure,
805
 introductory and perfect.
806
 The impure or introductory fear ‗is 
generated in us by the threat of punishment. It is through such fear that we develop in due order 
self-control, patience, hope in God and dispassion; and it is from dispassion that love comes‘ 
while the second type, which is pure and perfect ‗is linked with love and constantly produces 
reverence in the soul, so that it does not grow indifferent to God because of the intimate 
communion of its love‘.
807
 The first is a slave-like fear, while the person who has acquired the 
second type ‗has the status of a son, for he cherishes virtue not out of fear of punishment, 
but because of the love that ―casts out fear‖
808
. The condition of the son bestowed on him 
allows him to ‗greatly delight, unlike the slave who carries out orders under constraint 




Inner freedom is also put in relation to fear. Before engaging in spiritual warfare man fears 
distress and rejects the pain necessary to liberate his soul and as such he has the condition of a 
‗slave and servant of cowardice, trembling like a baby and fearing fear‘.
810
 The anxiety 
experienced may be about himself or others,
811
 but both result in lack of freedom. In between 
these two types of fear, there are those who started to fight against the passions. At this stage, 
passions may ‗become good if – like wise physicians who use the body of the viper as a remedy 
against present or expected harm resulting from its bite – we use them to destroy present or 
expected evil‘.
812
 At this level the man enslaves himself with the fear of God, through a life of 
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inner stillness, waiting for the freedom that God grants.
813
 This intermediary category 
sometimes overcomes fear and sometimes is overcome by it. But for the last category ‗who 
fears the Lord, there is no fear‘,
814
 purity of heart has completely triumphed over cowardice, thus 
inner freedom is offered to them. Between love and fear there is an inverse ratio: the more one 




Since one identified cause for fear as a passion is lapse of faith, it comes naturally that the cure 
involves its opposite, namely the presence of faith in one‘s soul. Since ‗Christ is present in us 
through faith‘
816
 as long as the soul is found in faith, it is not fearful because of His presence 
within. As we pointed out above, fear being not something in itself, but rather something lacking, 
it becomes extinct when God is present. Hence, the need for a cure through prayer.
817
 In 
Philokalic anthropology man cannot exist by himself, but his life is sustained permanently and 
entirely by God, whether he is aware of it or not. Thus, a close relation to God means a lack of 
fear, while a distant relation to Him means the presence of fear.  
 
Faith has two functions: it eliminates unnatural fear and replaces it with the good one. Saint 
Theodoros the Great Ascetic asserts that faith is a quality inherited in our nature
818
 which when 
lived inwardly in truth begets fear of God.
819
 Faith may assume such a role because through 
Christ which is the Truth, the ‗real faith is truth‘ as well as one ‗which is all-embracing, all-
sustaining and free from all falsehood‘.
820
 Hence, faith is inherited in our nature as part of being 
made in the image of Christ and as a consequence, naturally disposes towards faith in Him, in the 
virtue of potential likeness with Him. Fear of God is structurally related to the activity of intellect. 
Saint Illias the Presbyter highlights a useful relation between fear and thoughts: ‗Where fear 
does not lead the way, thoughts will be in a state of confusion, like sheep that have no 
shepherd. Where fear leads the way or goes with them, they will be under control and in 
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 Saint Maximus brings an interesting perspective on the matter of wisdom 
associated with both fear and love. He states that wisdom may manifest itself for our sake as 
fear, and then may become love: ‗To those who do not long for it, wisdom is fear, because of 
the loss which they suffer through their flight from it; but in those who cleave to it, wisdom is 




 appears to be 
found on a continuum and the human soul perceives it as love or fear according to its own 
condition.  
 
The opposing virtue of fear is courage, placed between the four principal virtues that govern the 
three powers of the soul.
830
 Saint Symeon Metaphrastis shows that courage is absolutely 
necessary if one wants to acquire divine love or become ‗a Son of God born of the Spirit‘.
831
 
Hence, love can be reached ‗by way of many hardships and struggles, after much time and 
diligence, testing and temptation‘ and only ‗who has courageously endured all the trials of 
evil‘
832
 will receive it. The final cure for fear is ‗tested‘ by the absence of its most terrifying fear, 
the fear of death, which in turn brings victory and joy
833
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III. Fear and Anxiety: Comparison 
 
 
Although the initial focus of this work was on psychological and spiritual illness, in order to 
treat them properly we had to delve into the study of the anthropological perspectives 
presupposed by the two paradigms under discussion. For the present research the comparative 
analysis of fear and anxiety is seen as a ‗case study‘ which may validate or invalidate the 
hypothesis according to which the major differences between how fear and anxiety are seen 
largely depends on the anthropological perspective employed by the two fields under discussion.  
 
Our comparative effort will focus on description and definition, aetiology and cure as proposed 
by the two paradigms, followed by some conclusions at the end. Calling on Williams‘ social-
cognitive viewpoint mentioned before, we also think that comparison is possible at the level of 
inner psychological dimensions rather than syndromes or disorders, which are designed to serve 
the present needs of practitioners in the medical field.  
 
 
1. Comparison in Terms of Description  
 
In terms of description and definition, the two perspectives present salient and evident 
similarities. Both paradigms highlight in the midst of the phenomena the presence of anticipatory 
anxiety, of anxious expectation that something bad is about to happen. Both fields speak about 
fear as being linked to physiological as well as psychological mechanisms,
835
 out of which 
emotion, cognition and imagination are most prominent. Fear is defined by writers of the 




 centuries in surprisingly modern terms: danger tasted in advance 
(St John Climacus), anxiety is fear of failure, fear that our efforts will not meet with success (St 
John of Damascus) etc. Thus, the empirical evidence provided by both fields in terms of their 
descriptions of fear seems to be almost identical, although nowadays due to a different target, 
various dimensions/symptoms were gathered together in various combinations so as to form 
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2. Comparison in Terms of Aetiology 
 
The modern psychotherapeutic viewpoint concerning the aetiology of anxiety comprises a few 
different routes as previously presented: failure of defence mechanisms to ‗protect‘ unconscious 
content; faulty learning accompanied by negative reinforcement through avoidance; 
dysfunctional beliefs and distorted automatic thinking, misperception and misinterpretation of 
internal or external stimuli; failure to live according to the real self which sometimes may 
assume sufferance, in other words, existential anxiety due to a failure to assume sufferance and a 
search for meaning.
836
 Briefly, anxiety rests on unconscious, behaviour, thoughts and inner 
incongruence or fragmentation. On the other hand, the Philokalia names as causes for fear a few 
sources: frustration of desire; lack of faith; actions of the demons; and denial of the Logos. Next, 
we try to see what links may be established between all these sources.  
 
Psychodynamic accounts concerned with the use of repression created by the deeply 
unconsciously felt fear, and the defence mechanisms meant to avoid awareness of both fear and 
the mechanisms used to ‗hide‘ it, are envisaged by the Philokalia as well. As previously showed, 
Saint Maximus‘ writings especially identify the close link that fear has with unfulfilled desire 
and rejection of pain. Identical accounts are offered by psychoanalysis which highlights that 





Whereas psychoanalysis explains in detail the inner mechanisms, the approximate age of their 
occurrences and the effects they have had on the lives of individuals, the Philokalia goes beyond 
these descriptions and seems more concerned with a careful discrimination of their causes, from 
which they derive specific treatments. It seems that since the Philokalia knows what is according 
to nature, i.e. healthy, it finds its way easier towards pointing out what is not according to nature, 
i.e. unhealthy, and what should be done in order to re-establish equilibrium. Our hypothesis is 
that the Philokalia naturally integrates by prevailing over the psychoanalytic perspective on our 
present discussion on fear, and as a consequence we will next try to offer such an account.  
 
Our account will refer to both the link between desire and fear, and fear resulting from loss of 
assurance, or lack of faith, since as we will see they are closely interconnected. In order to do 
this, we will inevitably have to employ a symbolic language which is specific to both 
psychoanalysis and the Philokalia. Thus, as in the physical delivery of beings, the ‗birth‘ of 
psychological beings requires some optimum conditions, and similarly, when in the physical 
                                                          
836
 This corresponds with the entropy or laziness identified by Scott Peck, whose viewpoint we presented in the 
section on Cure by Grace.  
837
 ‗The sense that anxiety has become a substitute for all other kinds of pleasure, is usually totally unconscious and 
only occurs in people who have lost contact with all other sources of liveliness and pleasure‘ Rycroft, op. cit., p. 9 
187 
 
realm these conditions are not met they result in various disabilities, the same in the 
psychological realm may result in various dysfunctions. In Philokalic terms, the ‗birth‘ of the 
psychological being is not a separate phenomenon but interconnected to its spiritual birth. Both 
perspectives emphasize that experience of frustrated desire becomes a reason for the occurrence 
of fear. Psychoanalysis places its beginning in infancy or even in pre-natal stages when the 
ability to trust and entrust is due to be formed.  
 
On the interaction between the growing psyche and environment, in the first instance represented 
by the natural mother and later by the caregiver, which usually remains the mother, in the virtue 
of being created in the image of God-Love, the human infant ‗expects‘ a good treatment
838
, 
meant to help him acquire a likeness with God-Love, i.e. ‗expects‘ to be encountered with a 
loving attitude and help him grow healthy, that is according to nature. These expectations of 
being met properly address all the three powers of the soul, i.e. the entire soul understood in its 
unity. If he is met with adversity either in the form of being offered too little (frustration, 
punishments) or two much (over-protection) of what is needed, various dysfunctions occur. In 
this area the entire psychodynamic area presents outstanding and detailed descriptions. In 
Philokalic language, too little or too much relates to the passions existing in the caregiver, which 
actually form a first environment for the child and may distort him relationally, first in the 
relationship with himself and through this in relationships with others. Since every human being 
is unique, the same is true of every relation between the infant and the caregiver, and that is why 
nobody can capture in words exactly what it means to encounter a child properly on the way to 
becoming into being. I think it is not wrong to say that there is always a sense of mystery in this 
relationship due to the numerous combinations of elements that are part of it. As many mental 
health practitioners noticed, we might be able to describe illness, but we cannot explain the 
mystery of health, why some people remain healthy in worse conditions compared to others who 
fail in better ones.  
 
Thus, if the infant‘s needs are not met promptly and carefully, that is in such a way so that the 
powers of the soul can be brought from potentiality to reality, from inexistence to existence, what 
appears is a lack of assurance, i.e. fear. That is to say that, if the soul does not meet the necessary 
conditions to develop, to grow, to exist and become, the ‗inexistent‘ remains in place, and 
instead of the ability to trust and entrust, mistrust appears. The ‗inexistent‘ considered here 
relates to the desiring power of the soul and takes the form of fear. That is why the frustration of 
desire results in fear, as both fields emphasize, and at the same time blocks further inner 
development through the loss of assurance and lack of faith. According to the Philokalia, all 
three powers of the soul need to be developed according to nature since they all communicate 
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their energies from one to the other in the virtue of the soul‘s indivisible unity, and therefore the 
dysfunction that appears at the level of desire will ultimately influence the health of the others.  
 
When one becomes, in whichever power of the soul, that component has being, and as such is 
healthy. Drawing on both Philokalic and psychoanalytic sources, it becomes clear that what is 
sick is something that has no existence, in other words is dead, while what is healthy is at the 
same time good, and as such has being, hence is alive. What the Philokalia adds to this 
apprehension is the ascertainment that what is inexistent is actually evil.
839
 The state of 
inexistence, even if not named as such by psychoanalysis, is found underlying various types of 
disorders, from which the clinical state of false self where fear generates extremely well 
organized forms of ‗existence‘, is perhaps most eloquent. Here is a quote highlighting this very 
idea: ‗The best example I can give is that of a middle-aged woman who had a very successful 
False Self but who had the feeling all her life that she had not started to exist, and that she had 
always been looking for a means of getting to her True Self‘.
840
 The problem of the true self is of 
primary concern for humanists as well, and for them fear results from the failure to live 
according to this true self.  
 
While we agree with Winnicot concerning the defensive nature of the False Self, we disagree on 
the matter that the function of the False Self is to ‗hide and protect the True Self, whatever that 
may be‘.
841
 Our research evidence showed that indeed the False Self is not just a simple defence 
mechanism, but a total defence, but whose resistance to change is meant not to defend the True 
Self but to defend itself from destruction. Thus, as the True Self ‗comes to life‘, the False Self 
‗has to die‘. In reference to the resistance opposed by defence mechanisms in order to avoid 
awareness of the inner world, Peck notices that the ‗psychological dysfunction‘ follows the same 
pattern as ‗sin‘ and that ‗the central defect of the evil is not the sin but the refusal to 
acknowledge it‘.
842
 A radical form of false self is seen in narcissism
843
 which in current 
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psychotherapies presents one of the poorest prognostics for cure.
844
 In our opinion, the presence 
of the false self proves the failure to become into being, while the true self is correlated with the 




On the other hand, although fear is experienced mainly in the desiring power, due to the soul‘s 
inseparable unity, the willing power is also involved. Saint Maximus the Confessor states that 
‗we suffer evil as something contrary to nature which occurs in the will; for we do not have a 
natural capacity for generating evil. Thus while we are in our present state we can actively 
accomplish the virtues by nature, since we have a natural capacity for accomplishing them‘.
846
 
Therefore, sickness, or evil, rests on the choice of our will. If we think of the incredible energy 
employed by the defence mechanisms in repression, and later in resistance, we understand that it 
is the willing power that maintains illness. The illness comes from an incorrect inner choice, and 
instead of being directed towards acknowledging what is being kept covered through defences 
and then experience and accept the suffering that results from this, it is directed towards 
preserving the life of the defence mechanisms, or conditions of worth, in the humanists‘ 
language. In a more evident or subtle way, such choices based on fear to assume sufferance keep 
one in a state of ‗inner deadness‘, i.e. not according to nature, and since man is a relational being, 




The above discussion concerning fear which is initially blocked by the emergence of defence 
mechanisms and later maintained by the resistance that they oppose, is essentially the same 
process captured later by behaviourists as forming the negative reinforcement cycle used in 
faulty learning and by cognitivists through the employment of a faulty cognitive style. In other 
words, we see defence mechanisms, faulty learning and distorted automatic thinking as having 
the same role in maintaining fear, since defence mechanisms may be considered a type of faulty 
learning, and are obviously accompanied by various thoughts which justify them; faulty learning 
also involves thoughts and acts as a defence mechanism opposed to new learning, whereas 
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thoughts ultimately express themselves behaviourally and may also be very resistant to 
change.
848
 However, the Philokalia, while acknowledging these inner phenomena, goes beyond 
them and establishes lack of faith as a cause of them all. Thus, man turns towards the world of 
the senses
849
 which keeps him bound to fallen nature through self-love (philautia), which is said 
to be ‗the mother of all passions‘.
850
 On such a background the Philokalia adds an extra cause 
which is the interference of demons: ‗The demons bind the intellect to sensible things by means 




As we have already mentioned humanists see fear as resulting from a failure to self-actualize the 
true self, but does not present a clear concept of the true self. In a Philokalic view, the true self is 
linked to the image of Christ and as previously pointed out the process involved is that of Christ-
actualization. Thus, fear emerges as a result of this process not being initiated and developed and 
represents at the same time a denial of the Logos, considered the prime cause by the Philokalia. 
The next quote from Saint Maximus will explain both how this denial of Logos takes place and 
what the solution is for refocusing man‘s functioning according to nature:  
 
‗Evil is the noetic soul‘s forgetfulness of what is good according to nature; and this 
forgetfulness results from an impassioned relationship with the flesh and the world. When 
the intelligence is in control it dispels this forgetfulness through spiritual knowledge, since 
intelligence, having investigated the nature of the world and the flesh, draws the soul to 
the realm of spiritual realities which is its true home. Into this realm the law of sin 
cannot penetrate; for the link between the soul and the senses has now been broken, and 
the senses, limited to the world of sensible objects, can no longer function as a bridge 
conveying the law of sin into the intellect. When the intellect transcends its relationship 
with sensible objects and the world to which they pertain, it becomes utterly free from the 




3. Comparison in Terms of Cure 
 
As highlighted in the first part of the research, the cure of every illness in the Philokalia starts 
with the healing of nous, which is the leading power of the soul. Unless the soul does not 
acknowledge itself as being made in Christ‘s image and all the consequences that result from 
this, fear will not be cured completely since there will always be a love for its cause, i.e. 
dependence upon the world and the associated consequences described above. The relapse in 
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various forms of anxiety after a cognitive-behavioural intervention, which is most effective in 
treating anxiety, may find an explanation in this way. As long as the causes that produce the 
thoughts are not cut off, they will reappear in one way or another, with a stronger or lesser 
intensity, at one moment or another. Still, the efficacy of this therapy is explained from a 
Philokalic viewpoint in that it uses the rational power of the soul to control the appetitive part. It 
seems that if the rational may be switched to the noetic, it will succeed in eliminating completely 
the causes of anxiety.  
 
St Maximus, in opposition to forgetfulness, proposes knowledge as the beginning of cure. 
Psychotherapeutic accounts make the same observation when stating that ‗knowledge is 
incompatible with anxiety and … the drive to know, may be regarded as a way of trying to 
eliminate anxiety‘.
853
 Thus, what is observed empirically through observation and experience 
seems to concord in the two fields, the difference is in that Saint Maximus implies spiritual 
knowledge obtained through the activity and purification of nous that may put one in line with 
functioning according to nature, while Rycroft‘s explanation has no such reference criteria and 
target. What results from here is that knowledge may help one temporarily eliminate various 
anxieties and substantially improve living standards, but spiritual knowledge eliminates causes 
for fear and deals with the ultimate fear of man, i.e. fear of death.  
 
Therefore, spiritual knowledge in the Philokalia is used to transform unhealthy fear into a 
healthy fear of God, which also involves the process of transforming a vice into virtue, and of 
fear into courage. If fear was defined above as an unhealthy alertness or watchfulness, we 
observe that the ascetic method has developed a curative technique based on watchfulness, from 
which we conclude that the state of being attentive is not psychologically unhealthy. In both 
types of anxious watchfulness one is paying attention to thoughts, specifically bad thoughts. The 
difference suggested by the Philokalia is in that when one is watchful outside the process of 
Christ-actualization one develops clinical anxiety and the anticipated evil may become fact, 
whereas when one does this inside this process, which may also take the form of prayer, one 
becomes aware of the bad thoughts and in time even develops a fine discrimination as to their 
causes, but is not afraid of them because they are expelled by Christ through the power of Being.  
 
There is also reference to the category of unwatchful people, which do not develop anxiety. 
About them Saint John Climacus states that they are even in a worse state than the fearful ones, 
since they are dead. He is careful in distinguishing between truthful courage and false courage, 
whose main feature is unwatchfulness in relation to one‘s inner world. Indirectly, he also shows 
that the state of ‗well-being‘, which we previously discussed as being a criterion for normality in 
the clinical area, does not necessary provide the proof for the lack of a clinical condition, but in 
fact it shows a very serious illness: ‗The one that does not fear does not mean that is not afraid, 
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but just that is dead: While cowards are vainglorious not everyone who is free from fear is also 
humble. Thieves and grave robbers may be untroubled by fear‘.
854
 This perspective confirms 
once again our hypothesis that fear is not an illness in itself but the sign of one‘s psyche that 
something is not going well within deeper layers, which relate to his spiritual life.
855
 In other 
words, fear evidenced in the psychological sphere sends to its cause which is ultimately spiritual, 
in the same way as fever evidenced in the body sends to a deeper cause found within it.  
 
Frankl‘s logotherapy highlights exactly such a perspective on fear. The methods he proposes for 
its cure are similar to the patristic perspective. Thus, the paradoxical intention, which directs one 
towards the very thing he is afraid of, is the same method implied by Saint John Climacus:  
 
‗Do not hesitate to go in the dark of the night to those places where you are normally 
frightened. The slightest concession to this weakness means that this childish and absurd 
malady will grow old with you … However, it is barrenness of soul, not the darkness or 




This method is also similar to the behaviourist technique of exposure to the feared stimulus, the 
only difference being that it first involves a gradually imaginary exposure followed by the one in 
real life, and with the cognitivists‘ worry exposure which is the behaviourist equivalent applied 
only to mental life.  
 
Also, Frankl’s dereflection implies a similar process to the one employed through prayer in the 
Philokalia, and is successful precisely because it involves ‗self-transcendence‘.
857
 The process of 
opposing some thoughts with others utilized both by dereflection and prayer
858
 is proved as 
being efficient mainly by studies on OCD patients where the activity of dysfunctional thoughts is 
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most evident and the efforts to oppose directly such thoughts by suppression, doubly increases 
their occurrence.
859
 Research on other forms of anxiety associated with trauma as in PTSD seem 
to point towards the same idea where a cure is obtained not by a debriefing technique, which 
might even worsen the diagnostic by talking things over, but rather by informal support received 




Rollo May‘s existential account, previously mentioned, allows us to make some new 
connections. Drawing on work previously done by Freud, Otto Rank and others he highlights 
that at bottom all anxiety is separation anxiety, and that loneliness is the painful awareness of 
such separation. He considers that there is a normal anxiety in the form of loneliness at the top 
and the loneliness of the long distance runner, identified in psychoanalysis as the ability to be 
alone, and the neurotic anxiety which results from the transformation of the original normal 
anxiety. This transformation is done by a process of conformation to social values and standards 
which are in turn reinforced by such a choice to conform.
861
 May‘s observations are confirmed 
by the Philokalic experience which speaks almost in similar terms about the tension that has been 
created between man having turned exclusively towards the world of the senses and the 
unhealthy fear that results. Looked at in psychological terms, the cure proposed is similar, as it 
involves the transformation of the unhealthy fear into a healthy one, which is described by May 
as loneliness at the top and the loneliness of the long distance runner and that is precisely the 
same inner state aimed to be acquired in the end of the ascetic effort in the Philokalia: the state of 




Putting the two theories together results in that the initial anxiety felt by the infant is ameliorated 
through the empathetic and loving attitude of the mother. If such an attitude is missing then high 
amounts of anxiety will give rise to various defences against becoming aware of it. Based on a 
Philokalic view, we hypothesize that this anxiety is ultimately God-separation anxiety which in 
practical psychological terms equals the inability of one to address his inner world where he may 
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meet God. This confirms Peck‘s findings previously addressed in the section on Cure by Grace, 
according to which all metal illness, and therefore anxiety, is a disorder of consciousness which 
through various blocking mechanisms unconsciously resists that which possesses the wisdom to 
cure, a curing wisdom called grace.
863
 On the other hand this type of God-separation anxiety may 
be the only one able to explain why people considered healthy psychologically still experience 
the pain of loneliness. 
 
The comparative analysis of the aetiology and curing methods proposed by the two paradigms 
points toward an integration by overcoming of the ones identified within the psychotherapeutic 
area by the Philokalic ones, due to the extent of the universe of discourse involved in their 
anthropological perspective. At the empirical level the things observed coincide most of the time; 
the difference consists in the interpretation of what is observed, and this interpretation depends 
on the larger anthropological framework in which they stand. The major difference consists in 
that every Philokalic interpretation of the facts points to Christ, as a result of man‘s being made 
in His image. Inner departure from this image results in illness, while cure comes from restoring 
it. In Philokalic terms this restoration starts with faith which is factually the science of healing 
described by Christ,
864
 and which generates the healthy fear of God that ultimately takes one to 
love and likeness with Him. Faith is not understood as something which opposes reason, but 
actually as involving the ultimate Logos, since Christ is present within this faith which is 
inherited in our nature, as showed above.  
 
In other words, faith is the very process of Christ-actualization. The more Christ grows within 
one‘s soul, the more faith increases and unhealthy fear decreases, being replaced by the healthy 
fear and later by love. For Philokalics, ‗faith‘ is actually ‗science‘ since it is naturally linked to 
the truth ‗which is all-embracing, all-sustaining and free from all falsehood‘.
865
 That is to say that 
truthful faith is linked to that which really exists, and has life, as opposed to inexistence which is 
the lack of such life. Inwardly, what really and truthfully exists relates to its likeness to Christ, as 
the only one Who IS and is the Archetype of man, and everything else does not exist but has only 
the appearance of existence.  
 
To express this in psychological terms, we observe that the three powers of the soul may be found 
at different levels of likeness, and therefore of Christ-actualization. We stated above that where 
there is likeness, there is life and truthful existence, where likeness lacks, inexistence appears. But 
even if man has no existence in some powers of the soul, and therefore is ill, because another of 
his soul‘s powers may be alive, due to the natural communication between the powers of the soul 
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and in the virtue of being made in the image, the man on the whole is alive until the moment of 
physical death. This is how the existence of the false-self discussed above may be possible, and 
even have such a strong socially validated appearance of existence. But as we have seen in 
Winnicot‘s case previously quoted, the person inside feels at the same time lifeless and that its life 
has not yet started.  
 
Our conclusion to this comparative analysis is that fear is ultimately a failure to become inwardly 
alive, supported both by Philokalic and modern psychotherapeutic accounts. The person seems to 
be in an intermediary place, neither having completely entered the world of the senses, nor 
having become fully connected to the world of the nous. On the continuum from inexistence to 
existence, or from death to life, experienced anxiety shows the crossroads to which one is found 
and his indecision to take one way or another. On this continuum if one follows it one direction 
reaches to the fear of God transformed later into the love of God, while if one goes towards the 
other end it reaches anxiety and later to depression, deep despair, ending in suicide. Simply put, 
fear takes one to death, whereas its opposite, courage, takes one to life. At the end of the first 
part concerned with anthropology, we said that we will follow in the next chapters the idea of the 
Philokalia as embodying a will to love. In our opinion, this comparative analysis of fear and 
anxiety seems to have offered clear evidence of such a will to have a leading role throughout the 







DEPRESSION AND DEJECTION 
 
This chapter discusses comparative issues on depression and dejection, the last travelling 
concepts to be analyzed in this research. In the first section we draw on the main 
psychotherapeutic positions expressed in relation to depression as applied in the clinical context, 
while in the second section we present the Philokalic perspective on dejection. In the final 
section we apply different concluding techniques and draw on the various findings that resulted 
from the comparison. In addition, this last section includes a discussion on symbolism and 
realism in relation to depressive loss and a sub-section that tries to connect anxiety/fear and 
depression/dejection by placing them on the continuum from existence to inexistence. 
 
The conclusion of the chapter on fear and anxiety points towards depression as being a 
‗continuation‘ of anxiety or a ‗deepening‘ of fear, found on the continuum from existence to 
inexistence. Next, we will see if this hypothesis is confirmed by the two paradigms considered 




1. The Modern Psychotherapeutic Perspective on Depression 
 
1. Description  
 
Depression is currently considered one of the major causes of disability around the world, with a 
4
th
 leading place concerning disease causation, and estimated by WHO to become by 2020 the 
second after ischemic heart disease.
866
 It is believed to affect up to 25% of people during their 
lifetime and is identified as the third most common presenting symptom of patients arriving at a 
Psychiatry Emergency Service, usually associated with a suicide attempt.
867
 Although studied 
from the times of Hippocrates and valuable advances have been made concerning its definition 
and treatment, this dysfunction is still considered ‗something of a mystery‘
868
 while others 
concluded that there is no single concept that can be described about this disease.
869
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As in the case of anxiety, depression is more often presented in the clinical terms of syndromes, 
but for our current discussion, it is more useful to emphasize a dimensional presentation which 
allows for comparison. There are various types of depression
870
, but the one we will consider 
here is the major depressive syndrome, which is most common and usually identified simply 
with depression.  
 
Depression is defined by a series of negative emotions such as ‗anxiety, loneliness, irritability, 
fear, anger, and panic‘,
871
 in terms of ‗overriding constructs of weakness, inadequacy or 
helplessness‘,
872
 a kind of ‗anger turned against ego‘,
873
 ‗a disruption of affection where mood 
disorders dominate, and as a recent addition, of intellectual and cognitive processes‘,
874
 a ‗less 
intense state of diminished vitality‘ or ‘the feeling of being blocked by excessive inhibition‘.
875
 It 
comprises symptoms from a few areas: biological; emotional; cognitive; behavioural, which 
many times may end in a suicidal attempt or even death.
876
 Symptoms associated with depressive 
disorders include sleep disturbance, diminished energy, changes in appetite, significant guilt, 
self-blame and worthlessness, feelings of helplessness-hopelessness, impaired concentration and 
difficulties in thinking, psychomotor retardation or agitation, and preoccupation with death or 
suicide.
877
 However, for a diagnosis of major depressive episode to be made prolonged sadness 




2. Aetiology  
 
The aetiology of affective/mood disorders is seen multifactorial in individual patients, and the 
most frequently employed is the biopsychosocial model that gives an account of biological, 
psychological and social factors that influence people in the course of their lifetime.
879
 Due to the 
characteristic of our research we have focused only on the psychological and social factors, as 
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emphasized by the psychotherapeutic paradigms considered here. Currently, the aetiological 
explanations that prevail in the field are of a cognitive nature, being strongly supported by 
research, but concurrent psychodynamic and behavioural accounts are also in place. Historically, 
Freud‘s paper on Mourning and Melancholia constituted a major shift from Kraepelin‘s biogenic 
theory and directed further research towards the causative psychological factor.  
 
Psychoanalytically, depression is a kind of reactivated loss which according to Freud allows the 
patient to merge his identity with the one of the person he has lost (either real or symbolic) by 
regressing to a dependency stage and thus symbolically regaining the lost person.
880
 Freud‘s 
main thesis is that in the way ‗mourning results from loss by death, so depression results from 
loss of other kinds‘.
881
 The ambivalent feelings towards the lost love object are negative in the 
form of anger, and positive in the form of guilt, and are both turned towards the self through the 
process of introjection, ‗thus producing the self-hatred and despair that we call depression‘.
882
 
The two categories of people which develop depression later in life are considered to be those 
whose parents failed to nurture or neglected them, and those who were overprotected. These 
people ‗may devote their lives to others, desperately searching for love and approval‘
883
 and 
when their efforts are not met, depression occurs.  
 
Therefore, in psychodynamic therapies the state of helplessness and hopelessness – an 
expression of the previous and real child‘s powerlessness in the face of harm – that occurs in 
depression is interpreted as being a cry for the lost love and a need for security and affection. 
Some authors even described depressives in terms of love addicts who try ‗continually to 
compensate for their own depleted self-worth by seeking comfort and reassurance from 
others‘.
884
 The psychodynamic theory seems to be confirmed by the various triggering factors of 
depression which all have in common the notion of failure either in the personal, professional, or 
social life of the individual. At the same time this theory assigns to depression not only a 
structural role, focused on what people feel or think, but also a functional role, being something 
that people use in developing relationships, ‗particularly in the form of dependency‘.
885
 In other 
words, depression reveals not only what a person feels inside but especially what a person does, 
how a life is arranged, how days are spent, what activities are prioritized, what life targets are 
followed.  
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A unique viewpoint on depression is offered by Tim Cantopher,
886
 a British psychiatrist, who 
thinks that strong people are more susceptible to develop the illness due to their sense of 
responsibility and need to push themselves hard in order to accomplish their tasks and not 
disappoint others. Depression in his opinion occurs because ‗you‘ve done too much, you were 
too strong, and you struggled too much for too long‘.
887
 First, the treatment he suggests 
presupposes one to understand his illness and therefore stop and take a break. Then he 
recommends crying as a therapeutic method, which fulfils the cathartic role of grieving and later 
frees the person towards experiencing the entire spectrum of human emotions, not only the 
blocking feelings of sadness. In the end, he advises one to accept his feelings, however painful, 




Behavioural theories concerning aetiology see depression as being a result of extinction, i.e. 
behaviours which cease as a result of not being properly rewarded. The leading behaviourist 
theory belongs to Lewinsohn who suggested that the low rate of positive social reinforcement 
depends mainly on two factors: the available level of social reinforcement accessible to the 
individual, and his ability in obtaining reinforcement.
889
 Thus, behaviourists‘ depression 
becomes a process of man‘s withdrawal into himself.
890
 Some authors observe that although 
sometimes unfavourable social circumstances make people depressed, ‗it may also be that their 
dark mood and flat behaviors help produce a decline in social rewards‘,
891
 whereas other 
behaviourally shaped researches emphasize that depression‘s ‗cry for help‘ rarely works and 




The cognitive perspective is undisputedly the dominant psychological model of depression 
fostered both by ‗research and common sense‘.
893
 There are two particularly influential cognitive 
explanations: Beck’s theory of negative thinking to which we also referred in the previous 
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chapter on anthropology, and Seligman’s theory of learned helplessness, a theory found at the 
crossroads of the behaviourist and cognitive perspective. Aaron Beck considers that depression is 
caused by a persistent pattern of negative automatic thinking, rather than various underlying 
conflicts or cessation of positive reinforcements. Albert Ellis also emphasized the role of 
irrational thoughts and maladaptive thinking as a cause for depression.  
 
According to Beck, depression is produced by a combination of maladaptive attitudes, a 
cognitive triad, errors in thinking
894
, and automatic thoughts. Maladaptive attitudes
895
 are 
formed during childhood, acquired through personal experience or introjection of people‘s 
judgments, whereas automatic thoughts
896
 through repetition become a habitual pattern of 
thinking and take the form of beliefs about the self that in turn are associated with negative 
feelings. Automatic thoughts are intrusive, when they appear for the first time, and become 
circular through repetition.
897
 Other lines of research underlined that people harbouring 
ruminative responses to their depressive moods ‗are more likely to develop clinical depression 
later in life than people who avoid such ruminations‘
898
 The cognitive triad identified in 
depression refers to negative thoughts about the self, the world, and the future.  
 
Seligman‘s learned helplessness theory places helplessness at the heart of depression and is a 
consequence of people thinking that they have no power or control over the surrounding 
environment and that they are solely responsible for this. Hence, people‘s attributional style, 
which in this case is internal, is closely linked to depression and helplessness.
899
 This initial 
cognitive-behavioural explanation of depression evolved through further studies to an explicitly 
cognitive one which links helplessness to hopelessness. According to Abramson and her 
colleagues, depression is caused both by the belief of one‘s lack of control over the environment 
and the belief that negative events are persistent and re-occur. Thus, the initial helplessness 
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expectancy is accompanied by a negative outcome expectancy, i.e. hopelessness, which is ‗the 






Other categories of stressors that trigger depression are to be found in the social environment. 
Thus, problems related to finance (lack of income or debt), employment (instability, retirement, 
dissatisfaction or unemployment), shelter (insecurity or homelessness), relationship (loss, 
violence, infidelity, bullying, conflict, and abuse), health issues, adjustment to new cultural 
environments, and social inequality may become stressful life events that activate depression.
901
 
As mentioned before, depression may end with a suicidal attempt or even death. Suicide is 
associated in research with a high amount of anxiety which in the presence of depression 
produces ‗unremitting psychic pain‘
902
 that culminates with feelings of hopelessness and finally 
leads to suicide.  
 
3. Cure  
 
The psychological cure for depression involves a combination of cognitive behavioural (CBT) 
and interpersonal therapy derived from the psychoanalytic method. CBT is focused on changing 
the negative patterns of thinking and cognitive schema and is a short-term directive therapy. 
Albert Ellis‘s and Aaron Beck‘s approaches are most used, with an emphasis on Beck‘s method 
which is devised to correct the cognitive dysfunctions specific to depression. Although CBT 
focuses mainly on cognition, it usually starts by using behavioural methods meant to trigger 
some improvements in energy and mood.  Beck‘s method follows a few steps: initially, through 
some behavioural techniques people are encouraged to become confident and active; then people 
are instructed in relation to their automatic thoughts and taught to record them as they occur so 
as to discuss them at the next session; a third step shows them how various illogical thinking 
processes develop and maintain the automatic thoughts and beliefs; and finally, therapists help 




Interpersonal psychotherapy (ITP) aims at bringing unconscious content related to loss to 
consciousness, help the patient grieve upon them, and finally switch from dependence to a more 
functional way of life. The core principle is that there are mutual influences between 
interpersonal problems and depression, in the sense that one can determine and maintain the 
other.
904
 Like CBT, it tends to be a short therapy, with standardized and brief therapy sessions. 
                                                          
900
 Alloy, pp. 256-7 
901
 Boursiquot, et al., op. cit., p. 96; Young, op. cit., p. 614; Hammen, op. cit., p. 103 
902
 Fawcett, apud: Wong, F.K., et al., ‗The Suicidal Patient‘ in: Clinical Manual of Emergency Psychiatry, eds. 
Michelle B. Riba and Divy Ravindranath, (Washington: American Psychiatric Association, 2010), pp. 38-9 
903
 Cf. Comer, op. cit., p. 283; Baldwin, D.S., Birtwistle, J., An Atlas of Depression, (New York: The Parthenon 
Publishing Group, 2002), p. 50; Bennet, op. cit., pp. 184-186 
904
 Cf. Beidel, op. cit., p. 229  
202 
 
This therapy ‗seems to be of greatest help in cases of depression that clearly involve a history of 





Other forms of cure include: psychoeducation,
906
 that empowers patients to contribute to the 
management of their condition by offering them the necessary psychological information; 





 which addresses the everyday problems considered as causes for 
symptoms; Cognitive Behavioural Analysis System of Psychotherapy (CBASP) a new goal-
oriented therapy which is efficient and simple to implement;
909
 behavioural activation devised to 




Major and important improvements have been done in understanding depression and alleviating 
it and yet, professionals in the field complain at the lack of a comprehensive definition of this 
vast dysfunction of the human‘s soul: ‗efforts at identifying disorders, specifying their causes, 
and providing effective treatments for them are all handicapped by the absence of a valid 
definition of depressive disorder‘.
911
 However, this complaint might as well be reversed and 
address the shortage in causal identification which would perhaps allow a better definition of 
depression. Whichever is the case, there are still a lot of mysteries to uncover concerning 
depression and we hope that the last comparative section of this chapter will be able to offer 
some more insight into these matters.  
 
 
II. The Philokalic Perspective on Dejection 
 
The general Philokalic framework for dejection follows the same pattern as for fear. It speaks of 
two types of grief or sorrow, a healthy and an unhealthy one, and proposes the same paradoxical 
cure of one through the other. The Philokalia distinguishes between two forms of sorrow as 
passion, dejection and despondency, but since in current psychotherapeutic practice there is no 
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clear distinction between the two,
912
 it would not be useful to emphasize such a difference in 
respect to our comparative effort and therefore we will treat them all together. However, some 
general remarks will be made in the last section of this chapter as to their connection with the 
three powers of the soul.  
 
 
1. Description  
 
Throughout the Philokalic text there are many words associated with dejection such as: worldly 
sorrow or grief; listlessness; restlessness; despondency; anguish; exhaustion; apathy; sadness; 
low spirits; weariness; sloth or negligence from excessive attention to worldly matters; 
carelessness.
913
 Dejection is mentioned as one of the eight evil thoughts or passions
914
 or just 
listed between many other vices.
915
 It is described as ‗a paralysis of the soul, a slackness of the 
mind, an approval of worldly things‘,
916
 ‗a passion that corrupts soul and body, affecting even 
the marrow of one‘s bones … often resulting in death‘,
917
 which involves ‗discouragement, 
debility, psychic heaviness and sorrow, distress, oppression, most often accompanied by anxiety 
and even with anguish‘.
918
 Saint John of Damascus identifies four types of pain, out of which 
three are considered unhealthy (anguish, grief and envy) and one healthy or positive (pity). 





Mutual and close relations are established between the intellect’s activity and dejection. On one 
hand dejection and listlessness have a negative impact on spiritual knowledge: ‗The incensive 
power roused in an unnatural fashion against men, sorrow that does not accord with God‘s will 
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and listlessness are all equally destructive of holy thoughts and spiritual knowledge‘
920
 and on the 
other hand, lack of spiritual knowledge produces unhealthy and inconsolable grief such as that for 
‗unsolicited worldly poverty‘.
921
 Saint John Cassian puts dejection in relation to the activity of 
demons or evil spirits and from this perspective he talks about ‗the demon of dejection, who 
obscures the soul‘s capacity for spiritual contemplation and keeps it from all good works‘.
922
 
He also points out dejection‘s relation to cognition, emotions and its behavioural and social 
implications:  
 
‗Undermining all the soul's salutary resolutions, weakening its persistence and constancy, 
he leaves it senseless and paralyzed, tied and bound by its despairing thoughts. Just as a 
moth devours clothing and a worm devours wood, so dejection devours a man‘s soul. It 
persuades him to shun every helpful encounter and stops him accepting advice from his 
true friends or giving them a courteous and peaceful reply. Seizing the entire soul, it fills it 




Dejection is also associated with two opposed categories: at one end, laxity and lack of inner 
discipline specific to ‗those who are dissipated in their life and habits‘
924
and at the other end 
it affects those who have previously attained dispassion through insistent remembrance of 
their past sins.
925
 Despair is seen as being worse than sin and is connected with the state of 
hopelessness which may lead to actual death as was the case of Judas,
926
 or to a kind of 
inner ‗total death‘
927





In terms of aetiology, dejection ‗is born of and dominated by all the passions‘
928
 whence the 
difficulty of opposing it by cultivating a particular virtue.
929
 Saint John Climacus expresses 
dejection‘s various sources and consequences in the following terms: ‗I have many mothers: 
Stolidity of Soul, Forgetfulness of the Things of Heaven, or, sometimes, Too Heavy a Burden of 
Troubles. My children who live with me are Changing from Place to Place, Disobedience of 
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One‘s Superior, Forgetfulness of the Judgment to Come, and sometimes, the Abandonment of 
One‘s Vocation‘.
930
 More specifically, dejection has a few causes: frustrated desire, ‗for those 
who love pleasure, when deprived of it, grow angry and embittered‘,
931
 or ‗can come from 
thoughts of anger‘,
932
 or may simply be the result of demonic activity: ‗the thoughts that come to 




Moreover, in other descriptions ‗worldly despondency between others is considered a ―fruit of 
the spirit of evil‖ as opposed with those of the Holy Spirit‘
934
 and at the same time as begetting 
in its turn other ‗fruits of the evil spirit: listlessness, impatience, anger, hatred, contentiousness, 
despair, sluggishness in praying‘.
935
 As we see from this description and others,
936
 dejection 
seems to produce listlessness which ‗works hand in hand with the demon of dejection … making 
him slack and full of fear‘.
937
 This passion is mainly associated with the inability of one to stay still 
and focused and therefore determines one either to look for various distractions under disguised 
meritorious causes or makes him oversleep and forget completely about his responsibilities.  
 
Dejection may also be triggered by ‗destructive forgetfulness or by the laziness which paralyzes 
the intellect and turns it away from life; ignorance, the cause of all evils, negligence, sensual 
pleasure, gluttony, lust, anger which causes hate‘.
938
 As a combined result of all these factors the 
soul reaches a state of crisis and ‗eventually the intellect, at a loss where to turn, is overwhelmed 
by dejection … and forfeits all its spiritual progress‘.
939
 Thus, we might say that dejection occurs 
after a general surrender of the soul‘s powers irrespective of the order in which they submitted. 
When presented as part of a short chain of passions linked with the desiring power dejection 
occurs in the end: ‗the vice of gluttony can lead to that of unchastity; and this in turn can lead to 
the vice of dejection‘.
940
 When included in a general chain of passions addressing all powers of 
the soul that describes the foolish man and which starts with lack of faith and laziness, dejection 
appears towards the end, after anger, and is followed by listlessness, self-esteem and pride.
941
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However, Saint Peter of Damascus, after having described how passions are chained together, 
adds: ‗Those consumed by them are led to despair and utter destruction; they fall away from God 
and become like the demons, as has already been said‘.
942
 We put this last description of despair 
and utter destruction in relation to despondency that is considered a total death, and pushes one to 
commit suicide which, as showed above, was exemplified by the case of Judas. 
 
 
3. Cure  
 
The cure for dejection evolves along the same lines as those for fear. Thus, as was the case for 
fear whose proposed cure was the fear of God, in the same way the worldly sorrow/grief is cured 
through spiritual or godly sorrow/grief. The latter, again as in the case of fear, presents two 
stages: an initial stage united with the fear of God, and a later stage united with the love for 
God.
943
 As fear and dejection were linked in concern to their aetiology and evolution, the same 
seem to be closely linked in the curing process. Saint Gregory Palamas parallels the two stages 
first with betrothal and wedlock:  
 
‗the initial stage of grief resembles something that appears to be almost unattainable – a 
kind of petition for betrothal to God … But the consummation of grief is pure bridal 
union with the Bridegroom‘
944
 and second with the parable of the prodigal son: ‗The first 
stage of grief resembles the return of the prodigal son. For this reason it fills the mourner 
with dejection … But the consummation of grief resembles the moment when the 
heavenly Father runs out to meet him and embraces him. And when the son finds himself 
accepted with such inexpressible compassion and on account of it is filled with great joy 
and boldness, he receives the Father's embrace and embraces Him in return‘.
945
 
Therefore, both godly fear and grief end in love.  
 
As is the case with all the passions, the treatment proposed by the Philokalia really starts with 
healing the nous through spiritual knowledge, which redirects the powers of the soul towards 
their natural role. Saint Maximus the Confessor states in regard to the healing activity of the 
intellect that ‗the state of spiritual knowledge heals the mental dejection produced by the storm 
of trials and temptations‘.
946
 In addition, various pieces of advice which equal a cognitive 
treatment are offered in relation to specific situations. For example, one is advised to ‗respond 




 ‗… the initial stage of grief, which is painful inasmuch as it is conjoined with the fear of God. … But in later 
stages it becomes in a wondrous manner wedded to love for God‘. St Gregory Palamas, To Reverend Nun Xenia, 68, 
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without rancour to thoughts of dejection, but oppose thoughts of self-indulgence with enmity‘.
947
 
In the same way, when ‗the demons that attack the soul induce in us by this thought an excessive 
depreciation of human nature on the grounds that, being mortal, it is valueless – and this is what 
they like to do when we torment them with the thought of death – we should recall the honour 
and glory of the heavenly kingdom, though without losing sight of the bitter and dreadful 





Hence, the first treatment recommended for dejection is ‗sorrow prompted by God‘ which acts as 
‗an excellent tonic for those parts of the soul corrupted by evil actions, and it restores them to 
their natural state‘,
949
 grief and tears whose final result is virtue as well as joy and the soul’s 
blessed laughter,
950
 and faith and hope in God.
951
 Other means of treatments include prayer 




 meditation on Holy 
Scripture, and by living with godly people.
954
 The cure for listlessness stresses the thought of 
death, the singing of psalms, manual labour, and patience, whereas the main challenge really 






III. Depression and Dejection: Comparison 
 
1. Comparison in Terms of Description  
 
The approach towards the pair dejection-depression employed by the Philokalia and modern 
psychotherapy presents striking similarity in terms of description. They both emphasize 
biological, cognitive, emotional, behavioural and social factors that associate with depression. 
Thus, both paradigms refer to key aspects of depression such as: exhaustion; weakness; 
inhibition; fear; anger; persistent psychic pain; deep sorrowfulness; all overriding in 
hopelessness and eventually death. 
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2. Comparison in Terms of Aetiology 
 
In terms of aetiology, depression is considered multifactorial by both fields, but whereas modern 
psychotherapy uses a bio-psycho-social model, the Philokalia employs a bio-psycho-socio-
spiritual model. As previously mentioned the Philokalic text points clearly towards a biological 
component of depression,
956
 as it does for anxiety,
957
 but the in-depth analysis of this connection 
is not the object of this research. As far as the psychological and social factors are concerned, 
again, the two perspectives present great similarities drawing on the same psychological 
dimensions. All modern psychotherapeutic paradigms make great contributions in understanding 
depression. Hence, it is conceptualized as a reactivated loss of love which connects with feelings 
of anger and guilt turned towards self, a result of extinction due to positive behaviours not being 
reinforced, as being caused by negative patterns of thinking affecting all areas of life (self, world 
and the future) or by incongruence associated with the false self, and confusion in regard to 
existential meaning.  
 
In its turn, the Philokalic text points towards the same dimensions conceptualized as sadness due 
to unsatisfied desire and attachment to worldly things, it is often associated with anger or seen as 
being produced by it, a lack of pleasure produced by current activities which used to be 
previously longed for and preferred, too heavy a burden of troubles, forgetfulness and existential 
confusion of the soul. In short, depression is considered as being born of and dominated by all 
passions, and as such, similar to modern perspectives, is viewed as having a broad and 
extensively debilitating effect upon one‘s life.  
 
The main difference, however, is the influence of the spiritual factor, considered the main cause 
of depression which is linked to two main aspects: the neglect, ignorance or forgetfulness 
regarding spiritual knowledge, on one hand; and the activity of demons associated with thoughts 
(logismoi), on the other hand. The Philokalic discourse specifically talks about the demon of 
dejection closely connected with the demon of listlessness, and in doing so it involves at all times 
a mainly ontological dimension, to which the psychological one is subordinated. That is why, all 
psychological and social factors enumerated by modern psychotherapy as causative for 
depression may be simply termed in a Philokalic language as worldly attachment, whether due to 
past loss, as emphasized by psychodynamic therapies, lack of social positive reinforcement as in 
behaviourism, misinterpretations and errors in thinking as in cognitivism, or lack of self-
genuineness and values confusion due to an existential vacuum, as in existential humanism.  
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3. Comparison in Terms of Cure 
 
In the same way, the similarities and differences of cure between the two paradigms rest on the 
distinctions that exist in regard to their aetiology. Thus, in terms of curing methods the Philokalia 
encompasses: behavioural methods, similar to behavioural activation, such as manual labour, the 
singing of psalms; in-depth psychoanalytic methods, such as grief and tears referred to as godly 
sorrowfulness meant to treat those parts of the soul affected by sickness and restore them to 
natural functioning;
958
 cognitive methods addressing the issue of thoughts which, as we have 
seen at one level, equal a cognitive intervention in that they oppose the negative thought through 
the remembrance of positive spiritual-like thoughts, but transcends this level by linkage with the 
idea of evil spirits present within various thoughts, whose eradication employs confession and 
the specific power of prayer; whereas interpersonal methods involve living with godly people on 
one hand; and the other two treatments specifically addressing dejection or despondency, on the 
other hand.  
 
Hence, in order to cure the withdrawal tendency specific to depression, the advice is to not to go 
away from people but to intensify the ascetic efforts, since separating from people will eliminate 
chances to diagnose it properly by understanding that ‗sickness does not come from without but 
lies within‘ and that ‗man can be harmed by another only through the causes of the passions which 
lie within himself‘.
 959
  For listlessness, however, one is advised to do the opposite, to avoid any 
distractions through thoughts or activities,
960
 remain in stillness and train himself in patience 
and endurance.
961
 In both cases, it is essential to face the sickness and acknowledge the various 
causes from within that caused it. Therefore, Philokalic methods address the same dimensions of 
the soul: grieve upon previous unconscious issues; trigger behavioural and cognitive changes; 
underline and propose clear approaches as to interpersonal relations; but their intended finality 
and outcome is different in that they redirect the soul‘s powers to their natural state, in 
conformity with the anthropological framework followed by the Philokalia.   
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Having highlighted the similarities and differences we found between these two paradigms, next 
we will try to put together the information they provide in order to reach a conclusion concerning 
the comparative effort on depression. In the end, we will try to integrate the conclusions on 
anxiety with those on depression with the hope of obtaining a unified viewpoint on how 
psychological illness is seen by these two fields. Depressives were described by psychotherapy 
as love addicts, whose addiction consists of a constant search for the comfort and reassurance 
offered by others. While thinking of themselves in almost exclusively negative terms, they see 
others in almost exclusively positive terms. As such, they look for and expect the positive 
coming from outside. Depression, with its helplessness-hopelessness dyad, occurs when one has 
exhausted all variants of looking for love: when he enters inwardly the depressive meets a 
combination formed from repressed and reactivated pain and the negativistic cognitive triad 
made up of various misguided beliefs, while outwardly his merits are not properly recognized 
and rewarded, the cry for help and the need for security and affection fail to find compassion and 
therefore results in failure. Depressives reach a dead end only after having used up all their 
resources. They have resources, but they seem not to be able to make a proper ‗investment‘ of 
them. As Carpenther noted, depression seems to be a problem of having done too much, of being 
too strong, of having struggled too much and for too long, hence not a problem of weakness but 
rather of persistent misdirected search. By comparison, fear seems to be a repetitive run away 
from something while depression is a repetitive misdirected run towards something. 
 
Through the psychotherapeutic methods presented above, depression is temporarily ameliorated, 
but not completely cured ‗tending to be a relapsing condition‘.
962
 Even if some distorted thinking 
patterns and beliefs are corrected and produce a great improvement in the condition, or the 
therapeutic process will allow the grievance labour to take place, or some behaviours are 
positively reinforced and improved for a period of time, since depression‘s triggering factors are 
so numerous and diverse the probability of reoccurrence is very high. A vicious circle is in place 
– the depressive searches for love with all his strength; he does this in a misdirected way, 
inwardly and outwardly, and after a while realizes that he did not find what he was looking for; 
his past inward helplessness reactivates and couples with the current outward hopelessness; 
depression occurs; as a result of a therapeutic process or support from people around the 
depressive recovers partially and goes on searching in the same misdirected way and the vicious 
circle is repeated over and over until some people renounce this search and may even end in 
death.  
 
Other descriptions depict the depressive as seeing the glass half-empty, hence the emphasis on 
the negative, and that the cure comes from training to see the glass as half-full. So, on one hand 
he searches for love in a misdirected way, and on the other hand this misdirection seems to rest 
on looking at the empty half, i.e. to what does not exist. Thus, depression appears to be both a 
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misguided and misdirected search for love, where misguidance is related inwardly and 
misdirection outwardly. Misguidance is due to the focus on the negative inside, and misdirection 
is due to searching for love outside when according to the Philokalic anthropology it is to be 
found within. That is why, according to contemporary research, clinical depression arises only 
when on top of the initial helplessness felt by the depressive, hopelessness is added,
963
 as a result 
of repeated failures to find what one was searching for.  
 
Our conceptualization of depression as misdirection and misguidance also relies on the concept 
of anhedonia which is considered the core feature of major depression and distinguishes it from 
normal sadness.
964
 The same is highlighted by the Philokalia which points out this paradox: on 
one hand depression is created by attachment to the world, but manifests itself as an acute form 
of deprivation on the other hand.
965
 According to Saint Dorotheos of Gaza, passion is described 





Hence, the excess recorded here comes from the constancy of a misdirected and misguided 
search on one hand and total withdrawal and refraining from it on the other hand. In our opinion, 
the depressive‘s core problem seems to be the confusion as in regard to where love may be 
found, hence his perpetual misdirected quest and failure. Taking into account both the Philokalic 
understanding of love, and the psychodynamic accounts on the loss of love, we conclude that the 
depressive has once inwardly met love, so he knows what it is, but he has then become confused 
as to where may be found, and currently the access to it is blocked through the vicious circle 
described above. It is at this point concerning the way out of the vicious circle that we see the 
Philokalia adding extra value to the discussion on depression.  
 
As we know, the Philokalia does not deny any of the powers of the soul including the desiring 
power to which depression is closely related, but what it underlines is that they need to function 
according to nature. Therefore, it is not the fact that one follows one‘s desire that is considered 
unhealthy, but its direction. Having reached here we need to bring in a few more specific 
clarifications as to how love is seen according to Philokalic sources. As previously mentioned, 
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the Philokalic anthropological framework relates love with God since God is love (1 John, 4:16). 
However, we will next be interested in relating love to the three powers of the soul and underline 
its structural and functional role, since as current psychotherapeutic accounts suggested, 
depression is not only something that one feels or thinks, but something that one uses in 
interpersonal relations, and as such becomes a way of relating to self, world and others.  
 
St Maximus the Confessor extensively treated the subject of love throughout the Four Hundred 
Texts on Love. He states that love relates to being unified inwardly through the divine since:  
 
‗Nothing so much as love brings together those who have been sundered and produces in 
them an effective union of will and purpose. Love is born in a man inwardly, when his soul‘s 
powers — that is, his intelligence, incensive power and desire — are concentrated and 
unified around the divine‘
967
 and outwardly because ‗He wishes to unite us in nature and will 
with one another, and in His goodness urges all humanity towards this goal‘.
968
 Love is 
structurally connected to the desiring power since ‗without the power of desire there is no 
longing, and so no love, which is the issue of longing; for the property of desire is to love 
something‘
969
 but functionally also influences or is influenced by the other two powers of the 
soul, the noetic/intelligent and incensive/volitional power: ‗Without the power of intelligence 
there is no capacity for spiritual knowledge; and without spiritual knowledge we cannot have 
the faith from which springs that hope whereby we grasp things of the future as though they 
were present. …  And without the incensive power, intensifying the desire for union with 
what is loved, there can be no peace, for peace is truly the complete and undisturbed 




In another place, Saint Maximus speaks about the many different forms in which love might be 
experienced and its relationship with goodness and beauty:  
 
‗Observe how the divine force of love — the erotic power pre-existing in the good - has 
given birth to the same blessed force within us, through which we long for the beautiful 
and good in accordance with the words, ―I became a lover of her beauty‖ (Wisd. 8:2), and 
―Love her and she will sustain you; fortify her and she will exalt you‖ (Prov. 4 : 6 , 8 ) .  
Theologians call the divine sometimes an erotic force, sometimes love, sometimes that 
which is intensely longed for and loved.
 
Consequently, as an erotic force and as love, the 
divine itself is subject to movement; and as that which is intensely longed for and loved it 
moves towards itself everything that is receptive of this force and love. To express this 
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more clearly: the divine itself is subject to movement since it produces an inward state of 
intense longing and love in those receptive to them; and it moves others since by nature it 
attracts the desire of those who are drawn towards it. In other words, it moves others and 





Viewed through a Philokalic anthropological framework it seems obvious to us that not only do 
depressives long for love as a result of being made in the image, but that they have in fact 
experienced divine love and for some reasons their growing into love has been stopped. In our 
opinion, this is sustained by a few arguments: first, the blockage formed by the negative 
cognitive functioning and its associated emotional and behavioural consequences which seem to 
prevent the access towards within where one may re-experience Love as God, irrespective of the 
fact that we see the cognitive functioning in Philokalic terms – as evil thoughts or spirits – or in 
psychotherapeutic terms – as negative automatic and irrational thinking. The main issue here is 
that one is prevented from accessing the good from within; second, it explains the efforts and the 
strength depressives employ to obtain love or to make themselves worthy of it; third, 
psychoanalytic sources argue that the depressive‘s grief over loss is caused by the ‗fantasy of 
having destroyed some internal authority‘
972
 whence his feelings of helplessness and lack of 
control, an authority which in our opinion is directly related to the experience of Love as Being, 
if we follow the Philokalic definition of God as One Who Is, and evil consisting in a lack of 
being. The loss of internal authority is therefore the loss of the relationship one used to have with 
God as Love, and is otherwise expressed through the cognitive blockage discussed above; and 
last, the fact that depression is mainly the result of an internal confusion concerning love seems 
to be supported by both contemporary research which points towards the cognitive methods as 
being most efficacious in treating it and the Philokalic focus on the cure through spiritual 
knowledge which addresses the intellect‘s activity and therefore provides various cognitive 
clarifications in the process. All these ideas put together make us think that depression reveals 
the struggle of one who strives towards likeness, a view to which the next discussion on 





4. The depressive loss – symbolism and realism  
 
The main psychoanalytic thesis which sees depression in terms of a mourning process caused by 
a real or symbolic loss allows us to make some new connections with the Philokalic 
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anthropological viewpoint. Our working hypothesis is that what is described as symbolic in a 
psychoanalytic anthropological framework is actually real in a Philokalic anthropological 
framework.  
 
In Freud‘s own words depression is characterized as ‗the reaction to the loss of a loved object. … 
there is a loss of a more ideal kind. The object has not perhaps actually died, but has been lost as 
an object of love (e.g. in the case of a betrothed girl who has been jilted). In yet other cases one 
feels justified in maintaining the belief that a loss of this kind has occurred, but one cannot see 
clearly what it is that has been lost, and it is all the more reasonable to suppose that the patient 
cannot consciously perceive what he has lost either. This, indeed, might be so even if the patient 
is aware of the loss which has given rise to his melancholia, but only in the sense that he knows 
whom he has lost but not what he has lost in him. This would suggest that melancholia is in some 
way related to an object-loss which is withdrawn from consciousness, in contradistinction to 
mourning, in which there is nothing about the loss that is unconscious.
974
 Therefore, even if one 
is aware of the object-loss, usually represented by the first caregiver, he cannot perceive what 
was actually lost in him. The psychoanalytical anthropological framework does not allow us to 
go more in-depth in trying to grasp the meaning of the inner loss that happens in depression, that 
is, to understand what was actually lost, even when we know through whom we have lost it. 
However, the Philokalic anthropological framework may provide useful information in this 
regard by showing that what Freud considers a symbolic or ideal nature is actually real. But first 
we have to highlight the Philokalic view on symbolism as used in parables and the principles of 
interpretation in the Philokalia which are different from the interpretations used in 
psychoanalysis.  
 
St Maximus the Confessor explains that one can apprehend Christ the Logos in two ways, 
directly or mediated by symbols:  
 
‗When He is contemplated in His true simplicity, in His principal state with God the 
Father (cf. John 1:1-2), although He embraces the models of the truth of all things in a 
distinct and naked manner, He does not contain within Himself parables, symbols and 
stories needing allegorical interpretation. But when He draws near to men who cannot 
with the naked intellect come into contact with noetic realities in their naked state, He 
selects things which are familiar to them, combining together various stories, symbols, 
parables and dark sayings; and in this way He becomes flesh. Thus at the first encounter 
our intellect comes into contact not with the naked Logos but with the incarnate Logos, 
that is, with various sayings and stories. The incarnate Logos, though Logos by nature, 
is flesh in appearance. Hence most people think they see flesh and not the Logos, 
although in fact He is the Logos. The intellect – that is, the inner meaning — of 
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Scripture is other than what it seems to most people. For the Logos becomes flesh in 
each of the recorded sayings‘.
975
 The same meaning is conveyed by Saint Mark the 




 we showed in relation to the symbols used in parables that, by 
employing the cognitive processes of abstracting, generalization and concretization, they actually 
transfer one in the world of spiritual meanings making him partake inwardly in them. In 
psychology it is currently established that there are two types of concrete: one sensory and one 
logical. Through processes of abstraction and generalization, cognition rises from the sensory 
concrete to the abstract and through the abstract to the logical concrete, where noetical meanings 
are conveyed. As in Philokalic accounts, cognition was identified as being ‗a distinct 
psychological mechanism‘
977
 within the more comprehensive concept of intelligence. 
Intelligence uses cognition, but is not limited to and not to be confused with it. Cognition is one 
of the forms of intelligence whose main function is to adjust to the real, while intelligence 
involves more than that.
978
 Although there is not enough evidence as to equate intelligence as 
described here with the nous and the fundamental role it plays in apprehending spiritual realities, 
however, it is obvious that the subordinate relation between cognition and intelligence described 
by modern psychology is similar to the same subordinate relation between reason and nous as 
described in the Philokalia.  
 
St Maximus, largely quoted above, emphasizes these matters by drawing on the spiritual 
meanings employed by one and the same reality of Logos Who presents Himself in two ways 
according to the state of the receptor: when one can perceive noetic realities in their naked state 
the Logos presents to him through means of the nous; when one cannot approach Him noetically, 
He becomes flesh by making use of parables and symbols to communicate with him. The first 
type of communication is possible through dispassion, while the second is specific to those who 
are involved in the process of acquiring dispassion. The first situation implies a pure nous, the 
second a reasoning procesuality which ends in grasping noetical meanings. The latter category 
depends on the former to be offered the ‗route‘ of symbols and parables which will take them to 
the right noetical meanings, otherwise delusions may appear.  
 
Next, we shall try to put the two perspectives together and offer a more comprehensive 
understanding of depression as resulting from this comparative effort. Hence, love is a relational 
phenomenon and is naturally lived first in relation with the mother, as a concrete effect of being 
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made in the image. As previously stated, psychoanalytically, depression occurs due to either 
overprotection or neglect, i.e. what is too much or too little, while normality should stand in the 
middle, i.e. the mother should just be there and empathetically respond to the child‘s needs.
979
 
The patristic perspective employs the same principle in stating that virtue, i.e. normality, stands 
in the middle between excess and defect.
980
 On the other hand, patristically, the potential to love 
is naturally found in man‘s constitution and is born in a man inwardly when all his soul‘s powers 
are unified around the divine.
981
 Applying the patristic principles to the situation just described, 
we conclude that what both psychoanalysis and patristics noticed is the need for the mother to be 
there and protect the child from every excess or deficiency, first starting with her own. While 
both patristics and psychoanalysis noticed through whom (the first caregiver, usually the mother) 
and how (excess or deficit) the loss appeared, patristics in addition might tell us what was 
actually lost, namely the already-experienced union with God in love.  
 
For the depressive, the process of Christ-actualization seems to have been abruptly disturbed by 
the whom and how described above, he lost the relation with his true self and as a result the 
loving union with God, and consequently depression occurred. The lost loved object, of which 
psychoanalysis talks about, is therefore not the parent, who usually continues to exist and share 
love with the child in the form that he is able to, but the relationship of union with God which the 
child experienced and which was disrupted by circumstances beyond his control and 
understanding, hence the feeling of powerlessness and helplessness. The criterion against which 
the disruption appeared is not primarily the parent, but the model in whose image was made, i.e. 
Christ the Logos. The parent was only the disturbance-predisposing environment, one which 
ideally should have acted as a facilitator for the potentiality hidden within the image. From a 
patristic perspective, the normality of a parental environment is the one which allows the birth of 
Christ within the child‘s soul, namely the actualization of Christ‘s image from within.  
 
The ascetic method and the inner healing it implies, suggests that through spiritual knowledge 
the child is reconnected to the source of life within and this relationship may be completely 
restored. The disruption that appeared through the parents or other people attending to the child 
is explained in terms of inherited fallen nature and is the object of the process of forgiveness, 
where man is assisted by grace. Thus, it seems that the misdirected and misguided search for 
love that we discussed above is rooted in the confusion of one searching for the lost object-
relation, while he searches for the lost experience of union with God in love. This might also 
explain why people that have everything they want according to current social standards 
(profession, family, social status and opportunities, etc.) still develop depressions and feel empty 
or unfulfilled.  
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We provided the above clarifications in order to show that what is psychoanalytically symbolic 
might be actually patristically real, but not a kind of immediate sensory reality that results from 
information brought by the physical senses. Symbolic refers to the reality perceived through the 
inner senses that many Philokalic writers talk about.
982
 In other words, the loss of love involved 
in depression is not symbolic, but real, that is why the search for it, even if misdirected, is itself 
real.  
 
5. Connecting fear /anxiety and depression/dejection 
 
Contemporary research on anxiety and depression shows a high rate of comorbidity concerning 
their aetiology and pathogenesis.
983
 Other psychoanalytically oriented authors notice that from 
the perspective of the inner experienced phenomena ‗anxiety is incompatible with sorrow and 
grief‘ and therefore ‗bad news gives relief from anxiety as effectively as good news‘.
984
 At a first 
look these two ideas may seem contradictory. But if we look at them from a Philokalic 
perspective they may find a proper explanation. Thus, anxiety and depression co-occur since 
they are produced in the same desiring power of the soul, and are incompatible with each other 
since they send to different states found on the continuum of existence-inexistence previously 
described: when bad news arrives anxiety diminishes, as a result of anticipated evil becoming 
real, whereas depression increases due to the reinforcement of the negative outcome expectancy 
– hopelessness.  
 
Based on Philokalic sources, we arrived at the conclusion that both anxiety and depression have 
to do with evil, either anticipated as in fear or expected as in depression, conceptualized as 
privation of good and inexistence. Anxiety results from lack of assurance or misbelief 
concerning existence, while depression is a misdirected focus on what does not exist, i.e. the 
empty half of the glass. In Philokalic terms, what does not exist relates to evil, while what is 
relates to God defined as He Who Is. In anxiety, the will is wrongly used to block awareness, 
while in depression the will focuses on evil or negative awareness. In both cases there is lacking 
a proper knowledge and discrimination of good and evil, i.e. existence and inexistence. While 
anxiety results from the refusal to acknowledge evil, hence the presence of the diverse defence 
mechanisms employed, depression comes from acknowledging and somehow confronting it but 
failing to ‗conquer‘ it, hence the occurrence of the dyad helplessness-hopelessness. If the anxious 
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person is still staying indecisively at the crossroads, the depressive has moved on and tried to 
face things but did it by going in the wrong direction and failing. While facing the various 
defence mechanisms and changing irrational beliefs and negative thinking patterns 
psychotherapy is greatly and consistently helping to improve these two conditions by getting one 
closer to his own inner world, in the light of the information provided by this comparative study, 
it seems that depression and anxiety may be completely overcome when the inner inexistence 
becomes existence, through the process of Christ-actualization previously described.   
 
An interesting connection between depression and anxiety, as described in the Philokalia, is that 
the viper is the symbol of the demons that produce both of them.
985
 As previously noted their 
curing process develops similarly, the fear and the worldly grief being gradually replaced by the 
godly fear and grief, and thus the unhealthy and unnatural inner states move to their healthy and 
natural ones. Evagrius associates the symbol of the viper to depression: ‗When used in 
moderation for man‘s good, its poison is an antidote against that of other venomous creatures, but 
when taken in excess it kills whoever takes it‘.
986
 On one hand, he uses it to explain the 
underlying realities of dejection which as showed above may be produced by all passions and as 
such curing depression would mean fighting against these various passions first, i.e. to cut off its 
numerous causes, and on the other hand it shows that excess of dejection leads to despondency
987
 









 and finally death, while on the way to existence fear is replaced 
by courage and faith, dejection by spiritual joy, and listlessness once faced develops into 
patience and strength acquired through long endurance.
991
 If in anxiety we deal with a kind of 
inactivity due to lack of assurance and faith, depression emerges from an activism which 
temporally helps surpass the blocking anxiety, but an activism conducted in a wrong direction 
due to a misplacement of trust and assurance. Before the onset of depression one might have 
strived hard, wholeheartedly and have exhausted all his inner resources to fight against his deep 
fears of worthlessness and emptiness on one hand, and having proved himself worthy of being 
loved by others on the other hand. The misplacement of trust comes from expecting from others 
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what they could never offer, i.e. what the depressive has lost, namely the previously unique and 
personal encounter with God in love.  
 
While fear and dejection seem to be mainly related to the desiring power of the soul, listlessness 
appears as an extension of dejection over the incensive power of the soul, but all three types of 
illness are the consequence of a darkened nous due to the denial of the Logos, whence the 
direction of the soul‘s powers which do not follow their natural course towards existence through 
unification with the One Who Is, but the opposite. That is why the curing process inevitably 
starts with cleaning the nous following the scheme of treatment and the methods described 
within the chapter on anthropology. Reversing the course of the soul‘s three powers on the 
continuum from inexistence to existence, one is expected to transform the worldly sorrow into 
godly sorrow which will naturally join on the way the godly fear emerged from the reverse of the 
unhealthy fear.  
 
The will to love that we mentioned in the end of the previous chapter on anxiety is even more 
evident in the case of depression. If anxiety seems to display a fear to look for love, depression 
appears as a misguided and misdirected look for love. In anxiety the will to love is obstructed 
and annihilated by the various and strong defence mechanisms whereas in depression the will to 
love is present but deviated.  In the Philokalia, the will to love seems to be the force that drives 
one to travel the inner journey from inexistence to existence and fulfil his life by becoming a god 
by grace, since ‗to love is to live for and in the beloved whose life becomes our life. Love leads 
to singleness of being‘.
992
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‘Why can’t I be happy?’ This is the question of a little girl aged seven, having her face bathed in 
tears while looking to her colleagues from the window of my cabinet. They were running and 
playing outside on a marvellous sunny day when the heart of each would sing ‘the song of life’, 
let alone that of a child! It is not a usual occurrence to be absorbed into such a deep depression 
at the age of seven, especially when you are coming from a family which seems happy and 
balanced. This is highly uncommon! At the same time, the child was psychologically healthy, in 
fact one of the healthiest. So, what was this deep heartbreaking suffering about? And more 
important, how does it need to be approached and cure attempted? It is for children like her, and 
all the other ‘children’ from the adults’ souls whom I have met along my professional practice 
and personal life and whom I never ceased to bear in my heart and thoughts, that I own this 
research. For them I aim to assume the risk of venturing myself in ‘academically unknown and 
perhaps dangerous realms’, in search for the method that would allow intervention in cases such 
as this where you need to trespass the border of the ‘psychological method and understanding’ 
and consider the spiritual one, but without confusing it with ‘psychology’.  
 
As a result of the comparative methodology employed by this research the third section of each 
chapter already comprise various conclusions in relation to specific matters treated there. What 
we shall note in this concluding part of the study is a general overview of the research with an 
emphasis on the research question as to the relationship between psychological and spiritual 
illness, a short discussion around values, the ‗labelling‘ they bring and their final impact on the 
human being, and at the end our personal viewpoint as it has emerged from this inquiry into the 
human soul.  
 
 
1. General Considerations 
 
1. Psychological illness due to psychological pain is real, with all its physiological, 
psychological, social and spiritual implications.  
 
2. In line with their own anthropologies, modern psychotherapies‘ conclusions in regard to 
psychological illness do not completely overlap the Philokalic ones, neither the Philokalic 
ones give full coverage to the former. ‗Their positions separate when it comes to 
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clarifying the roots and ways of treating these natural phenomena‘.
993
 The whole 
discussion, concerned with anxiety, depression, habits, thoughts, and so on, supports this 
fact. 
 
3. The more scientific the methods in psychotherapy are, the more they resemble statements 
from the Philokalia. As an example is the discussion around the mechanism of faulty 
learning acquired through a process of classical conditioning in psychology and habits in 
the Philokalia whose mechanism was found to be similar. This is explained by the fact 
that behaviourists derived their conclusions from experiments on animals, but since they 
restricted this research to what the Philokalic writers call the appetitive power of the soul 
which is common to animals, between the two at this level agreement there have been 
found. The difference is in that the Philokalia, while recognizing them, does not see them 
as an end in itself but subordinated to the higher faculties of the soul and serving higher 
purposes. Hence, we have previously mentioned the failure of such methods applied to 
young people in the communist prisons in the attempt to re-educate and transform them 
into the new man.  
 
A second example to mention here is the efficacy of the cognitive approach with its 
emphasis on the need to change the negative, irrational, automatic thoughts which is very 
close and confirmed by the Philokalic perspective that emphasizes the role of the intellect 
and its adjacent thoughts in healing. Again, in the latter the perspective is larger and 
includes the spiritual factor in considering thoughts up to the measure of seeing them as 
evil or demonic thoughts which produce illness and divine thoughts that bring health. The 
way one deals with them is also different, and direct challenge is not always 
recommended but rather transformation and redirection towards the divine and spiritual 
knowledge.  
 
However, while the behavioural and cognitive approaches are credited to be the most 
scientific and having the best curative impact in the current psychotherapeutic field, and 
they also most resemble the areas comprised by the ascetic method, they do present 
‗secondary effects‘. Viewed from a Philokalic perspective, the behavioural methods 
themselves used without spiritual direction might be used against human beings, as 
exemplified above, where the attempt to ‗change‘ the appetitive part of the soul served 
the intention of controlling the noetic one. In the second case, the relapse into the 
negative thinking patterns in depression and anxiety is bound to reappear until their 
causes are uprooted.  
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At a first glance, psychodynamic therapies through the depths of the matters approached 
resemble very much the preoccupations of the inner work undertaken within the 
Philokalia. Still, our inquiry has found them to be closer only in form but at a 
considerable distance in content. From a Philokalic perspective, although focusing on the 
same issues, they failed to interpret correctly what they ‗found‘. Thus, a paradox was 
created: the closer they got, the further they departed by incorrectly interpreting the 
findings. One example would be the unilateral and negative approach towards the 
Freudian repressed unconscious, which through generalization became a natural part of 
the human being. It is seen as problematic only if it becomes conflicting at the interface 
with ego‘s requirements and generates tension. Otherwise, it is seen as a normal part of 
man‘s psychological functioning, since anyone has it. At the same time, the theory does 
not allow for the existence of a healing from the unconscious, as underlined by Dr. Scott 
Peck. While evidence points towards all of us possessing a kind of repressed unconscious 
in different measures, the Philokalic perspective does not seem to provide any kind of 
information as to how the repressed unconscious is a normal and natural companion of 
the human being but instead sees it as a result of fallen nature. Peck‘s findings are an 
exception, which indirectly confirms the patristic understanding of the unconscious, 
defined by Larchet as l’inconscient theophile. Other examples would be the position 
concerning the defence mechanisms or the object relations, tackled in the section on 
anxiety. To put it simply, from a Philokalic perspective they failed to see Christ’s image 
from within man‘s soul although by going so in-depth they arrived at His immediate 
proximity.  
 
As argued in the first part concerned with anthropology, the humanist perspective 
drawing on purely theological categories such as free will, freedom to choose, love, 
person, and wholeness behaves as a religion whose proposed end is self-actualization, 
which represents a process of self-deification that naturally opposes the process of Christ-
actualization and deification in Christ proposed by the Philokalia. However, an exception 
is represented by Frankl‘s existential logotherapy which is perhaps the closest point of 
interaction with the Philokalic perspective by directly acknowledging the world of nous, 
and therefore the spiritual constitution of man. The main difference stands again on 
anthropology, and as such there is no connection made between the worlds of nous, 
logotherapy and Logos, although the process of self-transcendence needed in healing is 
acknowledged.  
 
4. Similarities between the two fields stand mainly on empirical facts, while differences on 
the opposed anthropological perspectives, which inevitably involve different values and 
meanings. We suggest that as long as the comparison is kept at the empirical level, it 
might be feasible. At the empirical level the matters observed coincide most of the times, 
the difference consists in the interpretation of what is observed, and this interpretation 
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largely depends on the anthropological framework within which it is done. From a 




The comparative analysis at the descriptive level was found to be similar in most cases, 
while the differences appear in terms of aetiology and curing methods proposed by the 
two paradigms, which point towards a kind of integration by distinction and overcoming 
the psychotherapeutic by the Philokalic ones, due to the extent of the universe of 
discourse involved in their anthropological perspectives.  
 
5. The Philokalic perspective was found to provide the best explanatory concept concerning 
the psychological structure of the soul, which points, at the same time, towards the 
possibility of a total healing. I think the following quote from Saint Gregory Palamas 
bears both a great psychotherapeutic explanation and solution: ‗For the soul is a single 
entity possessing many powers. Thus if one of its powers is vitiated the whole of it is 
denied; for since the soul is single, the evil in one of its powers is communicated to all 
the rest. Now since each of the soul‘s powers produces a different energy, it is possible 
that with diligence one of these energies might be temporally purified; but the power in 
question will not therefore be pure, since it communes with all the rest and so it remains 
impure rather than pure‘.
995
 As Peck noticed, any psychotherapeutic process is aided by 
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6. In addition, the Philokalia‘s perspective on man appears to be more far-reaching by 
embracing the human being in all its facets and by viewing it simultaneously as an 
‗irreducible pneumatic-psycho-physical being, of which both the material and immaterial 
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2. Psychological and Spiritual Illness 
 
Our conclusions on the topic are drawn within the universe of discourse represented by the 
current research, and therefore their generalization is restricted to it. Although the generality of 
the patterns found in depression and anxiety,
998
 as well as those found in the Philokalia might be 
considered to capture general laws of functioning of the human soul. 
 
The implicit question of the research was whether such a separation between psychological 
versus pneumatological/spiritual realms does exit. The answer to this as suggested by research is 
that this is merely a theoretical distinction, meant to emphasize that the noetic power is ‗the eye 
of the soul‘ when if cleaned one may access the divine realities, but is not a factual distinction. 
Saint Gregory Palamas just quoted above emphasized the natural unity of all powers of the soul, 
and in the virtue of this unity, the noetic power naturally communicates its noetic/spiritual 
energy to the others, whose natural position is to let themselves be led and coordinated by the 
nous. Since man has Christ as Archetype, seems that ‗theology‘ is implicit in every 
‗psychological‘ movement as Nellas also points out: ‗God is not an external ―principle‖ on which 
man depends, but truly and in reality his ontological origin and consummation. Having been 
made in the image of God, man has a theological structure. And to be a true man he must at 
every moment exist and live theocentricaly. When he denies God he denies himself and destroys 
himself. When he lives theocentricaly he realizes himself by reaching out into infinity; he attains 




The explicit question of the research was concerned with the specific comparison between 
psychological versus spiritual illness, which was exemplified here through the case studies of 
anxiety and depression. In both cases a great similarity was found in the description and 
definition of these illnesses, and partially in the case of aetiology and treatments. While their 
origin was placed in the appetitive part of the soul by both paradigms, their manifestation 
included also the rational power, hence the focus on thinking patterns. Within its universe of 
discourse, our research clearly suggests that what is described in modern psychotherapy as 
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psychological is described in the Philokalia as pneumatologic/spiritual/noetic and as implying 
categories of good and evil. While comparing the two illnesses between the two paradigms, 
using the method of the best (comprehensive) explanatory concept, we arrived at the conclusion 
that both of them deal with the pneumatological/spiritual categories of good and evil, with the 
latter understood as privation of good and inexistence, and the former with existence. It was also 
suggested that depression and anxiety may be completely overcome when the inner inexistence 
becomes existence, and that this might be accomplished through the process of Christ-
actualization, since what is relates to God defined as He Who Is, in opposition to evil which 
relates to what does not exist.  
 
It was also suggested that the individual will, either in a conscious or unconscious manner is 
essential in maintaining the illness.
1000
 Therefore, in anxiety, the will is wrongly used to block 
awareness, while in depression the will focuses on evil or negative awareness. This finding 
relates strongly with the need to restore responsibility for the illness to the individual, or allow 
empowering as discussed very much in the psychotherapeutic paradigm. The healing comes from 
using the will to do the opposite of what maintains illness and in our discussed cases from 
transforming the worldly sorrow into godly sorrow, and the unnatural fear into godly fear, with 
both finding their end in love. All these strongly suggest that we deal with the same category, 
only that when we emphasize the place of illness, the discussion becomes more psychological, 
while when we emphasize its aetiological and curative aspects, i.e. the redirection of 
functionality according to nature, the discussion becomes more pneumatological, hence 
theological. Still, the phenomena under discussion are one and the same. For practical purposes 
perhaps it is good to keep the distinctions but also to be aware of the overlaps and similarities. 
 
Our findings confirm Peck‘s conclusions as to anxiety and depression being only ‗symptoms‘ 
that point towards a deeper spiritual illness which is its main cause, and even more that they are 
‗manifestations of grace‘
1001
 meant to help us. From this perspective they might be seen as 
playing the role of a fever or headache that announces to us that something is wrong somewhere 
in our body. In the same way, anxiety and depression show that something is not going well in 
our inner being and we should see to it. As in the physical realm, where the most dangerous 
illnesses are those that do not give any signs, the same is here. Also our findings are consistent 
with the statements of Larchet and Vlachos who point towards the same idea of psychogenic 
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illnesses as having spiritual causes,
1002
 and with Littlewood,
1003
 who by employing a different 
comparative methodology, arrives at the same resemblance between what we call a 
psychological or spiritual pattern for illness. Therefore, following the ‗road‘ to psychological 
healing as described above one is found in the same time on the way to deification since ‘every 
movement of the Holy Spirit, who dwells within us, aims at bringing us into a living communion 




In the following points we might entirely agree with Freud: ‗Let me remind you that 
psychotherapy is in no way a modern method of treatment. On the contrary, it is the most ancient 
form of therapy in medicine … There are many ways and means of practising psychotherapy. All 
that lead to recovery are good. I despise none of these methods and would use them all in 
appropriate circumstances.‘
1005
 In addition, we think that without a proper understanding of the 
‘roots’ of illness, it will not be able to collect the ‘fruits’ of health. Perhaps the real shortage of 
the current psychotherapeutic approaches is the lack of the proper anthropological framework in 
which to operate. If adhering to the Philokalic anthropology many of them would find a natural 
place and resemblance. It seems that the huge proliferation of methods and orientations in 
psychotherapy is due to the lack of a unitary anthropological framework as other authors have 
previously suggested.  
 
The findings of the present research openly reactivate the discussion in connection with the 
categories of good/evil, which were considered undesirable to define psychological illness. The 
main argument was that psychological illness is something that happened to the individual, 
hence he is not to be held responsible for it, and therefore it is legitimate to call him ‗sick‘, rather 
than ‗bad‘, since the latter is stigmatizing. Research in the psychotherapeutic field proved both 
assumptions unfounded: first, it was concluded that the responsibility for illness needs to be 
returned to the individual so as to increase chances of cure, and therefore methods of 
empowering individuals enhanced by psychoeducation
1006
 and bibliotherapy were designed to 
bear the task of helping the individual to master his illness; second, research also shows that 
labelling people as ‗sick‘ is more stigmatizing than labelling them as ‗bad‘ because our fear of 
mental illness is even greater than our fear of becoming involved in crime or other immoral 
activities
1007
 and due to the negative impact it has on worsening by maintaining the illness, 
                                                          
1002
 Cf. Larchet, Mental Illness, op. cit., pp. 89-90 
1003
 Cf. Littlewood, op. cit.  
1004
 Spidlik T., The Spirituality of the Christian East: A Systematic Handbook, (Michigan: Cistercian Publications, 
1986), p. 45 
1005
 Freud, S. ‗On Psychotherapy‘ in: SECPWSF, v. 7, (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), pp. 258-59 
1006
 Carey, et al., op. cit., p. 151 
1007
 Cf. Gross,, op. cit., p. 761 
227 
 
‗stigma has been proposed as one of the main burdens of mental illness‘
 1008
 and special solutions 
are searched for in order to reduce it.  
 
While the presence of categories of good and evil cannot be avoided when considering 
psychological illness, as various researches as well as our comparative study throughout 
emphasized, the question that we arrived at is: why is there a tendency as to obscure or even 
exclude them? Why might one be considered ‗objective‘ or ‗scientific‘ on the basis of excluding 
them while it was showed that they are present implicitly or explicitly even in the physical 
realm,
1009
 and that on the other hand, naming things on their real name in clinical psychology is 
what brings healing?
1010
 As a psychologist, I cannot find a proper answer to this question which 
far exceeds the goal of this inquiry. However, it is a question that we feel the need to reflect on if 
what we are truly looking for is to reach the essence of things and find the most suitable ways to 
alleviate our fellow beings‘ distress.  
 
As a means towards concluding, the following quote from Arch. Sophrony, in our opinion a 
recent Philokalic-type writer, seems to synthesize the major lines of our work and findings:  
 
‗In the beginning God creates our spirit as pure potential. What follows does not depend 
altogether on Him. Man is free to disagree, even to resist Him. A situation arises in which 
we ourselves determine our eternal future – always, of course, in relation to Him: without 
Him, we should not exist. And if we seek a hallowed eternity which essentially appertains 
to Him alone, then our every action, all our creative activity, must most certainly proceed 
not separately from Him but together with Him and in Him. Born as pure potential, our 
spirit must go on to actualize our being as hypostasis. We need to grow, and this growth 
is linked with pain and suffering. However strange it may seem, suffering is imperative 
for the preservation of life created from nothing. If animals did not feel hunger, they 
would never make any effort to find food but would simply lie down and die. Similarly, 
acute discomfort compels primitive man to look for nourishment. Then, as he advances 
towards rational cognition, suffering discloses to his contemplative mind both his own 
imperfection and that of the world around him. This forces him to recognize the necessity 
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for a new form of creative effort to perfect life in all its manifestations … For us, 
Christians, Jesus Christ is the measure of all things, divine and human. In Him dwelleth 




Within the universe of discourse described by this research, in some ways, the psychological 
illness seems to be a disclaimer to the will of becoming into being
1012
 and therefore, man treats 
himself as an object. From the Philokalic perspective, healing implies to acknowledge himself as 
a hypostasis and as such, the ‗birth‘ of the psychological being is not a separate phenomenon but 
interconnected with his spiritual ‗birth‘. In the Philokalia, the driving force towards being is the 
will to love which overcomes and encompasses all other types of ‗wills‘. As far as our 
knowledge goes, nowhere is spoken in a nicer, more caring, loving, truthful but non-judgmental 
manner about psychological illness than in the Philokalia, where it is essentially seen as a failure 
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